People v. Evans
| Decision Date | 09 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4-14-0672,4-14-0672 |
| Citation | 2017 IL App (4th) 140672,73 N.E.3d 139 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles EVANS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jacqueline L. Bullard and Mariah K. Shaver (argued), of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
David J. Robinson and John M. Zimmerman (argued), of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of Springfield, for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, Charles Evans, appeals his conviction, arguing the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. On appeal, defendant argues he was unlawfully stopped by law enforcement and subjected to an unconstitutional search and the trial court erred by not suppressing the fruits of the search. We affirm.
¶ 3 In April 2014, a jury convicted defendant of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2012)) and possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 2012)). In July 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 months of probation. On appeal, defendant only challenges the trial court's denial of his "motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence." We limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the motion.
¶ 4 At approximately 1:54 a.m. on July 27, 2013, defendant was walking in the 300 block of Porter Street in Danville, Illinois. Officer Kyle Harrold of the Danville police department was dispatched to a possible burglary at 314 Porter Street. Officer Harrold was the first to arrive on the scene and noticed defendant walking down the street. Seeing defendant, Officer Harrold turned his squad car around, parked, and exited the vehicle. Officer Harrold approached defendant and asked whether defendant had seen anyone running in the area. Defendant denied seeing anything and stated he just left a friend's house down the block. Officer Harrold knew defendant's friend and knew the friend trafficked narcotics out of his house. During the course of this conversation, defendant placed his hands in the pockets of his shorts. Officer Harrold asked defendant to remove his hands, which defendant did, but defendant immediately placed his hands back in his pockets. Officer Harrold again asked defendant to remove his hands from his pockets, and defendant complied but placed his hands back in his pockets. This cycle occurred several times throughout the remainder of the conversation, and defendant ultimately asked officer Harrold why he needed to remove his hands from his pockets. At that point, officer Harrold informed defendant he was going to pat defendant down for weapons, and officer Harrold conducted a frisk.
¶ 5 During the frisk, officer Harrold felt what he knew to be a smoking pipe in one of defendant's pockets. Officer Harrold knew the object was a smoking pipe because of his experience with the Vermilion County metropolitan enforcement group, which is responsible for investigating narcotics crimes. Officer Harrold placed defendant in handcuffs at that point and told defendant he was under arrest for the drug paraphernalia in his pocket. Officer Harrold then removed the smoking pipe from defendant's pocket and began to reach into defendant's other pocket, at which point defendant began struggling in an attempt to prevent officer Harrold from searching the other pocket. Officer Harrold radioed for backup, and the struggle continued until officer Jon Stonewall arrived. The two officers were then able to subdue defendant and search his pocket. The search revealed a small Baggie containing a hard, rock-like substance. Officer Harrold field tested the substance and concluded it was cocaine. A state chemist later confirmed the substance was cocaine.
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.
¶ 6 Defendant filed a pretrial "motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence." The motion alleged officer Harrold lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and therefore did not have a right to search defendant. Defendant argued the evidence obtained from the search should be suppressed.
¶ 7 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, officer Harrold testified he approached defendant for the purpose of determining whether he was involved in the burglary or saw any possible suspects or other suspicious activity. Officer Harrold asked where defendant was coming from, to which defendant responded he just left his friend's house down the block. During the conversation, defendant placed his hands in his pockets, and officer Harrold asked him to remove them several times. When asked, defendant would remove his hands and then place them back into his pockets. Officer Harrold testified he was concerned for his safety because he was alone with defendant and defendant was much larger than he was. Officer Harrold testified he did not know whether defendant was armed, but his concern grew after defendant refused to keep his hands visible during the conversation. Officer Harrold testified he knew the area was a high-narcotics-crime area, and in his experience, those involved with narcotics were often armed with a firearm. Officer Harrold specifically testified the reason he frisked defendant was to determine whether defendant had a weapon in his pocket.
¶ 8 The trial court concluded the search was a permissible Terry frisk because a "reasonably prudent person when [f]aced with these circumstances could have believed his safety was in danger." See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The court stated the following factors supported Officer Harrold's reasonable belief his safety was in danger: (1) the late hour, (2) the size difference, (3) defendant's refusal to keep his hands visible, (4) the character of the neighborhood, (5) the fact officer Harrold was alone and responding to a possible burglary, and (6) officer Harrold's subjective concern for his safety. The court specifically found the initial encounter was consensual and defendant was not a burglary suspect at the time officer Harrold approached him. Rather, officer Harrold was merely attempting to gather information relating to the possible burglary in the area. The court denied defendant's motion.
¶ 9 The case proceeded to trial, and defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced to 30 months of probation. This appeal followed.
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his "motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence." Defendant asserts his constitutional rights were violated because he was unlawfully searched and, therefore, the items seized during the search should have been suppressed.
¶ 13 At the outset, we must comment on defendant's pretrial "motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence."
People v. Winchester , 2016 IL App (4th) 140781, ¶ 22, 408 Ill.Dec. 809, 66 N.E.3d 601 (). Since deciding Hansen , we have repeatedly reiterated the impropriety of titling motions to suppress evidence as "motions to quash arrest" and indicated defense counsel should cease filing such motions. Id. ¶¶ 24-27 (). Noting the lack of success in our effort to make this message clear, we recently called upon trial courts to sua sponte reject such motions and "give the counsel who filed the inappropriate motion the opportunity to file a proper motion to suppress under section 114-12 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Procedure Code) (725 ILCS 5/114-12 (West 2014) ) ]." Id. ¶ 30. We disapprove of filing meaningless motions to "quash arrest" when the goal is to suppress evidence, and we again call upon trial courts to sua sponte reject such motions on their face.
¶ 15 People v. Chambers , 2016 IL 117911, ¶ 76, 399 Ill.Dec. 863, 47 N.E.3d 545. On a motion to suppress, defendant carries the burden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful. People v. Price , 2011 IL App (4th) 110272, ¶ 17, 357 Ill.Dec. 134, 962 N.E.2d 1035. Id.
¶ 17 The United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. We interpret article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 in lockstep with the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution for search and seizure purposes. People v. Fitzpatrick , 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 15, 369 Ill.Dec. 527, 986 N.E.2d 1163. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness * * * is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree...
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