People v. Fitzgibbon

• Citation: 166 A.D.2d 745,563 N.Y.S.2d 518
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John P. FITZGIBBON, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 18 October 1990
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 518

563 N.Y.S.2d 518

166 A.D.2d 745

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John P. FITZGIBBON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Oct. 18, 1990.

Robert J. Krzys, Amsterdam, for appelalnt.

Guy T. Tomlinson, Montgomery County Dist. Atty. (Valerie Friedlander, of counsel), Fonda, for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and KANE, CASEY, LEVINE and HARVEY, JJ.

MAHONEY, Presiding Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Montgomery County (Aison, J.), rendered August 5, 1987, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree.

Defendant was charged with manslaughter in the second degree and assault in the second degree for recklessly stabbing and killing James Konik on August 31, 1986 in the Town of Amsterdam, Montgomery County. Rejecting defendant's defense of mental disease or defect, a jury convicted him of manslaughter in the second degree. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 5 to 15 years. This appeal followed.

Defendant's contention that the evidence excluded his knife as the weapon involved because the size of the wound was smaller than the width of the blade is rejected. Although the surgeon who treated the victim and the physician who performed the autopsy testified that a stab wound could not be smaller than the width of the knife blade which produced the injury, both doctors testified that the size of the victim's wound was consistent with the width of defendant's knife. Indeed, a measurement of the knife during trial indicated a width of just under 3/4 of an inch, consistent with the victim's wound of about 1/2 to 3/4 of an inch. Other testimony reveals that the size of a stab wound is difficult to assess accurately because organs are in motion in a living person and skin becomes distorted and contracts following a wound. On this record, we find no merit to defendant's contention.

We also reject defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence of recklessness to support the conviction. Since the prosecution's case included such direct proof as defendant's inculpatory statements (see, People v. Rumble, 45 N.Y.2d 879, 880, 410 N.Y.S.2d 806, 383 N.E.2d 108; People v. Hollis, 73 A.D.2d 994, 424 N.Y.S.2d 31), defendant's reliance on standards of proof relating to circumstantial evidence cases is without merit (see, People v. Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d 375, 380, 429 N.Y.S.2d 178, 406 N.E.2d 1071). The proof, considered most favorably to the prosecution in light of the conviction (see, People v. Wells, 159 A.D.2d 799, 552 N.Y.S.2d 688), establishes that defendant brandished a knife during what was either horseplay or an argument and stabbed the victim. There is evidence that immediately prior to the stabbing defendant threatened the victim and referred to cutting someone with his knife. Defendant later described the stabbing to a police officer as "a good hit" that "felt good". Based on the evidence deduced, we conclude that the jury properly could have concluded that defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk constituting a gross deviation from the standard of conduct to be observed by a reasonable person in the circumstances and, thus, acted recklessly (see, Penal Law § 15.05[3]; People v. Costello, 112 A.D.2d 478, 479, 490 N.Y.S.2d 892). Defendant's attempts to undermine the testimony of Frank Evans, who was present at the time of the stabbing, merely raised credibility issues within the jury's province (see, People v. Kinsman, 144 A.D.2d 772, 773, 534 N.Y.S.2d 756, lv. denied 73 N.Y.2d 1017, 541 N.Y.S.2d 771, 539 N.E.2d 599). That the events may have been precipitated by defendant's voluntary intoxication is no defense (see, Penal Law § 15.05[3].

Defendant claims that numerous errors by County Court deprived him of a fair trial. He contends that County Court erred in allowing hospital personnel to testify concerning statements made by the victim which implicate defendant. Considering that the victim had been stabbed within an hour of the statements and was obviously in critical condition with significant blood loss and pain when he made the statements, we conclude that County Court properly admitted these hearsay statements as excited utterances (see, People v. Brooks, 71 N.Y.2d 877, 527 N.Y.S.2d 753, 522 N.E.2d 1051). Any inconsistency between the statements as testified to at trial and as given at other times merely created credibility issues for the jury (see, People v. Kinsman, supra ).

Next, defendant argues that County Court impermissibly limited the scope of defendant's cross-examination of Evans, a prosecution witness. Our review of the record reveals that County Court properly limited defendant's cross-examination to the instances resulting in criminal convictions and refused to permit questions concerning mere arrests and court appearances (see, CPL 60.40[1]; 58 NYJur2d, Evidence and Witnesses, § 938, at 683-684). Defendant also argues that the prosecution's rebuttal psychiatric witness erroneously was permitted to offer an expert opinion on defendant's mental state. Expert opinion can be based on material not in evidence...