People v. Figueroa
| Decision Date | 28 September 1961 |
| Citation | 220 N.Y.S.2d 131 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Andre FIGUEROA. |
| Court | New York County Court |
Andre Figueroa, in pro per.
Edward S. Silver, Brooklyn (Wm. I. Siegel, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kings County, Brooklyn), for the People.
The petitioner was convicted by a jury of a violation of Section 1751 of the Penal Law as a felony and sentenced to 3 to 6 years in State Prison (December 4, 1957.)
On the basis of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed .2d 1081, the petitioner contends that he was convicted by the use of unconstitutional evidence. He makes this application in the nature of coram nobis to vacate the judgment.
No appeal was taken. I have only my trial notes. It appears that the police entered petitioner's home and seized contraband. (Other property seized I ordered returned during trial solely on the basis that it was not fruits, instrumentalities or contraband.) The reasonableness of the search would turn on the existence of probable cause to make an arrest in fixed premises. There was no evidence adduced at the trial in that regard. I conclude therefore that the constitutionality of the evidence received cannot be determined from the record.
But I decide the main issue raised by the petitioner.
I hold that it was the intention of the Supreme Court to make the exclusionary rule commanded by Mapp prospective only in operation with respect to criminal proceedings in this State.
Prior to Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1362, 93 L.Ed. 1782, it had never been certain whether the exclusionary rule as applied in the Federal courts was a constitutional command of the Fourth Amendment or a rule of evidence adopted by the Supreme Court in its supervisory capacity over the Federal courts.
Wolf resolved all doubts in that regard. Wolf stated that the exclusionary rule was a constitutional command to the Federal courts.
With respect to the States the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure has been 'absorbed' into the Fourteenth and is therefore a restraint against the States. It thus held that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and is therefore one of the specifics of the Bill of Rights which is enforceable against the States under the Due Process Clause.
But despite the holding that the 'exclusionary rule' was a constitutional command of the Fourth to the Federal courts, the Wolf court refused to hold that it was a command of the Due Process Clause to the States.
After considering other sanctions available to the citizen against State officials violating the right of privacy--criminal prosecution, civil suit for trespass, Federal civil right suits--the Court in Wolf concluded that the 'contrariety of views of the States' on the adoption of the exclusionary rule was 'particularly impressive'; therefore it could not 'brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of such conduct * * * too slight to call for a deterrent remedy * * * by overriding the [States'] relevant rules of evidence'.
As summed up briefly in Mapp, the holding in Wolf with respect to the exclusionary rule was----
'The [Wolf] Court decided that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not then be imposed upon the States as 'an essential ingredient of the right.'' (Italics mine.) [367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1689.]
Thus the decision in Wolf as construed by Mapp was that the Court decided it was not necessary at that time to impose the 'exclusionary rule' upon the States.
To make the holding clearer, between Wolf and Mapp the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1441, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669, in outlawing the 'silver platter' doctrine stated---- .
Mapp itself removes the last vestige of doubt as to the intent of the Supreme Court to impose the rule prospectively and not retroactively----
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United States v. Walker
...in New York have consistently refused to apply Mapp retroactively in post-conviction proceedings. The first such holding was People v. Figueroa, 220 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Kings Cty.Ct. 1961), based on the language in Mapp and criticized in Redlich, "1961 Survey of New York Law — Constitutional Law,......
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...N.E.2d 100.9 People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 227 N.Y.S.2d 421, 182 N.E.2d 99; State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761; People v. Figueroa, Co.Ct., 220 N.Y.S.2d 131; People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 227 N.Y.S.2d 423, 182 N.E.2d 100; Commonwealth ex rel. Wilson v. Rundle, 412 Pa. 109, 194 ......
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...remedy of appeal from the conviction would have afforded no relief. Confronted with a similar fact situation, I held in People v. Figueroa (Co.Ct., 220 N.Y.S.2d 131) decided soon after Mapp, that it was the intention of the Supreme Court to impose the 'exclusionary rule' as a constitutional......