People v. Frierson
Decision Date | 28 December 2017 |
Docket Number | S236728 |
Citation | 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 582,4 Cal.5th 225,407 P.3d 423 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Belton FRIERSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Richard B. Lennon and Suzan E. Hier, Los Angeles, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Louis W. Karlin and Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the "Reform Act" or the "Act"), amended the Three Strikes sentencing scheme. The Act reduced the class of defendants who are eligible for indeterminate prison terms following a third felony conviction. It also permitted some inmates serving a Three Strikes term to petition for modification of their current sentences. The Act excluded resentencing under certain circumstances. The People acknowledge that they bear the burden of establishing that a petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. The question here is what degree of proof is required to discharge that burden. We hold that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.
We recently considered another aspect of the Reform Act in People v. Conley(2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 622, 373 P.3d 435 ( Conley ). The background provided there is helpful to an analysis of the current question. "Enacted ‘to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses' (Pen. Code, former § 667, subd. (b), Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1, pp. 71, 72), the Three Strikes law ‘consists of two, nearly identical statutory schemes.’ [Citation.] The first of these schemes was enacted by the Legislature in March 1994. (Pen. Code, former § 667, subds. (b)-(i).) The second was enacted by ballot initiative in November of the same year. (Pen. Code, former § 1170.12, added by Prop. 184, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) (Proposition 184).) The two statutes differ only in minor respects not relevant here.[1 ][Citation.]
( Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 652, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 622, 373 P.3d 435.) Thus, under the original law, a defendant previously convicted of two qualifying strikes was subject to a life term if he was subsequently convicted of any new felony, regardless of whether it was a serious or violent one.
"The Reform Act changed the sentence prescribed for a third strike defendant whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony. [Citation.]
Under the Reform Act's revised penalty provisions, many third strike defendants are excepted from the provision imposing an indeterminate life sentence (see Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A) ) and are instead sentenced in the same way as second strike defendants (see id., subd. (c)(2)(C)): that is, they receive a term equal to ‘twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction’ (id., subd. (c)(1)). A defendant does not qualify for this ameliorative change, however, if his current offense is a controlled substance charge involving large quantities (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)), one of various enumerated sex offenses (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(ii)), or one in which he used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)). The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply in cases in which the defendant was previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including those involving sexual violence, child sexual abuse, homicide or attempted homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death. ( § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)–(VIII).) The Act provides that these disqualifying factors must be pleaded and proved by the prosecution. ( § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
( Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 652-653, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 622, 373 P.3d 435.) The Act, therefore, enacted two kinds of reforms: prospective, by exempting some newly-charged defendants from an indeterminate term, and retrospective, by permitting resentencing for some already convicted.
Serious and violent felonies are defined in the Penal Code in two ways: by definition or because of the circumstances of their commission. Rape, robbery, murder and other listed offenses are serious or violent by definition.
See Pen. Code,2 §§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c).) Other felonies may qualify as serious based on a defendant's conduct during their commission. (See, e.g., § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23).) The circumstances of commission requirements are similar to, but different from, the factors set out in the Reform Act's resentencing provisions. (See discussion post.)
Defendant James Frierson and his girlfriend, Lynn Thompson, had a stormy relationship. In September 1998, he struck her in the head, broke her car windshield, and threatened to kill her. Frierson was jailed but the couple reconciled and married. When Frierson was subsequently sent to state prison, Thompson told him she was suing for divorce. Frierson responded by sending Thompson a series of letters, threatening to "track [her] down," and saying she "better run fast." He wrote: He indicated he would come to her job or son's school to find her. After Thompson filed divorce papers and secured a restraining order, Frierson sent more letters, threatening to rape and kill her.
A jury convicted defendant of stalking and stalking while violating a restraining order.3
(§ 646.9, subds. (a), (b).) Frierson had been convicted of robbery (§ 211) in 1981 and 1990, and of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) in 1998. The robbery convictions qualified as separate strikes. ( §§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).) Accordingly, he was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life in prison on one stalking count.
After passage of the Reform Act, defendant petitioned for resentencing. Stalking is not a serious or violent felony by definition. The People opposed resentencing, however. They urged Frierson was ineligible for relief because, during commission of that offense, he "intended to cause great bodily injury to another person."4 ( § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii) ; see also § 1170.126, subd. (e)(2).)
The court granted the People's unopposed motion to admit six exhibits, which included trial testimony by Thompson and two officers, as well as a May 2014 letter Thompson wrote to the sentencing court. The court denied resentencing, reasoning Frierson was ineligible because, "even assuming arguendo that the offense of stalking does not involve an intent to cause great bodily injury, the factual circumstances of petitioner's stalking clearly evidence an intent to cause great bodily injury." The court concluded that "the People have amply met their burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that Petitioner is ineligible for resentencing because petitioner ‘[d]uring the commission of the current offense, ... intended to cause great bodily injury to another person’ ( [ Pen. Code, §] 1170.12 [, subd.] (c)(2)(C)(iii))." The Court of Appeal affirmed.
The Three Strikes law, both before and after the Reform Act, does not directly mention the applicable burden of proof. However, the Three Strikes law has always required that a qualifying prior conviction be "pled and proved" by the prosecution. ( Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subds. (a), (c)(1), (c)(2)(A).) It has long been settled that "[t]he burden is on the state as in the case of the trial of other factual matters in issue to prove...
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