People v. Farias

Decision Date30 July 2019
Docket NumberH042301
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANKLIN ALAN FARIAS, Defendant and Appellant.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1486106)

Defendant Franklin Alan Farias was convicted of multiple drug offenses based on incriminating text messages on his cell phone and drugs and indicia of drug sales found in several containers in his garage. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone and in the containers. As we will explain, we conclude that (1) a final, published California Court of Appeal decision is binding precedent for purposes of the good-faith reliance exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule; and (2) in the case of a warrantless search of a closed container in a shared residence based on the consent of one occupant, the consenting party must have, or appear to have, a right to access the container. Although we find no error in the denial of defendant's motion as to the evidence found on his cell phone, the evidence found in certain containers in the garage should have been suppressed. We will therefore reverse the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

We take the underlying facts from the evidence presented at the preliminary examination. Detective Tim Ferrara of the Fremont Police Department and a team of several other police officers were conducting surveillance of defendant's home in San Jose, after a confidential informant reported drugs were being sold there. They observed defendant drive around the neighborhood and engage people in several exchanges that the officers suspected were drug transactions. After the last such exchange, Detective Andrew Holt stopped defendant's car a few blocks away from his home. As he spoke with defendant through the driver's side window, Detective Holt saw $40-$60 in cash, two cell phones, and a pill bottle with a loosely attached prescription label, all of which he believed to be consistent with the sale of illegal drugs.

Detective Holt ordered defendant out of the car, searched him, and found over $2,000 cash in his pocket. A search of the car then revealed a bottle of hydrocodone pills and a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. Defendant was placed under arrest. Detective Holt examined one of the two cell phones found in the car and read a text message conversation that appeared on the screen. The text messages discussed a meeting to exchange drugs for a videogame console.

After defendant was arrested, Detective Holt asked him for permission to search his home. Defendant refused. Detective Ferrara and two other officers then returned to defendant's house and encountered his wife outside. Detective Ferrara knew from a previous records search that both she and defendant lived in the house, and he asked her for consent to search the premises. Defendant's wife told Detective Ferrara that the officers were "free to search anywhere" in the house. She also signed a consent form authorizing law enforcement to search the premises and take "any letters, papers, materials or other property which they may desire." She then directed the officers to the garage, describing it as the place where defendant spent most of his time and where he often did things that were illegal. She pointed out specific locations in the garage where she believed defendant kept "illegal contraband." Following her direction, Detective Ferrara looked underneath a shelf on a garage worktable and found a red plastic toolbox and a green metal box designed to store ammunition. Inside the metal ammunition box,he found large quantities of various pills (opiates, tranquilizers, and Methadone). Inside the toolbox was a plastic bag containing methamphetamine. Detective Ferrara also looked inside a wooden cigar box, a fender compartment on defendant's motorcycle, and a glass jar in a cabinet. In the cigar box he found plastic bags commonly used for drug packaging. The glass jar contained marijuana, and the fender compartment contained opiate tablets. On a shelf in the garage, officers found a digital scale, as well as a list of handwritten names and numbers that appeared to reflect dollar amounts.

Defendant was charged by complaint with transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count one); four counts of possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; counts two through five); one count of possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count six); two counts of possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(1); counts seven and eight); maintaining a place for unlawful activities involving controlled substances (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366; count nine); and violating a protective order (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a); count ten).1

At the preliminary examination, defendant moved to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 on the ground that the warrantless search of his cellular phone and garage violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant's wife had authority to consent to a search of the entire residence and therefore the seizure of the items in the garage was valid. The court also found that the search of the cellular phone was lawful under the law as it existed at the time of the search.2

Defendant pleaded no contest to counts one through eight, and to count ten. He was sentenced to five years eight months to be served in county jail (two years in custody, followed by mandatory supervision for the remainder of the term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)).

II. DISCUSSION

Under Penal Code section 1538.5, a defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement from a warrantless search that is unreasonable. We apply Federal constitutional standards to determine the reasonableness of a search. (People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916.) "A warrantless search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the few narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a warrant." (Ibid.) The burden is on the prosecution to show based on competent evidence that a warrantless search was lawful. (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 733.)

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's express and implied factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) We then exercise our independent judgment in determining whether the facts as found by the trial court satisfy the prosecution's burden to show a warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Glaser, supra, at p. 362.)

A. EVIDENCE FROM THE CELL PHONE NEED NOT BE SUPPRESSED

Defendant contends the warrantless search of the cell phone found in his car violated the Fourth Amendment according to Riley. In Riley, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exception for searches incident to arrest does not encompass warrantless searches of modern cell phones. (Riley, supra, 573 U.S. 373 at p. 386.) The Attorney General does not dispute that Riley now renders the search of defendant's cell phone unconstitutional. But Riley was decided shortly after the search in this case occurred. Accordingly, the Attorney General argues that the evidence found onthe cell phone is admissible—the constitutional violation notwithstanding—because pre-Riley appellate precedent allowed the search of a cell phone incident to arrest and therefore the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 231-232.) The rule does not apply when law enforcement conducts a search "in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent," even if later appellate authority deems the type of search unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 232.) The rationale for this good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is that no deterrent effect is gained by excluding evidence obtained by law enforcement agents who acted with a good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful. (Id. at p. 238.)

At the time defendant's cell phone was searched, California Supreme Court precedent provided that a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84 (Diaz) [overruled by Riley, supra, 573 U.S. 373 at p. 386].) Defendant argues that Diaz does not provide a basis for the good-faith exception to apply here, because Diaz involved the search of a cell phone found on the arrestee's person, while the cell phone searched in this case was found in a vehicle. However, in People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531 (Nottoli), this court rejected that very argument, finding "no principled reason to distinguish between a cell phone found on an arrestee's person during a search incident to arrest and a cell phone found in a passenger compartment during a vehicular search incident to arrest." (Id. at p. 558.)

Defendant does not attempt to distinguish Nottoli, since its holding permitting the search of a cell phone found in a vehicle incident to arrest (pre-Riley) is squarely on point here. Rather, he argues that Nottoli does not constitute "binding appellate precedent" for purposes of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because it is...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT