People v. Fappiano

• Decision Date: 10 February 1987
• Citation: 512 N.Y.S.2d 301,134 Misc.2d 693
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Scott FAPPIANO, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 301

512 N.Y.S.2d 301

134 Misc.2d 693

PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Scott FAPPIANO, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Kings County.

Feb. 10, 1987.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Kings County (Darrell Fields, of counsel), for the People.

Gino Josh Singer, New York City, for defendant.

JULIUS VINIK, Justice.

Defendant moves to vacate his judgment of conviction on the grounds that the prosecutor did not inform him that the complaining witness was an alcoholic at the time of the alleged crimes and that she received treatment from a Police Department psychologist soon thereafter (CPL § 440.10and ).

Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law, § 140.30) and various sex crimes in August of 1985 and subsequently sentenced. ¹ The evidence at trial established that early one morning, a man entered the home of the victim, Theresa Scotti, and her husband, Frank Scotti, a police officer. This man tied up Frank Scotti and repeatedly raped, sodomized and sexually abused his wife. At the trial, Mrs. Scotti identified defendant as the perpetrator and recounted her ordeal; Mr. Scotti was unable to identify the defendant.

Defendant bases his allegations on information divulged by Mr. Scotti at the latter's plea allocution in July of 1986 on an unrelated matter. At this allocution, Mr. Scotti made reference to his wife's drinking problem, which required institutionalization, and alluded to her treatment by a Police Department psychologist. From these statements, defendant asserts, in conclusory fashion, that Mrs. Scotti was an alcoholic for some time prior to the commission of the crimes of which defendant was convicted, and that this condition lasted at least until the conclusion of the trial. ² Defendant has not supplied any further information to support these allegations.

CPL 440.10(1)(h)

BRANCH OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION

It is well established that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment ..." (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, at p. 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; accord, People v. Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 131-132, 365 N.Y.S.2d 812, 325 N.E.2d 139). Three factors to consider in determining whether a Brady violation has occurred are: suppression by the prosecutor; the evidence's favorable character to the defense; and the materiality of the evidence (Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, at pp. 794-795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, at pp. 2567-2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 reh. den. 409 U.S. 897, 93 S.Ct. 87, 34 L.Ed.2d 155).

(A) Suppression

There must be suppression by the prosecutor, since Brady is inapplicable to evidence not in the prosecutor's possession (United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1125, (6th Cir.) cert. den., --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1183, 89 L.Ed.2d 300; United States v. Escobar, 674 F.2d 469, 479 (5th Cir.)). Where, as here, the prosecutor did not actually possess the alleged psychological file, it must be shown that possession can Imputation rests on the theory that although the prosecutor may not be in actual possession of certain material, access--justifies charging him with its constructive possession (People v. Price, 100 Misc.2d 372, 382, 419 N.Y.S.2d 415); thus, knowledge possessed by all members of the prosecutor's office will be imputed to the prosecutor(s) actually handling the case (Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104). Moreover, knowledge by police personnel, who have investigated a particular case, will be imputed to the prosecution (United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir.); Smith v. State, 492 So.2d 260 ). Indeed, the Police Department may have an independent Brady obligation itself (People v. Springer, 122 A.D.2d 87, 504 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234; People v. Russo, 109 A.D.2d 855, 856, 486 N.Y.S.2d 769).

be imputed to the prosecution; that is, that the prosecution constructively possessed the file.

However, there can be no imputation to the prosecution of privileged material, since the prosecution lacks control over such material (People v. Mayers, 100 A.D.2d 558, 559, 473 N.Y.S.2d 263). ³ Since defendant concedes that the alleged psychological file is privileged, there has been no "suppression" by the prosecution and no dereliction of its Brady obligation. ⁴ Similarly, the Police Department has not disregarded its Brady duty, if such a duty exists at all, since the privileged nature of the alleged file prevents the Police Department from exercising control over it.

Defendant next contends that the information possessed by Mr. Scotti regarding his wife's condition, including institutionalization, must be imputed to the prosecution, since Mr. Scotti is a police officer.

This contention is without merit. Defendant has not established that as a police officer, Mr. Scotti acquired knowledge of his wife's condition through his participation in this investigation (United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555 (2nd Cir.); cf. Pina v. Henderson, 752 F.2d 47, 49 (2nd Cir.) ). Mr. Scotti gained knowledge of his wife's condition, if at all, in his capacity as a husband and not as a police officer, and on this basis his knowledge cannot be imputed to the prosecution (People v. Bracy and DePasquale, 98 Misc.2d 346, 351, 413 N.Y.S.2d 969, affd. 75 A.D.2d 751, 427 N.Y.S.2d 893, affd. 54 N.Y.2d 693, 442 N.Y.S.2d 973, 426 N.E.2d 467). Indeed, defendant has not adduced any facts showing that Mr. Scotti even possesses any relevant information, save the equivocal plea allocution minutes. Moreover, assuming defendant can make this showing, he has not addressed the issue of whether the marital privilege (CPLR 4502) prohibits revelation of such information.

Therefore, the knowledge acquired by Mr. Scotti pertaining to his wife's alleged alcoholic condition cannot be charged to the prosecution.

(B) Evidence's Favorable Character to the Defense

The evidence must be favorable to the defense. However, this is not limited to Evidence of chronic alcoholism, standing alone, is inadmissible to impeach a witness's character (McCormick, Evidence § 45 (Cleary ) or to allow a jury to infer that the witness was intoxicated at a particular time (Tinney v. Neilson's Flowers, Inc., 61 Misc.2d 717, 718, 305 N.Y.S.2d 713, affd. 35 A.D.2d 532, 314 N.Y.S.2d 161; Miller v. City of New York, 286 App.Div. 1033, 145 N.Y.S.2d 295, mot. for lv. to app. den., 1 N.Y.2d 643, 134 N.E.2d 210). Moreover, evidence of intoxication on prior occasions is generally inadmissible to allow an inference that the witness was intoxicated at the time of the viewing of the events (People v. Holliday, 38 N.Y.2d 763, 765, 381 N.Y.S.2d 53, 343 N.E.2d 770; DelToro v. Carroll, 33 A.D.2d 160, 164, 306 N.Y.S.2d 95; McQuage v. City of New York, 285 App.Div. 249, 253-254, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111; see also, 8 A.L.R.3d 749). ⁵

evidence pertaining solely to defendant's guilt; indeed, in appropriate cases, impeaching evidence may fall within the ambit of the Brady doctrine (Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766; 31 L.Ed.2d 104 supra; People v. Cwikla, 46 N.Y.2d 434, 441, 414 N.Y.S.2d 102, 386 N.E.2d 1070).

However, where the evidence demonstrates that the condition of alcoholism causes the witness some degree of mental impairment, such as hallucinating or "blacking out," and the evidence shows he was drinking near the time of the event, evidence of alcoholism may be probative of the witness's sensory capacity (People v. DiMaso, 100 Ill.App.3d 338, 55 Ill.Dec. 647, 426 N.E.2d 972; State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158 see also, People v. Walker, 116 A.D.2d 948, 951, 498 N.Y.S.2d 521).

Defendant has not shown other than mere speculation, the nature of the evidence relating to Mrs. Scotti's alleged alcoholism. The admissibility of such evidence is, as noted above, contingent upon the existence of several factors, none of which defendant has satisfactorily demonstrated. In this case, defendant requests that we infer, from the allegation that Mrs. Scotti was an alcoholic, that she was intoxicated either at the time of the crimes or at trial. As previously stated, this logical leap cannot be made legally.

This court finds that defendant has failed to prove that the alleged suppressed evidence is favorable to the defense.

(C) Materiality of the Evidence

Defendant must show that the withheld evidence is material. Evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494).

Since the alleged...