People v. Folignos
| Decision Date | 08 October 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 17273.,17273. |
| Citation | 153 N.E. 373,322 Ill. 304 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. FOLIGNOS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; William B. Brothers, Judge.
James Folignos was convicted of threatening by written communication to kill another or some member of such other's family, and to destroy his property, with intent to extort money, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Thomas A. Green and Charles P. R. Macaulay, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, and Virgil L. Blanding, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson and Henry T. Chase, Jr., both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Plaintiff in error, James Folignos, was convicted in the criminal court of Cook county of the crime of threatening, by written communication, to kill Valentino Parise or some member of his family and to destroy the property of Parise, with intent thereby to extort money from Parise, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary. He prosecutes this writ of error to reverse the judgment for the reasons (1) that the indictment is insufficient; (2) that the act under which the prosecution is brought is unconstitutional; and (3) that improper evidence was admitted on behalf of the prosecution.
A trial was had upon the fourth and sixth counts of the indictment, and a general verdict of guilty was returned. The fourth count charged:
That plaintiff in error and others ‘did by written communications maliciously and willfully threaten to wound, maim, kill, and murder another person, to wit, one Walentino Parise, which said written communications are in the Italian language and in words and figures and letters as follows, to wit [photograph of letters in Italian language], and the said written communications translated into the English language are, in substance, as follows, to wit:
—with intent thereby to extort from him, the said Valentino Parise, a large sum of money.'
The sixth count is the same, except that it includes Valentino's son, Gene Parise, as one of the persons threatened.
It is not alleged in either count that Valentino Parise or Gene Parise could read and understand the Italian language,and it is contended by plaintiff in error that this was an essential averment. We do not agree with this contention. The indictment is in the language of the statute, and it sets out in both Italian and English the contents of the letters which it is charged the accused sent to the persons threatened. He was fully informed of the charge against him, and had a full opportunity to prepare his defense. The indictment is sufficient. Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464.
It is also contended that it was not proven on the trial that the persons threatened could read or understand the letters. With this we do not agree. Gene Parise testified that he could read and understand the Italian language, that he received the two letters, that he opened them and read them, and that he communicated their contents to his father.
[3][4] The prosecution in this case is under section 93a of the Criminal Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1925, c. 38, § 241), added by an Act approved May 9, 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 144). It is contended that this section is void, for the reason that it amends section 93 without inserting at length in the new act the section amended, as required by section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution. Section 93, which is a part of the Act of March 27, 1874 (Rev. St. 1874, c. 38), prescribes the punishment for one who either verbally or by written or printed communication threatens to accuse another of a crime, or to expose any of his infirmities, with intent to extort money, or who threatens to maim or murder another or to destroy another's property, though no money be demanded. Section 93a prescribes a more severe punishment for one who either verbally or by written or printed communication maliciously and willfully threatens to kidnap, maim, or murder another person or one related to such other person, or to destroy any building or other property belonging to another person, with intent thereby to extort money or other valuable thing. The latter section is not an amendment of the former. Section 93 refers to a crime different from the crime with which section 93a deals. Before there can be a conviction under section 93a, it is essential to prove, not only the threat to kidnap, maim, or murder the person threatened or his relative, or to destroy his property, but also that the threat is made with the specific intent to extort money or other valuable thing from the person threatened. The act is free from the constitutional objection suggested. People v. Exton, 298 Ill. 119, 131 N. E. 275;People v. Jones, 242 Ill. 138, 89 N. E. 711.
There is no direct proof of the fact that plaintiff in error wrote the letters set forth in the indictment. The conviction rests upon circumstantial evidence. Valentino Parise is an Italian who has been in this country a great many years. He owned two buildings on Front avenue, in the city of Chicago. In one he maintained an office where he sold steamship tickets and conducted other business connected therewith, and in the other building his son operated a restaurant. That section of the city of Chicago is commonly called Kensington, and is populated largely by Italians. Shortly after the first letter was received a bomb was exploded in front of the restaurant, and the building was damaged to the amount of $500. After the explosion, Gene Parise called upon Vincenzo Calabrese, who conducted a drug store in the neighborhood, and told him he had come to settle the demand made in the letter. Calabrese told him he could have avoided trouble if he had come sooner, but that he would call up the chief and let Parise know on what terms they would settle. Parise did not return the next day as instructed, and about three weeks later a second bomb was exploded, causing damages to the building in the amount of $600. Parise went again to Calabrese and was sent by him to plaintiff in error, who operates a barber shop in Kensington. Plaintiff in error demanded that $2,000 be paid, and Parise finally agreed to pay this amount. On the night following the making of the agreement, Parise met plaintiff in error, and, after further negotiations, it was agreed that $1,500 should be paid to satisfy the demand of the Black Hand, and that plaintiff in error should receive an additional $250 for the expense he had incurred because of the failure of Parise to meet the demand sooner. This money was paid. The foregoing is the substance of the testimony on behalf of the prosecution. Calabrese and plaintiff in error deny that they wrote the letters or had anything to do with sending them or received any money from Parise. The jury evidently believed the testimony for the prosecution, and we see no reason for disturbing their finding on the facts.
[5] For the purpose of showing that the letters were sent with the intent to extort money, the prosecution proved that Bernard Battaglin and Marco Magneabosco each received similar threatening letters about the same time Parise received his threatening letters, that buildings belonging to Battaglin and Magneabosco were damaged by bombs, and that each of them thereafter paid money to plaintiff in error in settlement of the demand of the Black Hand. The letter to Battaglin was received by him prior to the time Parise received his letter, and the letter to Magneabosco was received some time during the same month, but he is not certain of the day. It is contended that it was error to receive this evidence.
[6][7][8] Where a specific intent is an essential element of a crime, and the prosecution must prove this specific intent in order to secure a legal conviction, evidence of similar acts committed by the accused, happening at or about the same time, is relevant and competent to show such intent. People v. Hobbs, 297 Ill. 399, 130 N. E. 779;Schintz v. People, 178 Ill. 320, 52 N. E. 903;Thomas v. People, 59 Ill. 160;Higgins v. State, 157 Ind. 57, 60 N. E. 685;Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 10 L. Ed. 987; 1 Wharton on Crim. Evidence (10th Ed.) § 35. That evidence offered proves or tends to prove an offense other than the one with which the accused is charged is never a valid objection to its admissibility. People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 141 N. E. 196;State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 24 Am. Rep. 69; 1 Wigmore on Evidence...
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