People v. Fitzpatrick

• Decision Date: 04 April 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 113449.
• Citation: 2013 IL 113449,986 N.E.2d 1163,369 Ill.Dec. 527
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lewis C. FITZPATRICK, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2013 IL 113449

986 N.E.2d 1163

369 Ill.Dec. 527

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Lewis C. FITZPATRICK, Appellant.

Docket No. 113449.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 4, 2013.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Barbara R. Paschen, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael J. Waller, State's Attorney, of Waukegan (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Drew Meyer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[369 Ill.Dec. 528]¶ 1 At issue is whether the circuit court of Lake County erred in denying defendant'smotion to suppress evidence, where the evidence was obtained pursuant to a search incident to an arrest for a petty offense. We hold that the trial court did not err, because defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the arrest violated his rights under the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State charged defendant, Lewis C. Fitzpatrick, with possessing fewer than 15 grams of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence that was discovered during a search of his person after he was arrested for a petty offense. Defendant alleged that subjecting him to an arrest for a petty offense violated his rights under the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of our state constitution.

¶ 4 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Paul Kehrli of the Zion police department testified that in July 2009, he observed defendant and a companion walking down the middle of 28th Street. Walking in the middle of the street is a violation of section 11–1007 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11–1007 (West 2010)), and it is classified as a petty offense (625 ILCS 5/11–202 (West 2010)). Kehrli also testified that defendant's conduct violated a municipal ordinance. Kehrli testified that he had no specific belief that defendant was armed, and defendant was not doing anything threatening at the time. Kehrli conducted a brief pat-down search for weapons and then placed defendant under arrest. As part of routine procedure when someone is placed under arrest, defendant was searched for contraband at the police station. The police discovered cocaine in defendant's sock.

¶ 5 The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court found that People v. Taylor, 388 Ill.App.3d 169, 327 Ill.Dec. 630, 902 N.E.2d 751 (2009), is the controlling law in the Second District. In Taylor, the court held that, pursuant to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001), an arrest for a minor fine-only offense does not violate the fourth amendment. And, because this court has construed the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in limited lockstep with the fourth amendment ( People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26 (2006)), such an arrest does not violate the Illinois Constitution either. Taylor, 388 Ill.App.3d at 176, 327 Ill.Dec. 630, 902 N.E.2d 751.

¶ 6 Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed. 2011 IL App (2d) 100463, 355 Ill.Dec. 827, 960 N.E.2d 709. That court acknowledged that it had, in an earlier decision, held that this court had implicitly rejected Atwater.Id. ¶ 4 (discussing People v. Moorman, 369 Ill.App.3d 187, 307 Ill.Dec. 428, 859 N.E.2d 1105 (2006)). However, the Second District later disavowed Moorman in Taylor and concluded that this court had not implicitly rejected Atwater. See Taylor, 388 Ill.App.3d at 176–78, 327 Ill.Dec. 630, 902 N.E.2d 751. In the present case, the Second District continued to follow Taylor. The court explained that Illinois follows a “limited lockstep” approach and that none of the narrow exceptions for departing from lockstep were present in this case. 2011 IL App (2d) 100463, ¶¶ 8–12, 355 Ill.Dec. 827, 960 N.E.2d 709. Accordingly, the court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress.

¶ 7 The court agreed with defendant that he should have been granted a hearing on his ability to pay a public defender fee before such a fee was imposed, and the court remanded for such a hearing. The court rejected defendant's argument that such a remand was improper because more than 90 days had passed since the entry of final judgment. Id. ¶ 13.

¶ 8 We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart; and (2) that the appellate court erred in remanding the cause for a hearing on defendant's ability to pay a public defender fee, as more than 90 days had passed since the entry of final judgment.

¶ 11 Motion to Suppress

¶ 12 Defendant's first argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because an arrest for a petty offense is unreasonable under the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant concedes that the issue was settled for fourth amendment purposes by Atwater. However, defendant argues that this court should hold that our state constitution provides greater protection than the fourth amendment and prohibits full custodial arrests for petty offenses. Defendant acknowledges this court's limited lockstep doctrine set forth in Caballes, but argues that this situation falls within the exceptions set forth in Caballes. The State disagrees with defendant, and contends that none of the exceptions set forth in Caballes apply to this situation. This is solely a question of law, and thus our review proceeds de novo. People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 19, 357 Ill.Dec. 1, 962 N.E.2d 902.

¶ 13 In Atwater, the defendant was arrested for failing to wear a seat belt. Under Texas law, this was a misdemeanor offense, punishable by a fine of between $25 and $50. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323–24, 121 S.Ct. 1536. The police took the defendant to the police station in handcuffs, took her mug shot, and then booked her into jail. Id. at 324, 121 S.Ct. 1536. The defendant brought a section 1983 suit (42 U.S.C. § 1983), alleging that the police and the City of Lago Vista had violated her fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 1536.

¶ 14 The case reached the Supreme Court, where the Court held that the arrest did not violate the fourth amendment. The Court framed the question before it as whether the fourth amendment placed any restrictions on a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses. Id. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 1536. The Court ultimately concluded that, “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Id. at 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536.

¶ 15 In Caballes, this court held that it applies a “limited lockstep” approach to analyzing cognate provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and the United States Constitution. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 309–10, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26. Under this approach, we will construe our constitution as providing greater protection than its federal counterpart when the following criteria are met:

“ ‘We must find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they are patterned.’ ” Id. at 310, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26 (quoting People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226, 245, 82 Ill.Dec. 613, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984)).

As this court noted in Caballes, this court has done this analysis for purposes of article I, section 6, of our state constitution, and determined that the framers intended for it to have the same scope as the fourth amendment. Id. at 296–97, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26 (quoting Tisler, 103 Ill.2d at 241–42, 82 Ill.Dec. 613, 469 N.E.2d 147). We reaffirmed our commitment to this approach in Caballes( id. at 313–14, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26), so the lockstep question is generally settled for search and seizure purposes.

¶ 16 Caballes did note, however, that our limited lockstep approach would allow for consideration of “state tradition and values as reflected by long-standing state case precedent.” Id. at 314, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26. Thus, in People v. Washington, 171 Ill.2d 475, 216 Ill.Dec. 773, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (1996), we held that a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence could be raised in a postconviction proceeding, despite the holding in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), that such a claim was not cognizable as a violation of due process in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. We relied in part on this court's previous willingness to look to this state's historical approach to due process questions. Id. at 485–88, 216 Ill.Dec. 773, 665 N.E.2d 1330. Similarly, in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill.2d 60, 221 Ill.Dec. 409, 675 N.E.2d 604 (1996), this court held that it would not follow Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), which recognized a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when a search was conducted pursuant to a statute later held unconstitutional. Krueger was based on this state's history of applying the exclusionary rule under the state constitution and also a long-standing state tradition of excluding evidence obtained under...