People v. Frechette

• Decision Date: 09 February 1968
• Docket Number: No. 29,29
• Citation: 155 N.W.2d 830,380 Mich. 64
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Clarence R. FRECHETTE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 830

155 N.W.2d 830

380 Mich. 64

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Clarence R. FRECHETTE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 29.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 9, 1968.

Charles B. Gatesman, Livingston County Pros. Atty., Howell, for plaintiff and appellee.

E. Reed Flectcher, Howell, for defendant and appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

KAVANAGH, Justice.

Defendant-appellant is presently serving a life sentence for first degree murder. An order granting a delayed appeal was entered September 13, 1965, by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals decided that appellant was not entitled to a new trial, even though there was serious doubt in the mind of that Court that defendant received a fair trial. (3 Mich.App. 249, 142 N.W.2d 19). Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on November 14, 1966.

Because much of the record has been lost, we are furnished only excerpts from some of the testimony. Appellant supplies most of the facts, and the prosecution opens its fact statement in its brief with the following: 'There is essentially no dispute about the facts involved in this case.'

Defendant Frechette was convicted on March 28, 1935, of the murder of his employer, one Robert Brown, near Howell, Michigan. Defendant was riding in an automobile owned and driven by Brown. Brown stopped the car and, while both were standing outside the car, Brown made a derogatory remark regarding Frechette's girl friend. A fight ensued and Frechette struck Brown, knocking him to the ground. Frechette, believing he was fired from his job and would not get a ride back to Howell, turned to walk in that direction. As he did so, he saw Brown reach into the glove compartment of the car and pull out a gun. Frechette grabbed Brown's gun hand and in the ensuing struggle the gun was discharged twice, killing Brown. There were no witnesses to the shooting.

Frechette placed the body of Brown in the trunk of the car and, after having spent the night at his father's home at Oxbow Lake, left the next day for Detroit and then for Kalamazoo. The following two days, with the body concealed in the trunk, accompanied by a girl of his acquaintance, he visited Benton Harbor and Grand Rapids and then returned to Kalamazoo. On February 1st he left Kalamazoo for California, and when apprehended at Truckee, California near the Nevada border, the body was discovered.

The case attracted nationwide publicity, which is evidenced by the many newspaper clippings incorporated in appellant's brief and also affidavits as to the conduct of the trial.

That Frechette had taken a lie detector test was testified to at his trial, and as the lie detector or polygraph was a new instrument used in crime detection there were 15 pages of testimony as to how it operated and the accuracy of many tests. The expert who was testifying was asked if he had an opinion as to whether Frechette made a truthful or untruthful answer. His reply was, 'Yes, I have.' Defense counsel then objected to the opinion of the expert. The trial court sustained the objection and went on to state:

'I might amplify the reason why the court sustains the objection to the introduction of the report and records known as polygrams. In regard to the offering in evidence of the record known as polygrams made by the apparatus known as a lie detector used on the defendant in this case, the court is of the opinion that as yet, as a matter of law, such an instrument is not perfected to such an extent that its record of any test made by it should be used or received in evidence in court.'

The trial court further said:

'I will state on the record, that is the statement of counsel permitting the examining in relation to the polygrams, that he didn't claim for it perfection at all, but thought he would introduce it and leave it to the consideration of the jury, that is what he stated at the time; however, the court is of the opinion, as I already stated, it wouldn't be of any evidential value to the jury on account of--well, it seems to the court an uncertainty and to admit it perhaps would be prejudicial in view of the objection of the defendant.'

The trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard the numerous reports of polygraph tests or for that matter to disregard the answer of the expert as to his opinion of whether Frechette was lying. In an attempt to counteract the damage already done, the appellant, out of the presence of the jury, stated he would be willing to take a polygraph test in front of the jury. This request was denied by the court.

Appellant contends that the admission of the testimony concerning the lie detector test was error and he should therefore be granted a new trial. In connection with the nationwide publicity, appellant contends that as all the jurors had heard radio news reports or read about the case in the newspapers, he was deprived of his right to a fair trial.

The first issue for determination is whether the admission of the 15 pages of testimony of the expert witness concerning the operation of the polygraph and the results of numerous tests, including appellant's test, and the operator's opinion as to whether appellant was telling the truth, was error; and if so, whether it was prejudicial error.

There can be no doubt at present that in this jurisdiction the results of lie detector tests are inadmissible. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503, 139 A.L.R. 1171; People v. Welke, 342 Mich. 164, 68 N.W.2d 759; Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172; People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269.

Speaking of the lie detector, the Court in People v. Davis, supra, stated 343 Mich. p. 372, 72 N.W.2d p. 282:

'The tremendous weight which such tests would necessarily carry in the minds of a jury requires us to be most careful regarding their admission into evidence and we should not do so before its accuracy and general scientific acceptance and standardization are clearly shown.'

In People v. Welke, supra, the Court stated 342 Mich. p. 169, 68 N.W.2d 761:

'We believe reversible error was committed by allowing the testimony that clearly disclosed to the jury that not only was the lie detector test made but the fact that the man who made the test concluded and informed the defendant he was lying. The fact that the exact results of the test were not testified to does not correct this error. It is a well accepted principle in this State that results of a lie detector test are not admissible in evidence.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case before us we note that approximately 15 pages of testimony were given by the expert witness as to the operation of the polygraph machine, the accuracy of the machine, and the results of many tests which were intended to show that this type of machine was accurate. The expert witness was asked if Frechette had been given a lie detector test, and answered affirmatively. The sheets showing the results of the test were then shown to the expert and he testified they were of the Frechette examination. He was asked:

'Q. From the reading of those grams did you form an opinion as to whether or not the subject, Clarence Frechette, made a truthful or untruthful answer to any particular question on the gram?

'A. Yes, I have.'

Objection was then made by defense counsel.

The trial judge ruled that to admit further testimony and to elicit the results of the polygraph test would perhaps be prejudicial.

In the case of State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E.2d 669, 684, 685, the court was considering lie detector tests and the fact was admitted that the defendant had merely refused to take a test. The court stated (p. 423, 111 S.E.2d p. 684):

'The record reveals that the witness Faulk, who qualified as an expert with reference to the lie detector machine and in giving of tests thereby, described in detail the mechanisms and operation of such machine, and over objection he was permitted to testify. 'The question you asked, I believe, is how many actually refuse to take the lie detector test. Less than one per cent refuse to take the test even though they are known criminals.' In our opinion, permitting the witness to so testify was very damaging and highly prejudicial to the appellant Britt.'

It was then noted that The trial judge had told the jury not to consider this testimony when determining the issue of the guilt of the defendant. Of this that court said (pp. 425, 426, 111 S.E.2d p. 685):

'What effect the testimony as to the reputation of the appellant Britt and of his failure...