People v. Fowler
| Decision Date | 03 December 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 25248,25248 |
| Citation | 516 P.2d 428,183 Colo. 300 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Doyle Raymond FOWLER and Lsabel M. Fowler, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jack E. Hanthorn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Douglass F. Primavera, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
Appellants were convicted in the Jefferson County district court of prostitution (C.R.S.1963, 40--9--11) and conspiracy to commit prostitution (C.R.S.1963, 40--7--35). The prostitution count of the information charged that Doyle Raymond Fowler and Isabel M. Fowler, being over the age of 18 years, did knowingly and feloniously live on and were supported and maintained, in whole or in part, by money realized, procured and earned by a female person through her own prostitution.
On the morning of trial, after members of the jury panel had assembled for duty, appellants determined to waive a jury trial, and did so in writing. Trial was then to the court, which found both appellants guilty on both charges.
In brief summary, the record convincingly established that appellants provided a house at 305 Sheridan Boulevard in Jefferson County where, under the guise of operating a massage parlor, a prostitution business was carried on. The earnings from the business were shared equally by the prostitutes and the appellants. Testimony was presented from one of the prostitutes concerning the details of the operation, including daily payments to appellants of one-half of the illicit earnings. Further corroborative evidence was presented by an undercover agent who had conducted a surveillance of the premises. Appellant, Doyle Raymond Fowler, testified for the defense, admitting the maintenance of the massage business but disclaiming knowledge or participation in the prostitution business.
Appellants in their briefs raised several constitutional challenges to the prostitution statute, C.R.S.1963, 40--9--11. At oral argument, however, they abandoned all contentions of unconstitutionality except the claim that there was in existence another statute, C.R.S.1963, 49--9--15, concerning keeping a lewd house, punishable as a misdemeanor, under which they could have been charged; and that, therefore, the district attorney was granted an unlawful discretion in the choice of criminal charges that might be brought under the same set of facts. This argument was disposed of by the recent case of People v. James, Colo., 497 P.2d 1256, which reaffirmed the well-established principle that a single transaction that violates two criminal statutes may generally be prosecuted under either. In such a situation it is the proper function of the district attorney to determine under which of the statutes he wishes to prosecute. No constitutional proscription has been demonstrated which would prohibit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in such a situation, and we conclude that appellants might properly have been charged under either statute in this case.
Appellants next argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions in that the People failed to present express evidence of the age of appellants during the prosecution's case. Appellants' motion for judgment of acquittal on this basis was denied, the court stating that a prima facie case had been made. Appellants chose not to stand on their motion for judgment of acquittal but went forward and presented evidence of their defense. On cross-examination, Doyle Fowler testified that he was 33 and his wife, Isabel Fowler, was 30. Thus, the issue of alleged insufficiency in regard to the age of appellants was eliminated. Upon consideration of all of the evidence, both the People's and the appellants', it was clear that the evidence amply...
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People v. Curtis
...evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that waiver was not voluntary, knowing and intentional. See People v. Fowler, 183 Colo. 300, 516 P.2d 428 (1973) (right to jury trial). We have applied the latter standard of proof in Curtis. We need not decide which burden of proof applie......
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State v. Gore
...also cases cited in footnote 17 of this opinion; cf. Bolt v. State, 314 Ark. 387, 387-91, 862 S.W.2d 841 (1993); People v. Fowler, 183 Colo. 300, 303-304, 516 P.2d 428 (1973); State v. Foote, 149 N.H. 323, 324-27, 821 A.2d 1072 (2003); but see, e.g., United States v. Leja, 448 F.3d 86, 92-9......
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People v. Norman
...be by the court. Any such waiver is effective only if it is made understandingly, voluntarily and deliberately, see People v. Fowler, 183 Colo. 300, 516 P.2d 428 (1973); People v. Evans, 44 Colo.App. 288, 612 P.2d 1153 (1980), and any conclusion that a valid waiver was made must be a matter......