People v. Fuller, 3

Decision Date18 December 1975
Docket NumberNo. 3,3
Citation236 N.W.2d 58,395 Mich. 451
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cornell FULLER, Defendant-Appellant. 395 Mich. 451, 236 N.W.2d 58
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Atty., Research, Training & Appeals, Gerard A. Poehlman, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

State Appellate Defender Office by Dennis H. Benson, Asst. Defender, Detroit, Rolf Berg, Ken Lerner, Researchers, for defendant-appellant.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This Court has steadfastly supported the right of the trier of fact, particularly the jury, to believe, or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented. The instant case involves this doctrine.

As my brother the Chief Justice in his opinion observes, 'There was uncontradicted testimony that 16-year-old Zerious Meadows started the fire by throwing a Molotov cocktail, and by striking a match.' However, as he correctly notes, the question before us is not whether defendant Cornell 'Fuller planned the arson, or that he lit the fire, but rather that he acted as a lookout for Meadows by standing by the backgate of the yard and looking up and down the alley.'

In our opinion, evidence was presented which, if believed by the jury, would show just that. This is not a case of 'mere presence at the scene', for, if the jury believed it, defendant's activities were consonant with a theory of active participation in the crime.

The Chief Justice in his opinion carefully lays out the testimony of the important witnesses. There is no need to repeat this material in this opinion.

The jury could connect Fuller with Meadows who perpetrated the arson, because, as the Chief Justice summarized,

'(O)ne witness testified she saw five or six boys huddled together on the sidewalk in front of the Turner home before it burned. She identified one of the boys as Fuller. She said she saw him go through the gate to the back yard of the Turner home. She saw another of the boys in front throw something at the house and the house caught fire. She identified one of the other boys as a boy named 'Jefferey'.'

This boy was Jefferey Coleman, whose testimony, well set out by the Chief Justice, described Fuller's role in the crime. Even if we eliminate Jefferey Coleman's speculation that 'I guess he (Fuller) was watching out for Zerious', he still testified that defendant was looking back and forth 'to Jefferson' and 'back towards Kercheval' several times and that after the fire started, Fuller and Meadows together took off and ran toward Kercheval.

Another witness, Gary Martin, in the words of the Chief Justice 'testified that he saw Cornell Fuller, Zerious Meadows and four others walking together in the alley between Fairview and LeMay going towards Jefferson. He said he next saw Fuller and Meadows run through a yard and then run down to Kercheval through the alley.'

It is for the trier of fact to determine if the prosecution has 'negated every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant's innocence of the crime charged'. It was so determined in this case.

Conviction affirmed.

COLEMAN and FITZGERALD, JJ., concur.

LINDEMER and RYAN, JJ., not participating.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Chief Justice (dissenting).

Cornell Fuller was convicted of first-degree felony murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, by a jury.

Because we are satisfied after a thorough review of the record that there was insufficient evidence to support conviction, we set this verdict aside.

On May 18, 1970, two young girls lost their lives in a fire asserted to be caused by arson. There was uncontradicted testimony that 16-year-old Zerious Meadows started the fire by throwing a Molotov cocktail, and by striking a match. The prosecution did not allege that Fuller planned the arson, or that he lit the fire, but rather that he acted as a lookout for Meadows by standing by the back gate of the yard and looking up and down the alley.

One witness testified she saw five or six boys huddled together on the sidewalk in front of the Turner home before it burned. She identified one of the boys as Fuller. She said she saw him go through the gate to the back yard of the Turner home. She saw another of the boys in front throw something at the house and the house caught fire. She identified one of the other boys as a boy named 'Jefferey'. She testified she did not see anything unusual at the rear of the Turner home because she could not see that far.

Fourteen-year-old Jefferey Coleman testified that he saw Zerious Meadows on the back porch with a Coca Cola bottle in his hand, light a rag in the bottle and throw it against the porch. He said he saw Cornell Fuller 'standing by the gate' in the back yard. The following colloquy then occurred:

'Q. Now after he (Meadows) had struck the match and started the second fire what happened then?

'A. Well, he had jumped off the porch and then they ran down the alley towards Kercheval.

'Q. When you say they ran down the alley, who ran down the alley?

'A. Zerious and Cornell.

'Q. Towards Kercheval.

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. During the time that Zerious Meadows was throwing the bottle against the side of the house or against the side of the porch and lighting the match which set--started the second fire did you see what Cornell Fuller was doing?

'A. He was still standing by the gate, looking around.

'Q. When you say he was looking around what, exactly, was he doing?

'A. I guess he was watching out for Zerious--he had looked to Jefferson and he looked back towards Kercheval.

'Q. He looked towards Jefferson and looked back towards Kercheval?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Did he do that once or more than once?

'A. He did it more than once.

'Q. He did it more than once--how many times--

THE COURT: Was this the alley gate or the gate toward the front of the house?

'A. It was the alley gate.

'Q. How many times would you say Cornell Fuller looked towards Jefferson and then looked back towards Kercheval?

'A. I wouldn't know.

'Q. But it was more than once; is that correct?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Was it more than twice?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Now, during the time that this was taking place, Jefferey, did you hear any words spoken between Zerious and Cornell?

'A. No.

'Q. Did you say anything to them?

'A. No.

'Q. Now, after--strike that, please--after the second fire began, you testified that Zerious and Cornell left the backyard; is that correct?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Did they enter the alley?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Did they enter the alley through the gate that Cornell Fuller was standing by?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. And then they started running; is that correct?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Were they running together or separately, Jefferey?

'A. Together.

'Q. And they were running towards Kercheval; is that correct?

'A. Yes, sir.'

Gary Martin testified that he saw Cornell Fuller, Zerious Meadows and four others walking together in the alley between Fairview and LeMay going towards Jefferson. He said he next saw Fuller and Meadows run through a yard and then run down to Kercheval through the alley.

The testimony summarized above was the entire evidence linking Cornell Fuller with the arson and resulting deaths. At the conclusion of the prosecution's case, Fuller's attorney moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. The trial judge in denying the motion said:

'THE COURT: The question in this case is a close one. As I regard the testimony the defendant's complicity in the case depends almost completely on the fact that he was present at the scene of the crime and that he was seen going to it and seen running afterwards. There was very meagre evidence to call him a look-out in this particular case; however, the Court is of the impression that we do have a border-line prima facie case in this instance--a border line prima facie case--and, accordingly, the Court will reserve its ruling on the motion for a directed verdict. It seems to me that the testimony is the kind that would be--that there would be a high probability that the jury would return a verdict of not guilty in this case, but where there is a prima facie case the Court cannot speculate on it--on the jury's decision in the case and the Court will, however, reserve a ruling on the motion.'

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, a motion to set aside that verdict as against the great weight of the evidence was denied.

The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support a conviction of felony murder against this defendant. In a prosecution for felony murder, the felony must be proven independently of the murder. People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973). Arson is a specific intent crime, and proof of the corpus delicti requires the showing not only that the building was burned but that the fire was intentionally set. Peterson v. Oceana Circuit Judge, 243 Mich. 215, 219 N.W. 934 (1928). There was inadequate proof of Fuller's intention to act in concert with Zerious Meadows to set this fire.

The prosecution did not contend that Fuller assisted in planning this arson; they argued rather that he acted as a 'lookout' for Meadows, I.e., that he was an 'aider and abettor'. The fact that Fuller and Meadows were seen together--that Fuller was seen by the alley 'standing by the gate, looking around' does not establish his being a lookout for...

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