People v. Fenti
| Decision Date | 20 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | XXXXX/XX. |
| Citation | 62 N.Y.S.3d 887,57 Misc.3d 471 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Jaime FENTI, Defendant. |
| Court | New York County Court |
Sandra Doorley, Esq., Monroe County District Attorney, By Daniel Strollo, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, Rochester.
Tim Donaher, Esq., Monroe County Public Defender, By Latoya Lee, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, Rochester.
Defendant is charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2–a][a] ); two counts of driving while intoxicated ( Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192[2] and 1192[3] ); harassment in the second degree ( Penal Law § 240.26[1] ) and resisting arrest ( Penal Law § 205.30 ).
The court granted defendant's request for a probable cause hearing to determine if there was sufficient cause to stop defendant's vehicle and place her under arrest, a Huntley hearing to determine the admissibility of statements police allegedly overheard defendant make to a member of an ambulance crew, and a hearing to determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to a blood test.
The court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On August 5, 2016, defendant Jaime Fenti called 911 requesting assistance because she was unable to start her car. Defendant indicated that she was driving a Volkswagen Jetta and that she was in Ellison Park, but she did not know exactly where in Ellison Park she was located.
At approximately 4:11 p.m., Monroe County Sheriff's Deputy Paolo Saieva received a "check the welfare" dispatch relaying the information defendant provided to 911. Saieva responded to one of the parking lots at Ellison Park and observed a female, later identified as defendant, backing a Volkswagen Jetta out of a parking space. Saieva turned on his lights and parked behind the vehicle as if he were initiating a traffic stop. Saieva approached and asked defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle, if everything was okay. Defendant stated that she was okay. Saieva then asked if she needed a ride or a tow. Defendant told Saieva that she was okay and no longer needed police assistance. Saieva asked to see her license and registration. Defendant indicated she did not have the documents on her or in her vehicle.
During this initial conversation, Saieva detected the odor of alcohol emitting from defendant's breath. He also observed that her eyes were watery, her speech slurred and her clothes disheveled.
Although not directed to do so, defendant turned the vehicle off and got out of her car. She was swaying back and forth and had difficulty standing. Saieva told her that she could not leave until she was cleared by medical personnel as she appeared to be intoxicated and unable to operate the vehicle. Defendant cursed at Saieva and told him to leave her alone.
Defendant entered her vehicle and attempted to close the door while Saieva was standing in the door frame. Defendant put the keys in the ignition and started the vehicle. Saieva reached in and turned the vehicle off. As he was doing so, defendant punched him in the right arm with a closed fist two or three times and threatened to kill him. Saieva told her she was under arrest. Defendant again directed vulgarities at Saieva and attempted to punch him. Saieva repeatedly told her to exit the vehicle. When she refused to comply, he forcibly removed her from the vehicle, placed her in handcuffs and brought her to his patrol vehicle. Defendant continued to fight, kick and use profanity as Saieva placed her in the patrol vehicle.
An ambulance arrived at the scene and a member of the crew treated defendant for minor injuries she sustained during the use of force, including a laceration to her left eye and scrapes to her left knee. Saieva heard a member of the ambulance crew ask defendant if she had consumed any alcohol. Defendant responded that she consumed a bottle of wine before driving to the park. Deputy Chris Cooper, who arrived at the scene shortly after Saieva, administered a breath test which was positive for the presence of alcohol.
Saieva arrested defendant at 4:26 p.m. for harassment and resisting arrest. He later issued tickets for driving while intoxicated. Defendant was also detained under the Mental Hygiene Law due to her high level of intoxication, threats to kill Saieva, and statements that she wanted to die because she was embarrassed that she hit a police officer.
Defendant was transported to Strong Memorial Hospital by ambulance. Hannah Griffiths, a registered nurse, triaged defendant in the Emergency Department. Griffiths observed a small cut on defendant's forehead. Defendant was cooperative with Griffiths and gave coherent answers to all her questions. Saieva asked defendant if she would consent to the taking of a blood sample. Defendant agreed to the blood draw. Griffiths completed a consent form and presented it to defendant for her signature. Defendant signed the consent form granting permission for blood samples to be taken. Griffiths drew the blood samples from defendant at 6:15 p.m.
"In evaluating police conduct, the court must determine whether the action taken was justified in its inception and at every subsequent stage of the encounter" ( People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 [1976] ).
Defendant argues that the police action was not justified at its inception, and consequently, any evidence obtained thereafter should be suppressed. Defendant contends that when the deputy arrived in response to her 911 call, it was apparent that she had been able to start her car and was no longer in need of assistance, and therefore, police were not justified in stopping her vehicle. The court disagrees. When specific and articulable facts exist supporting an officer's reasonable belief that a motorist needs assistance because there is something wrong with the vehicle or an occupant of the vehicle, the community caretaking exception may be applied to justify the stop of the motor vehicle.
It is well settled that the stop of an automobile by police constitutes a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment ( People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 [1995] ; People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760, 609 N.E.2d 113 [1992] ). Police stops of automobiles are permissible where the police have probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation ( People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 8 N.Y.S.3d 237, 30 N.E.3d 880 [2015] ; People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 [2001] ), or where there exists reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime ( Spencer at 752, 753, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 ).1
Here, it is clear that the stop of defendant's vehicle as she backed out of a parking space constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. It is equally clear that at the time of the stop the deputy did not have probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a traffic violation or have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The question presented is whether the stop may be justified as a proper exercise of a police officer's community caretaking function.
The Court of Appeals has long recognized that police officers perform public service functions unrelated to their law enforcement functions. In De Bour, supra, the Court noted that . The Court made clear that the four-tiered approach for evaluating the propriety of police-citizen encounters set forth in De Bour applied to police engaged in their criminal law enforcement function, not their public safety function.
The United States Supreme Court has also distinguished situations where police were acting in their law enforcement capacity from situations where police were acting in their public safety or, as termed by the Court, their "community caretaking" capacity. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) defendant, an out-of-state police officer, was involved in an automobile accident and thereafter arrested for drunken driving. Defendant's damaged vehicle was towed and later searched on the belief that the vehicle may contain defendant's service revolver. The Court upheld the warrantless search of the impounded vehicle because it was undertaken pursuant to the officer's "community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."
Most cases applying the community caretaking exception address situations where police searched, towed, and impounded a vehicle that was disabled or unattended because the operator was arrested.
People v. Tardi, 28 N.Y.3d 1077, 44 N.Y.S.3d 366, 66 N.E.3d 1084 (2016) illustrates application of the community caretaking exception to the impoundment of automobiles. In Tardi, the defendant was arrested for shoplifting in a store in a Buffalo suburb. Police, acting upon the request of security, impounded the vehicle and performed an inventory search of its contents before towing it. A handgun was discovered during the inventory search. The Court upheld the search, holding that the officer's decision to search the vehicle was consistent with the community caretaking function of the police department; "Police acting in a community caretaking capacity may impound an arrestee's vehicle when the vehicle, if left unattended, risks being vandalized or stolen (citations omitted)".
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...who on his own volition exited a vehicle and walked in the direction of the detective.Also instructive is the case of People v. Fenti , 57 Misc. 3d 471, 62 N.Y.S.3d 887 [Penfield Just. Ct. 2017]. In that case, the court held that a police officer conducting a welfare check on a driver was j......
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...are committing, or are about to commit a crime ( Spencer at 752, 753, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 646 N.E.2d 785 )." ( People v. Fenti , 57 Misc 3d 471,475, 62 N.Y.S.3d 887, 890 [Mulley, J, Penfield J. Ct. 2017] ). In this case Sergeant Wilder testified to observing the defendant make two right hand ......
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