People v. Evans

• Decision Date: 18 July 1991
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher R. EVANS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 508

572 N.Y.S.2d 508

175 A.D.2d 456

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher R. EVANS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

July 18, 1991.

Feit & Schlenker (Ellen C. Brotman, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

Paul Czajka, Dist. Atty. (Marlene O. Tuczinski, of counsel), Hudson, for respondent.

Before CASEY, J.P., and YESAWICH, MERCURE, CREW and HARVEY, JJ.

CASEY, Justice Presiding.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Zittell, J.), rendered June 14, 1990, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree.

The underlying facts reveal that at approximately 12:50 A.M. on March 14, 1989, defendant's vehicle was observed by the State Troopers on routine patrol in the "overlook area" of the Taconic State Parkway in the Town of Gallatin, Columbia County. The area was deserted except for defendant's vehicle which was parked backed against the easterly curb edging a wooded area. From the passenger's seat of the patrol car, Trooper Kimberly Adriance observed that defendant's vehicle contained two persons, had no front license plate, no windshield stickers, and its rear window had been broken out. The vehicle was not running and had no lights. This rest area had no bathroom facilities, buildings or lights, other than the illumination provided by the headlights of the patrol car. Trooper Michael Martel, the driver of the marked patrol car, drove it in front of and perpendicular to the parked car and stopped, leaving the lights of the police vehicle on.

Considering all of these circumstances, we do not consider that the actions of the State Troopers were a "stop" that had to be supported by reasonable suspicion. The mere approach by police to an occupied parked vehicle, especially one situated as was defendant's, in order to inquire is a minimal intrusion (see, People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470, 475, 457 N.Y.S.2d 199, 443 N.E.2d 447), which is not the equivalent of a "stop" (see, People v. Heston, 152 A.D.2d 999, 543 N.Y.S.2d 803, lv. denied 76 N.Y.2d 940, 563 N.Y.S.2d 69, 564 N.E.2d 679). The Troopers here had an objective, credible reason to approach and check out the vehicle by inquiry, irrespective of whether they had any indication of criminal activity (see, People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562). The Troopers subsequent conduct was justified. Their flashlight shining through defendant's car window revealed a tweezer-size gold spoon located on top of a clear plastic bag of a white substance on the hump in the center of the floor of the front seat between the driver and passenger seats. When asked what the bag contained, defendant answered "popcorn and soda" and pulled out another bag. When told by the Trooper that this was not the bag that he referred to, defendant did not answer.

In order to confiscate the material that was observed, defendant was ordered out of his vehicle. The substances that were seized were later identified as 10.19 grams of cocaine and heroin. The passenger in defendant's car was a young woman who told the Troopers that the seized items belonged to defendant. Later, at the State Police barracks, defendant stated that the passenger was not involved with the items taken.

After the...