People v. Estrada

• Decision Date: 20 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. S043210,S043210
• Parties: , 904 P.2d 1197, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8843, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,297 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Conrad ESTRADA et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 586

46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586

11 Cal.4th 568, 904 P.2d 1197, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8843,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,297

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Conrad ESTRADA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S043210.

Supreme Court of California.

Nov. 20, 1995.

Robert E. Boyce, Laura Schaefer, San Diego, Shulman, Shulman & Siegel and Corrine S. Shulman, Hydesville, for Defendants and Appellants.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, William T. Harter, Scott W. Davenport, Kenneth C. Byrne and Emilio E. Varanini IV, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

A defendant convicted of first degree murder with at least one special circumstance found true will be sentenced to either death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Pen.Code, § 190.2; all further statutory references are to this code.) One of these special circumstances is the felony-murder special circumstance under which a murder occurred during the commission or attempted commission, or the immediate flight after commission, of one of eleven specified felonies. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i-xi).) A felony-murder special circumstance is applicable to a defendant who is not the actual killer if the defendant, either with the "intent to kill" (§ 190.2, subd. (c)), or "with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of [one of the eleven enumerated felonies]." (§ 190.2, subd. (d), italics added [hereafter 190.2(d) ].)

We granted review in this case to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal over whether a trial court has a sua sponte duty to define the phrase "reckless indifference to human life" when instructing a jury regarding a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation against a defendant who is not the actual killer. We conclude that because a common understanding of the phrase "reckless indifference to human life" amply conveys the meaning of section 190.2(d), a trial court is not required, in the absence of a request, to further explain the statutory phrase to the jury. The Court of Appeal in this case reached a similar conclusion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Background

Police officers were summoned to the El Monte home of Rudolph Jaime, where they found the house ransacked and Mr. Jaime lying in a pool of blood on the living room floor. The victim was alive but gravely injured from multiple cuts and stab wounds to his chest, neck, and head. He died from his injuries shortly after the officers arrived.

Defendant Michael Siqueros and a codefendant, Conrad Estrada, were present in Jaime's home and were immediately taken into custody. They were jointly charged in a three-count information with first degree murder, robbery, and burglary. Two felony-murder special circumstances were alleged, namely, (1) that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery, and (2) that the murder occurred during the course of a burglary. It was also alleged, as to each count, that defendant and Estrada personally used a weapon in the commission of the offense. Finally, as to defendant only, an allegation was made that he suffered two prior serious felony convictions.

Defendant and Estrada were tried jointly before a jury. At trial, evidence was introduced that defendant was not the actual killer. In light of this evidence, when instructing the jury on the two felony-murder special-circumstance allegations, the trial court gave the portion of CALJIC No. 8.80.1 that tracks the language of section 190.2, subdivisions (c) and (d), pertaining to accomplice liability. The jury was charged as follows: "If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, you cannot find the special circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder in the first degree, or with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted in the commission of the crime of Penal Code section 190, subdivision (a), subdivision (17), which resulted in the death of a human being, namely, Rudolph Jaime." (Italics added.) The trial court gave no further instructions defining "reckless indifference to human life."

Following deliberations, the jury found both defendants guilty of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary. The jury also found true, as to each defendant, the special circumstance allegations that the murder of Jaime was committed while defendants were engaged in the robbery and burglary of the victim's home. Consistent with the prosecution's version of the evidence, the jury found true the allegations that Estrada personally used a knife during the commission of each offense, but found the same allegations not true as to defendant.

Both defendants were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, with consecutive midterm sentences for the robbery and burglary convictions stayed pursuant to section 654. In addition, the court imposed on defendant a restitution fine of $5,000, and a consecutive sentence of 10 years, having found true the allegation that defendant suffered 2 prior serious felony convictions.

Defendant and Estrada jointly appealed their convictions and sentences on numerous grounds. Rejecting all contentions, the Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgments.

In the portion of its opinion relevant to the issue presented here, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court had no sua sponte duty to define the phrase "reckless indifference to human life." Noting that defendant failed to request an explanatory instruction, the court found no trial court error. In so holding, the court expressly disagreed with the conclusion reached in People v. Purcell (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 65, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 (hereafter Purcell ).

We granted defendant's petition for review in order to resolve this conflict in the decisions of the Courts of Appeal.

Discussion

In a criminal case, a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on " ' " 'the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.' " ' " (People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 503, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803.) The "general principles of law governing the case" are those principles connected with the evidence and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. (Ibid.; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) As to pertinent matters falling outside the definition of a "general principle of law governing the case," it is "defendant's obligation to request any clarifying or amplifying instruction." (People v. Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 503, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803.)

As we explained in People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082, "[t]he language of a statute defining a crime or defense is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction, and is ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails to request amplification. If the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance, the court need do no more than instruct in statutory language." (Id. at p. 327, 246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082; see also People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, 138, 95 Cal.Rptr. 601, 486 P.2d 129; People v. Page (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 569, 577, 163 Cal.Rptr. 839.)

The rule to be applied in determining whether the meaning of a statute is adequately conveyed by its express terms is well established. When a word or phrase " 'is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request.' " (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 270-271, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897, citing People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217; see also People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 408, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1314-1315, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221; People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639, 51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366.) A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning. (See, e.g., People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 901, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712 [no legal definition of "sadistic purpose" ].) Thus, as the court in People v. Richie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1347, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 explains, terms are held to require clarification by the trial court when their statutory definition differs from the meaning that might be ascribed to the same terms in common parlance. (Id. at p. 1360, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 200.)

The jury in this case was instructed in the language of section 190.2(d). This provision was added to existing capital sentencing law in 1990 as a result of the passage of the initiative measure Proposition 115, which, in relevant part, eliminated the former, judicially imposed requirement that a jury find intent to kill in order to sustain a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation against a defendant who was not the actual killer. (Purcell, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 72, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 242.) Now, pursuant to section 190.2(d), in the absence of a showing of intent to kill, an accomplice to the underlying felony who is not the actual killer, but is found to have acted with "reckless indifference to human life...