People v. Francis

• Decision Date: 04 January 2022
• Docket Number: Ind. No. 2021-0335
• Citation: 74 Misc.3d 808,164 N.Y.S.3d 358
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Kaliek FRANCIS and Roy Siplin, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

74 Misc.3d 808

164 N.Y.S.3d 358

The PEOPLE of the State of New York

v.Kaliek FRANCIS and Roy Siplin, Defendants.

Ind. No. 2021-0335

Supreme Court, Monroe County, New York.

Decided on January 4, 2022

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney (Robin Catalano of counsel), for Plaintiff.

Donald Thompson, Esq., for Defendant Kaliek Francis

Michael Schiano, Esq., for Defendant Roy Siplin

Thomas E. Moran, J.

The Defendants, each charged with gun offenses, seek various forms of relief under the discovery statute, including applications before this Court to compel the District Attorney to disclose and turn over to the defense the disciplinary personnel files of several officers of the Rochester Police Department. The Defendants,¹ through counsel, seek a determination from this Court, of the following: (1) whether Brighton Police Patrolman Association, et. al. v. Brighton Police Chief, David Catholdi, et. al. (Taddeo, JSC), is applicable to this matter; (2) whether the Monroe County District Attorney's Office has met its obligation by use of the office's Giglio committee, as it relates to CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) ; (3) whether the People, by referring the defendants to the Rochester Police Department's database, have satisfied their disclosure obligations under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) ; (4) whether the categories of dispositions, and procedures by which those dispositions are obtained, are sufficient to allow the Court to determine which of the documents and dispositions the People must disclose to the defense under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) ; and (5), whether the methods, standards and/or procedures used by the Rochester Police Department's Professional Standard Section ("PSS") are sufficiently defined to allow the Court to make this determination.

Defendant Francis moves that his indictment be dismissed on the grounds that the People failed to provide the defendant with his recorded interrogation at least 48 hours prior to the time he was scheduled to testify before the grand jury.

Further, the Defendants request that this Court rule that the Rochester Police Department's officer disciplinary records are in the "constructive possession" of the District Attorney's Office.

As part of the instant motion, the implications of the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a² comes into play, and whether the repeal of § 50-a involves ex post facto concerns. Specifically, the Defendants ask this Court to find that the repeal of § 50-a must be applied retroactively. Similarly, the Defendants argue that all records, reports and documents held by PSS be turned over in discovery, irrespective of whether any complaints in those files were determined to be "founded" or "substantiated."

Also related to the discovery issue, the Defendants maintain that disclosure of the District Attorney's emails to officers involved in this case (wherein they request the officer/department disclose any exculpatory materials in their possession) does not alone satisfy the People's discovery obligations under the new legislation, or under Brady v. Maryland and U.S. v. Giglio.

In addition, the Defendants allege that the People have violated their obligation to provide impeachment materials under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv). Here, they argue that the City's public-facing Rochester Police Department database is devoid of decisions in other cases, wherein the District Attorney's Office appeared on behalf of the People, in which courts found that the People's witnesses testified falsely or incredibly.

Also, in relation to disclosure of impeachment materials, the Defendants ask the Court to find that the People have failed to satisfy their obligation under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv), by instead referring the defense to "public filings" in federal civil lawsuits in which police officers are named as defendants. Instead, the Defendants argue that in order for the District Attorney to comply with the statute, the People must obtain the underlying documents supporting the civil lawsuits, and provide those materials to the defense.

Lastly, the Defendants argue that the People's violation of their discovery obligations have rendered their statements of "readiness" illusory, and that as a result the People have failed to file a valid certificate of compliance based upon their failure to provide the defense with impeachment materials as required by CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv).

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT BASED ON ALLEGED CPL 245.10(1)(c) VIOLATION

In turning first to Defendant Francis’ motion to dismiss his indictment, the Defendant's motion for dismissal is based upon the People's failure to provide the Defendant with his recorded interrogation, at least 48 hours before the defendant was scheduled to testify before grand jury. In relevant part, CPL § 245.10(1)(c) states:

The prosecution shall disclose statements of the defendant as described in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 245.20 of this article to any defendant who has been arraigned in a local criminal court upon a currently undisposed of felony complaint charging an offense, which is a subject of a prospective or pending grand jury proceeding, no later than 48 hours before the time scheduled for the defendant to testify at a grand jury proceeding pursuant to subdivision five of section 190.50 of this part. (emphasis added).

In support of his application the Defendant cites People v. McMillian , 71 Misc. 3d 374, 142 N.Y.S.3d 279 (Crim. Ct. Bronx County, 2021). In McMillian, the People at arraignment notified the defendant in writing of their intention to present his case to a grand jury, and the defendant served written notice of his intent to exercise his right to testify before the grand jury (pursuant to CPL § 190.50 ). However, that is not what occurred in this case. Here, the Defendant does not claim he ever notified the People of his intention to testify. Thus, the requirement to turn over defendant's statement at least 48 hours before his scheduled time to testify was never triggered.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to provide defendant's statements prior grand jury presentation, is hereby denied.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT RPD DISCIPLINARY RECORDS ARE IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Defendants next request that this Court find that the Rochester Police Department's records concerning officer discipline, are in the "constructive possession" of the District Attorney's Office.

In holding that these records are in possession of the District Attorney, the Court in People v. Quinlan , 71 Misc. 3d 266, 142 N.Y.S.3d 305 (Crim. Ct., Bronx Co., 2021) explained:

... CPL 245.20 (2) states, in pertinent part, that "[f]or purposes of subdivision one of this section, all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution." This language is clear and unambiguous: regardless of whether the People have actual possession of discoverable material and information from law enforcement, such material and information is statutorily deemed to be in the People's possession. The importance of this legislative mandate is supported by CPL § 245.55 (1), which charges the People with "ensurs[ing] that a flow of information is maintained between [them and] the police and other investigative personnel." In addition, CPL §245.55 (2) requires that "each New York state and local law enforcement agency shall make available to the prosecution a complete copy of its complete records and files related to the investigation of the case or the prosecution of the defendant for compliance with [article 245]." It was, therefore, improper for the People to file a certificate of compliance while acknowledging that some discoverable law enforcement materials and information had not been disclosed because they were not in their "actual possession.

Quinlan , at 271-272, 142 N.Y.S.3d 305.

In People v. Cooper, 71 Misc. 3d 559, 143 N.Y.S.3d 805 (Erie Co. Ct., 2021), the Court (Eagan, J.) noted "it is undisputed that police personnel records are in the possession of the police. Therefore, possession of the records is imputed to the People." This reasoning has likewise been applied in People v. Haymon, 71 Misc. 3d 1203(a), 2021 WL 1185047 (Albany Co. Ct., 2021).

Similarly, in People v. Edwards, 73 Misc. 3d 1206(A), 2021 WL 4697690 (City of N.Y., Crim. Ct., 2021), the court held

Moreover, the Legislature did not leave in serious doubt whether the People are, as a matter of law, in possession of police disciplinary records. In addressing the relationship between the prosecution and police, the Legislature deemed prosecutors to be in possession and control of material known to, and in possession of, the police. First, and most important, CPL § 245.20(2) plainly states that, "[f]or purposes of [ CPL § 245.20(1) ], all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution." Impeachment evidence is "related to the prosecution of a charge" for the same reason that impeachment evidence relates to "the subject matter of the case": it directly relates to whether the factfinder should believe the witness's testimony.

This Court finds it hard to envision a more explicit statute than CPL § 245.20(2), which states "all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police, or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution."

Insofar as this Court finds the language of CPL § 245.20(2) to be clear and unequivocal, and based upon the above-referenced case authority, the Court finds that the People are indeed in the constructive possession of the Rochester Police Department's officer disciplinary records.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT REPEAL...