People v. Flores
| Decision Date | 01 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 77-3035 |
| Citation | 89 Mich.App. 687,282 N.W.2d 183 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph R. FLORES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
James R. Neuhard, State App. Defender, by Janet Tooley, Asst. State App. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Eugene C. Penzien, Pros. Atty., James Hammond, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CYNAR, P. J., and GILLIS and BAGULEY, * JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of delivery and conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, heroin. M.C.L. § 335.341; M.S.A. § 18.1070(41) and M.C.L. § 750.157a; M.S.A. § 28.354(1). He was sentenced to serve 8 to 20 years in prison and appeals as of right.
The charges against defendant were based upon certain events which took place on March 23, 1976. Thomas Cadieux, a police informant, contacted Edward Emmons, seeking to purchase some heroin. Emmons called defendant's house and spoke with Paul Sobeck to arrange a sale. Cadieux then picked up Emmons and the two drove to defendant's house where they were admitted by a woman and sent to the basement. Emmons went upstairs and returned with Paul Sobeck. Cadieux then arranged for the purchase of a gram of heroin. Sobeck went back upstairs and subsequently returned with defendant. Defendant was carrying a tinfoil packet in his hand. He handed this to Sobeck who in turn gave it to Cadieux. Cadieux handed defendant $80 to pay for the substance which was later analyzed as heroin.
Initially defendant, Sobeck, Emmons, and Guadalupe Flores, defendant's wife, were all charged in this matter. Following the preliminary examination Sobeck, Emmons and defendant were bound over on conspiracy and delivery charges. Mrs. Flores was bound over on conspiracy and possession with intent to deliver charges.
The first issue raised by defendant concerns the admissibility of certain evidence. There was testimony that witness Cadieux and undercover Officer DeFeyter had gone to defendant's house on a number of times prior to March 23, 1976, and been denied admittance. There was also testimony that Officer DeFeyter had made heroin purchases at the house from persons other than defendant.
We agree the evidence that entrance to the house was denied was not probative of any matter in issue. In addition, it is questionable whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to link defendant with the sales by other persons. See People v. Samuel Smith, 85 Mich.App. 404, 271 N.W.2d 252 (1978). However, we find any error in the admission of this evidence to be harmless.
There is no indication that the prosecutor deliberately tried to inject prejudice into the trial, People v. Swan, 56 Mich.App. 22, 223 N.W.2d 346 (1974), and no basis for finding an error so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial system as to require reversal. In addition, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and it was not reasonably possible that, absent the claimed error, even one juror might have voted to acquit. Hence, the error was harmless. People v. Wilkins, 82 Mich.App. 260, 266 N.W.2d 781 (1978).
Defendant also claims it was error to admit evidence of prior transactions wherein defendant sold heroin to one of the alleged co-conspirators, Emmons. These transactions took place in defendant's basement over a four-month period prior to the date of the incident in question.
In order to prove conspiracy, it was necessary for the prosecutor to establish specific intent. In People v. Atley, 392 Mich. 298, 310, 220 N.W.2d 465, 471 (1974), the Court explained this element as follows:
Where intent is material, other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his intent in doing the act in question may be proved notwithstanding that such proof may tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant. M.C.L. § 768.27; M.S.A. § 28.1050.
In the instant case it was necessary to show that defendant had intent to deliver and was aware of the unlawful purpose of this delivery. Evidence that he had engaged in prior heroin transactions was admissible to show that defendant was not an innocent conduit for the delivery of heroin on March 23, 1976.
While this evidence may have been prejudicial to defendant, it was highly probative on the issue of intent. In addition, both the prosecutor and the trial judge properly informed the jury of the limited use to which this evidence could be put. We find no reversible error in its admission.
Defendant also argues that under the facts of this case convictions of both conspiracy to deliver heroin and delivery of heroin violated the double jeopardy clause. We reject this argument on the authority of People v. Gonzales, 86 Mich.App. 166...
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People v. Betancourt
...Gonzalez, 86 Mich.App. 166, 272 N.W.2d 227 (1978), modified on other grounds 406 Mich. 943, 289 N.W.2d 926 (1979); People v. Flores, 89 Mich.App. 687, 282 N.W.2d 183 (1979), rev'd on other grounds 407 Mich. 871, 283 N.W.2d 632 Nor are we persuaded that defendant's conspiracy[120 MICHAPP 64]......
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People v. Gjidoda
...2. This Court holds that a sentence may not be based upon an arbitrary classification, such as race or religion. People v. Flores, 89 Mich.App. 687, 693, 282 N.W.2d 183 (1979), rev'd on other grounds 407 Mich. 871, 283 N.W.2d 632 (1979); People v. Dupuie, 52 Mich.App. 510, 513, 217 N.W.2d 9......
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...since it was reasonably possible that in any proceeding free of this error one juror might have voted to acquit. People v. Flores, 89 Mich.App. 687, 282 N.W.2d 183 (1979); People v. Wilkins, supra. See also, People v. Rustin, supra. We also agree that reversible error was committed when the......