People v. White

• Decision Date: 07 February 1978
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77-2548
• Citation: 265 N.W.2d 139,81 Mich.App. 335
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin WHITE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 139

265 N.W.2d 139

81 Mich.App. 335

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin WHITE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 77-2548.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Feb. 7, 1978.

Released for Publication April 26, 1978.

Carl Ziemba, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward R. Wilson, Chief Appellate Counsel, Asst. Pros. Atty., Craig L. John, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KAUFMAN, P. J., and BRONSON and D. E. HOLBROOK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.83; M.S.A. § 28.278. Sitting without a jury, the trial court found that defendant was insane at the time of the crime charged and entered a verdict of "not guilty by reason of mental illness", and ordered that defendant be committed to the custody of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry for a period not to exceed 60 days pursuant to the provisions of M.C.L.A. § 330.2050; M.S.A. § 14.800 (1050). From that finding, defendant appeals by right.

Prior to trial, defendant filed a notice of intention to raise the defense of insanity. His motion for leave to retain the services of a psychiatrist was granted. The psychiatrist testified that defendant was legally insane at the time the crime was committed.

Defendant also filed a motion seeking an order declaring unconstitutional M.C.L.A. § 768.29a; M.S.A. § 28.1052(1), which provides for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. That motion was denied by the trial court. On appeal, defendant renews his challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.

Defendant first contends that the form of the verdict under M.C.L.A. § 768.29a; M.S.A. § 28.1052(1) impliedly casts the burden of proving insanity on him. We cannot agree. In this state, in a criminal case, the burden is on the prosecution to prove every element of the crime charged. People v. Eddington, 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972).

The precise issue, about which defendant complains, was settled early in our jurisprudence. In People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 23 (1868), the Supreme Court concluded:

"(The jury) are at liberty to rest upon the presumption of sanity until proof of the contrary condition is given by the defense. But when any evidence is given which tends to overthrow that presumption, the jury are to examine, weigh and pass upon it with the understanding that although the initiative in presenting the evidence is taken by the defense, the burden of proof upon this part of the case, as well as upon the other, is upon the prosecution to establish the conditions of guilt." (Emphasis added.)

Accord: People v. Eggleston, 186 Mich. 510, 152 N.W. 944 (1915); People v. Krugman, 377 Mich. 559, 141 N.W.2d 33 (1966). This Court has also affirmed the validity of the rule. In People v. Fisk, 62 Mich.App. 638, 641, 233 N.W.2d 684, 686 (1975), this Court held:

"A defendant is presumptively sane, but this presumption can be rebutted by offering evidence to the contrary; when this is done, the prosecution has the burden of persuading the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity."

Thus, as the statute has been construed so as to avoid any impermissible shifting of the burden of proof, it cannot be said to violate due process on that ground.

Defendant next claims that the form of the verdict under the assailed statute is a special verdict, relieving the prosecution of its burden to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Once again, we must disagree. This argument was also raised and rejected very early in this state's judicial history. In Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1, 2-3 (1875), the Supreme Court held:

"The finding of the jury is confined to the prisoner's condition at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act. The indictment or information embraces, and can lawfully embrace, no issue except the prisoner's guilt as charged. The right of trial by jury is secured by constitutional provisions, and it would not be competent to make any substantial changes in its character. As suggested in People v. Marion, 29 Mich.R., 31, one of its substantial elements is the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits. Any collateral inquiry would be foreign to the issue. And as no insane person is subject to be put on trial, a finding that they had been trying such a person would be somewhat inconsistent with the notion that the trial could have been proper. The statute has avoided this error by confining their attention to the time of the offense; and while it is not competent to prevent an acquittal on a reasonable doubt of insanity, which would require a general verdict of not guilty, yet if the jury agree that the prisoner was insane, and that he would have been guilty if not so, they are undoubtedly at liberty, though they cannot be compelled, to find that fact specially. We cannot hold a special verdict or finding unauthorized, as the common law furnishes abundant...