People v. Foster
| Citation | 319 Mich.App. 365,901 N.W.2d 127 |
| Decision Date | 20 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 329992.,329992. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Eugene FOSTER, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
319 Mich.App. 365
901 N.W.2d 127
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Michael Eugene FOSTER, Defendant–Appellant.
No. 329992.
Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Submitted January 12, 2017, at Lansing
Decided April 20, 2017, 9:10 a.m.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, and Nichol J. Palumbo, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Jeanice Dagher-Margosian ) for defendant.
Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Stephens and O'Brien, JJ.
Stephens, J.
Defendant, Michael Eugene Foster, pleaded guilty to two counts of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, MCL 750.110, and one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i ). Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted1 the judgment of sentence, which ordered defendant to serve concurrent prison terms of 19 months to 10 years for the breaking and entering convictions, consecutive to a term of 78 months to 20 years for the possession with intent to deliver conviction. Defendant was also ordered to pay a $500 fine for the possession of a controlled substance offense, and, inter alia , restitution in the amount of $419.02 for two dismissed misdemeanor offenses. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment of sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant does not contest the factual basis of this prosecution. In LC No. 14-008881-FH, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of breaking and entering and stated that around September 21 or 22, 2014, he entered a barn located at a golf course on Cedar Lake Road in Iosco County and "took 11 batteries" after his "co-defendant opened the door." He later sold the batteries for their scrap value. Defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of breaking and entering in LC No. 14-008692-FH and stated that, on June 5, 2014, he entered a garage "[o]n the corner of Jordonville Road and US–23" "in Iosco County" and "me and my co-defendant carried a generator out." In LC No. 15-009012-FH, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing with the intent to deliver the controlled substance of methamphetamine and stated that around December 16, 2014, he "had a substantial amount of Methamphetamine. And we got pulled over, and it was found in the vehicle, and I admitted it was mine." Defendant added that he possessed the methamphetamine for the purpose of "[s]hooting it, smoking it, snorting it. ... Yeah, there was an intent to sell some of it."
Defendant and the prosecution entered a plea agreement on the record. In exchange for defendant's pleas of guilty, the prosecution and defendant agreed that the breaking and entering sentences would be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the possession with intent to deliver offense and that defendant would be sentenced without consideration of his habitual-offender status to a "max/minimum ... at the bottom of the sentence guidelines" on all three offenses. The parties also agreed that "two misdemeanor Retail Fraud matters
in District Court would be dismissed with restitution to be paid in full on those—in addition to the restitution on these files that are being pled guilty to."
The trial court informed defendant that breaking and entering is an offense that carries with it a maximum penalty of ten years' incarceration for each conviction and that possession with intent to deliver the controlled substance of methamphetamine carries with it a maximum penalty of twenty years' incarceration, a $25,000 fine or both. The trial court also informed defendant that the court was not bound by the plea agreement at sentencing and that, if the court imposed a sentence different from that agreed to, then defendant could withdraw his pleas. The court accepted all three pleas and referred defendant to the Department of Corrections for preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSIR).
At the sentencing hearing, the court followed the recommendations of the Department of Corrections as provided in the PSIR. In LC No. 14-008692-FH, defendant was sentenced as previously stated and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $232.19 to Helen Bero jointly and severally with codefendants Allen Preston and Zachary Williams. Defendant was further ordered to pay a $68 minimum state cost, a crime victims assessment in the amount of $130, $1,100 in court costs, and a $500 fine. In LC No. 14-008881-FH, defendant was sentenced as previously stated and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $887.52 to Lakewood Shores Golf Resort jointly and severally with codefendant Paul Sivrais. Defendant was also ordered to pay a $68 minimum state cost and a crime victims assessment in the amount of $130. In LC No. 15-40-SM, the case involving the dismissed misdemeanors, defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $223.76 to Walmart jointly and severally with codefendant Valerie Foster and restitution in the amount of $195.26 to Walmart.2 In LC No. 15-009012-FH, defendant was sentenced as previously stated and ordered to pay a $68 minimum state cost and a crime victims assessment in the amount of $130.
The trial court asked defendant and his counsel if they were "aware of any additions, deletions, or corrections that need to be made with regard to any of the factual matters contained within the [presentence] report." Defense counsel indicated that he did not have any changes. The prosecution noted two minor changes. Additionally, the prosecution, defendant, and defendant's counsel all stated that they did not have any objection to the scoring of the sentencing guidelines. The trial court then sentenced defendant as recommended by the Department of Corrections.
II. THE VALIDITY OF THE FINE
Defendant first challenges the $500 fine imposed by the court in LC No. 14-008692-FH, the case involving the breaking and entering conviction related to the generator theft. Defendant contends that because the fine was not a part of his sentence recommendation and he was not given the opportunity to withdraw his plea after the fine was imposed, the fine should be vacated. We agree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant did not challenge at sentencing the trial court's authority to order the fine. This Court reviews unpreserved claims of error under the plain error rule.
People v. Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 763, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). "To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear
or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." Id . (citation omitted).
B. ANALYSIS
"If the prosecuting attorney and the defendant choose to negotiate, and in fact reach a sentence agreement or sentence recommendation, the court shall require disclosure in open court of the details of the agreement at the time the plea is offered."3 People v. Killebrew , 416 Mich. 189, 206, 330 N.W.2d 834 (1982).
In Killebrew , our Supreme Court held that when a plea agreement contains a nonbinding prosecutorial sentence recommendation,
the judge may accept the guilty plea ..., yet refuse to be bound by the recommended sentence. The judge retains his freedom to choose a different sentence. However, the trial judge must explain to the defendant that the recommendation
was not accepted by the court, and state the sentence that the court finds to be the appropriate disposition. The court must then give the defendant the opportunity to affirm or withdraw his guilty plea. [Id . at 209–210.]
No written plea agreement is included in the record on appeal. According to defendant, his counsel, and the prosecution at the plea hearing, defendant agreed to plead guilty to the three felonies and pay restitution on those charges and on two misdemeanor retail fraud charges in exchange for the dismissal of the two misdemeanors. In addition, defendant understood that no habitual-offender notices were to be filed, and he was to be sentenced at the bottom of the sentencing guidelines. The record contains no indication that a fine was contemplated by the agreement.
At the plea hearing, the trial court informed defendant that it was not bound by the "sentence agreement," that the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver carried with it a maximum fine of $25,000, and that defendant would be allowed to withdraw his plea in the event the trial court deviated from the agreement at sentencing. However, the sentencing record indicates that the trial court imposed a $500 fine in connection with LC No....
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...181 P.3d 324, 327 (Colo. App. 2007) ( Apprendi does not apply to restitution because there is no statutory maximum); People v. Foster, 319 Mich. App. 365, 389, 901 N.W.2d 127 (2017) ( Apprendi does not apply to restitution because restitution is not punishment); State v. Maxwell , 802 N.W.2......
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