People v. Firth

• Decision Date: 05 December 1957
• Citation: 3 N.Y.2d 472,146 N.E.2d 682,168 N.Y.S.2d 949
• Parties: , 146 N.E.2d 682 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Philip R. FIRTH, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 949

168 N.Y.S.2d 949

3 N.Y.2d 472, 146 N.E.2d 682

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Philip R. FIRTH, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 5, 1957.

Harry L. Rosenthal, Dist. Atty., Rochester (Nicholas P. Varlan, Rochester, of counsel), for appellant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (John R. Davison, Philip J. Fitzgerald and Peter E. Herzog, Albany, of counsel), in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law, Consol.Laws, c. 18.

William L. Clay, Rochester, for respondent.

DESMOND, Judge.

Defendant was convicted and fined $50 after a trial before a Justice of the Peace in Monroe County on an information which charged a violation of subdivision 1 of section 56 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol.Laws, c. 71, which subdivision is in full as follows: '1. No person shall operate a motor vehicle or a motor cycle upon a public highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person, nor at a rate of speed greater than will permit such person to bring the vehicle to a stop without injury to another or his property.' On appeal, however, the County Judge reversed on the law, vacated the judgment and ordered the fine remitted, holding that the abovequoted statute is unconstitutional because too vague and indefinite to be enforced.

There was testimony that on the evening of June 9, 1956, on a two-lane rural highway, defendant, while passing another car going in the same direction, struck a young girl riding a bicycle in the opposite direction, smashing her bicycle and causing serious personal injuries, some of the testimony being that defendant's car was going 60 to 65 miles an hour. However, defendant was not charged with violating any of the express speed limits in other subdivisions of section 56 nor was he charged with the crime of reckless driving under section 58 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

This conviction was not for a crime but for a so-called 'traffic infraction' (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 2, subd. 29). However, there are applicable to such prosecutions the rules of the criminal law (People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377, 49 A.L.R.2d 449). Our question, then, is whether this statute satisfies the requirement that a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite, 'clear and positive' to give 'unequivocal warning' to citizens of the rule which is to be obeyed (see cases cited in People v. Vetri, 309 N.Y. 401, 405-406, 131 N.E.2d 568, 570-571). We agree with the County Judge that this subdivision 1 of section 56 is too vague and indefinite to constitute a sufficient definition of criminal conduct and that it contains no sufficient standard by which a driver's conduct may be tested. One could go further and say that the statutory verbiage is practically meaningless. We may guess at what the draftsman intended and, indeed, as we shall show in a later paragraph, there is material available to show what was intended. But that is not sufficient. For validity the statute must be informative on its face. It attempts to set up two prohibitions. The first is as to driving 'at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person'. The second prohibition is against driving a motor vehicle on any highway 'at a rate of speed greater than will permit such person to bring the vehicle to a stop without injury to another or his property'. The first of those prohibitions, as so worded, is truly meaningless because there is no such thing as motor vehicle speed incapable of endangering life, limb or property. As to the second prohibition, the only possible meaning is that a speed is unlawful unless it permits the car to be stopped without injuring anyone or anything. That amounts to saying that if, under any circumstances, the driver is unable to bring his car to a stop without injuring someone or something, he has been driving too fast.

The statutory draftsman did not, of course, intend any such result. The subdivision in its present form was enacted in 1946 (L.1946, ch. 861). Before that it read: 'Every person operating a motor vehicle or a motorcycle upon a public highway shall drive such vehicle in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed so as not to endanger the property of another or the life or limb of any person'. Laws 1942, c. 506. It is clear that the 1946 changes were...