People v. Fields (In re Commitment of Fields)

• Decision Date: 28 December 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. 1–11–2191.
• Citation: 367 Ill.Dec. 59,981 N.E.2d 384,2012 IL App (1st) 112191
• Parties: In re COMMITMENT OF Justin FIELDS (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Justin Fields, Respondent–Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 112191

981 N.E.2d 384

367 Ill.Dec. 59

In re COMMITMENT OF Justin FIELDS (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Justin Fields, Respondent–Appellant).

Docket No. 1–11–2191.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Nov. 14, 2012.

Modified upon Denial of Rehearing Dec. 28, 2012.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Lindsay Beyer Payne, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

Law Offices of Chicago-Kent College of Law, of Chicago (Daniel T. Coyne, Matthew M. Daniels, and Elizabeth D. Leeb, of counsel), for appellant.

OPINION

Justice STEELE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[367 Ill.Dec. 61]¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, respondent Justin Fields was found to be a sexually violent person (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2010)).¹ The trial court subsequently entered an order committing respondent to a secure facility for institutional care and treatment. On appeal, respondent argues that: (1) he was denied a fair trial when the prosecution improperly commented about his custodial status and nonparticipation in treatment, as well as improperly argued testimony from the State's expert witnesses as substantive evidence, during its closing argument that shifted the burden of proof and violated orders in limine; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based upon the prosecution's allegedly improper remarks during closing argument; (3) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an SVP under the Act; and (4) he was denied his right to a dispositional hearing under the Act ( 725 ILCS 207/40(b) (West 2010)) before the commitment order was entered. While we reject respondent's challenges to the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument and the sufficiency of the evidence against him, we remand the cause to the trial court to conduct a dispositional hearing allowing respondent to present testimony and evidence for its consideration in framing the commitment order.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 23, 2005, the respondent, then 21 years old, was arrested and charged with approximately 20 counts for various offenses, including aggravated criminal sexual abuse, aggravated kidnapping, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle, in Cook County circuit court case number 05 CR 21674. He subsequently pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse and one count of kidnapping stemming from the events involving a nine-year-old male victim. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC).

¶ 4 Petition for Commitment

¶ 5 Prior to his mandatory supervised release, the State filed a petition on February 14, 2007, for respondent's involuntary commitment under the Act. The petition alleged, among other things, that respondent was an SVP as defined by the Act; that respondent was diagnosed by Barry Leavitt, Psy. D., as having the mental disorder of pedophilia; and that respondent'smental disorder made it substantially probable that he would engage in sexually violent acts. Dr. Leavitt's evaluation was attached to the petition.

¶ 6 On February 15, 2007, the trial court entered an order to have respondent detained in a facility under the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS). On July 25, 2007, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion and order finding probable cause for respondent's commitment under the Act following hearings that commenced on April 17, 2007, and concluded on June 18, 2007. Counsel for the parties filed jury demands on the same date. Further, Lesley Kane, Psy. D., was appointed as the respondent's expert to conduct an assessment and evaluation of the respondent.

¶ 7 Pretrial Proceedings

¶ 8 Prior to trial, the parties engaged in discovery, including depositions and document production, and respondent filed various motions. For the purposes of our discussion, this section highlights motions in limine related to the issues raised on appeal. On August 30, 2010, respondent filed two motions in limine. One motion sought to limit testimony about the respondent's background proffered by the State's witnesses only to show the bases for their opinions and not as substantive evidence in accordance with Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981). Respondent also requested an appropriate instruction for the jury. The second motion sought to preclude any testimony regarding respondent's custodial status, to which the State objected.

¶ 9 On September 17, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on respondent's motions. The trial court granted the motion brought under Wilson, with no objection by the State. The trial court agreed to provide a limiting instruction to the jury before each witness testified and during closing instructions. The trial court also cautioned the State to preface comments during closing arguments that the information was relied upon by the witnesses in forming their opinions. As for the motion regarding respondent's custodial status, the trial court granted the motion in part, admonishing the State not to make “unnecessary or gratuitous” references to respondent's custodial status. In response to the State's request for clarification, the trial court indicated it was acceptable to ask routine questions, such as where an interview with respondent occurred, and noted respondent's custodial status would come up in anticipated discussion regarding disciplinary tickets contained in respondent's master file. Indeed, the trial court expected the term “did” would have to be used relative to respondent's conduct while in custody.

¶ 10 Trial Proceedings

¶ 11 After some continuances, the jury trial was scheduled to begin on March 22, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the jury was selected. Before the trial proceedings began the following day, respondent moved in limine for the trial court to instruct the jury before and after every witness's testimony, as well as prior to deliberations, about the limited purpose of their testimony about respondent's background under Wilson in explaining the bases for their opinions and not as substantive evidence. The State objected to the limiting instruction being read after each witness's testimony. Referring to his notes when the issue was previously raised, the trial judge denied the request and indicated he would issue the limited instruction to the jury before each witness testified and with the closing instructions. The court then proceeded with other preliminary matters, including admonishing the jury about respondent's innocence until proven guilty, the State having the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt its allegations, and the opening statements by the parties were not evidence. The State called Dr. Leavitt as its first witness. Before he testified, the trial judge cautioned the jury, consistent with the order in limine, about the limited purpose of his testimony.

¶ 12 Leavitt Testimony

¶ 13 Dr. Leavitt testified that he was a licensed psychologist in Illinois and had been licensed to practice for approximately 25 years. He had his own clinical and forensic practice that involved general and psychological treatment of juveniles and adults individuals, and specialized forensic assessments of sexually violent persons in Illinois and other jurisdictions and of issues that may be relevant in court. He previously worked for about 25 years with Affiliated Psychologists, a clinical and forensic practice located in Chicago, Illinois, that had a contract with the DOC to conduct screenings. He described his educational background, which included a doctoral degree and a master's degree in clinical psychology. Over the last 25 years, he specialized in the general area of sexual abuse, with the last 15 or more years focusing in the area of evaluation and risk assessments of juvenile and adults who had committed assorted sexual offenses. He noted that the “far majority” of evaluations did not result in SVP referrals. Since 1998, he had conducted nearly 200 evaluations of sex offenders and SVPs. Moreover, he had conducted or overseen approximately several thousand screenings for the DOC's sexually violent persons unit while working at Affiliated Psychologists. Along with membership in various professional organizations, he had been approved by the Illinois Sex Offender Management Board regarding assessment and treatment of adult and juvenile sex offenders. He had testified and been qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology, specifically regarding sex offender evaluations, diagnosis and risk assessments, over 100 times in Illinois courts throughout the state. The State tendered Dr. Leavitt as an expert witness. The trial court qualified him as an expert, with no objection by the respondent.

¶ 14 Dr. Leavitt testified that he was familiar with the general purpose of the Act. He explained the DOC's responsibility related to the Act to screen, evaluate, interview, and identify persons who met the criteria, and report opinions about potentially eligible persons to the Attorney General's office for consideration. In 2007, Affiliated Psychologists had a contract with the DOC to conduct screenings, evaluations, and interviews. He reiterated that about 90% of the individuals screened did not meet the necessary criteria for commitment under the Act (due to no diagnosis and/or no risk), and that less than 5% were referred to the next phase after screening. He conducted a clinical evaluation of the respondent, who was scheduled for release on February 19, 2007, to determine if he was a candidate for commitment under the Act. Respondent agreed to the interview, which lasted approximately 3 1/2 hours, and only the two of them were present. He stated that he followed the standard protocol in...