People v. Fisk

• Decision Date: 22 July 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 20883
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard G. FISK, Defendant-Appellant. 62 Mich.App. 638, 233 N.W.2d 684
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 684

233 N.W.2d 684

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard G. FISK, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 20883.

62 Mich.App. 638, 233 N.W.2d 684

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

July 22, 1975.

Released for Publication Oct. 21, 1975.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

[62 MICHAPP 639] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., E. W. Ten Houten, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BASHARA, P.J., and J. H. GILLIS and CAVANAGH, JJ.

CAVANAGH, Judge.

In a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery, M.C.L.A. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797. The Wexford County Circuit Court Judge imposed a sentence of twenty to forty years imprisonment.

After a night of heavy drinking, the defendant pulled into a service station in Wexford County. He pulled a gun on the station attendant and demanded money. He identified himself as a deputy sheriff but he soon put the gun away, and, without taking any money, he left. An hour later he returned wearing the same distinctive clothing but with masking tape wrapped around his head. This time the defendant successfully robbed the [62 MICHAPP 640] station. He admonished the attendant not to call the police after he left because he would be watching from across the street. About two hours later, the defendant was arrested when he came to the station for the third time and asked for gasoline.

At trial the defendant pleaded insanity and contended that, because of his intoxication, he lacked the requisite specific intent to commit a robbery. Dr. Matthew Schiff, a psychiatrist at the Forensic Center, testified that the defendant was suffering from a depressive reaction, was unable to differentiate between right and wrong, and was probably acting under an irresistible impulse. Another psychiatrist, Dr. Edward Edmund, concluded that the defendant suffered from a sociopathic personality disorder and from 'alcoholic psychosis' and that alcohol intake caused him to lose the willpower to resist the impulse to commit the crime. Dr. Edmund's diagnosis, however, was more tentative due to his limited opportunity ot observe the defendant.

The prosecutor cross-examined both medical witnesses, but offered no rebuttal evidence on the issue of insanity. The trial court rejected the condlusions of the psychiatrists that the defendant was psychotic. He made the factual finding that the defendant, by voluntary intoxication, allowed his willpower to be weakened to the point that it permitted the commission of the offense. Further, he found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's speech and behavior demonstrated his purposeful intent to rob the service station.

The prospect of sending a man who has obvious emotional problems to prison for twenty to forty years prompts this Court to examine carefully the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case. Having done so, we must affirm his conviction.

[62 MICHAPP 641] The knowledge and experience of psychiatrists can assist appreciably a factfinder who gives their opinions due consideration, but the ultimate determination of sanity and the existence of specific intent rests with the trier of fact, whether court or jury. People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 422, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1971), Cert. den. 408 U.S. 929, 92 S.Ct. 2505, 33 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). People v. Banks, 50 Mich.App. 622, 629, 213 N.W.2d 817 (1973).

A defendant is presumptively sane, but this presumption can be rebutted by offering evidence to the contrary; ¹ when this is done, the prosecution has the burden of persuading the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity. People v. Livingston, 57 Mich.App. 726, 732, 226 N.W.2d 704 (1975).

The prosecution discharged its burden in this case by limited cross-examination and by emphasizing the admitted limitations on the psychiatrists' conclusions. It is conceivable that in some cases the prosecution can effectively discharge its burden of proving the defendant's sanity by cross-examining the defense witnesses without offering additional rebuttal witnesses.

The trial court determined as factfinder that the defendant knew that what he was doing was wrong and that he had the willpower to resist the [62 MICHAPP 642] wrongful act. See People v. Martin, supra, 386 Mich. 407, 418, 192 N.W.2d 215. Considering all of the circumstances of the case, we find these determinations not to be clearly erroneous. GCR 1963, 517.1. The circumstances of the robbery can support the conclusion of defendant's legal sanity. His actions of masking his face and warning the attendant not to call the police show that at least cognitively he realized the wrongfulness of the act. Although the defendant's willpower or 'superego', as the psychiatrists termed it, was deleteriously affected, there was evidence to support the court's conclusion that this was a result of his voluntary intoxication. ²

The defendant urges that the trial judge violated due process by relying upon the definition of 'psychosis' from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association. The prosecutor counters that the court is entitled to recognize the publication as authoritative and cites Jones v. Bloom, 388 Mich. 98, 118, 200 N.W.2d 196 (1972), to support that proposition. Jones, however, only permitted, for the purpose of cross-examination, the use of textbooks acknowledged as authoritative.

In this case, we perceive no constitutional error in the use of the manual. It appears from the text of the trial judge's opinion that this reference was made in his discussion of the testimony by one of the psychiatrists. He did not utilize the work as independent research to contradict the evidence. [62 MICHAPP 643] Under these circumstances, the reference to a statement appearing in a textbook which was not offered as evidence was not so fundamentally unfair as to be a violation of...