People v. Funez–Paiagua

• Decision Date: 21 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11SA368.,11SA368.
• Citation: 276 P.3d 576,2012 CO 37
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Adolph E. FUNEZ–PAIAGUA, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

276 P.3d 576

2012 CO 37

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Adolph E. FUNEZ–PAIAGUA, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 11SA368.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

May 21, 2012.

Mitchell R. Morrissey, District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Robert J. Whitley, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Arnie A. Beckman, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant–Appellee.

Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this interlocutory appeal, we review the trial court's order suppressing evidence that police officers seized from Adolph E. Funez–Paiagua. We conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop under the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 Two police officers observed Funez–Paiagua standing on the property of a closed business late at night. When one of the officers approached, Funez–Paiagua fled and the officer heard a loud crash as a car stereo amplifier fell to the ground. The officer ran after him and ordered him to stop. Funez–Paiagua stopped and the officers asked him for his name and birthdate and asked him what he was doing. The officers then searched law enforcement databases and discovered four outstanding warrants for Funez–Paiagua's arrest. The officers arrested Funez–Paiagua, searched a bag he was carrying, and found a gun in it. The prosecution charged Funez–Paiagua with possession of a weapon by a previous offender.

¶ 3 Funez–Paiagua moved the trial court to suppress the gun from evidence. At the suppression hearing, the two officers testified regarding the events of the evening. The officers testified that they were assigned to patrol a portion of Colfax Avenue because the area had recently seen an increase in criminal activity. The first officer saw Funez–Paiagua standing on private property belonging to an auto body shop. The officers testified that it was 1:15 a.m., that the auto body shop was closed, and that no other businesses in the area were open. Although the testimony indicated that Colfax Avenue is generally a busy area, the officers testified that at the time of the arrest no other people were nearby. The first officer approached the place where he had seen Funez–Paiagua standing, but Funez–Paiagua was no longer there. The officer then heard a loud crash and saw Funez–Paiagua running away from him and carrying some bags.¹ The officer then ordered Funez–Paiagua to stop.

¶ 4 The trial court found the officers' testimony credible, but concluded that the evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Specifically, the trial court determined that the seizure occurred “at the time the [first] officer contacted [Funez–Paiagua].” The trial court found that, at that time, the officer knew that Funez–Paiagua was standing on private property late at night. The trial court concluded that these facts did not support reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop and therefore the trial court suppressed the evidence seized as a result of the stop.

¶ 5 The People filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16–12–102(2), C.R.S. (2011), and C.A.R. 4.1.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 6 When reviewing an order on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings and will not disturb them if they are supported by competent evidence in the record. People v. Revoal, 2012 CO 8, ¶ 9, 269 P.3d 1238. We review de novo the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion of whether a seizure violated constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Brown, 217 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Colo.2009).

III. Applicable Law

¶ 7 The federal and Colorado constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. Warrantless seizures must generally be supported by probable cause, but an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion is an exception to this general rule. People v. King, 16 P.3d 807, 812–13 (Colo.2001); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 508–10, 485 P.2d 495, 497–98 (1971). An investigatory stop is an encounter in which an officer briefly stops a suspicious person and makes reasonable inquiries to confirm or dispel these suspicions, such as determining an individual's identity or obtaining an explanation of a person's behavior. King, 16 P.3d at 814;People v. Greer, 860 P.2d 528, 530 (Colo.1993).

¶ 8 Three conditions must be met when undertaking an investigatory stop: (1) there must be reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred, is taking place, or is about to occur; (2) the purpose of the intrusion must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the intrusion must be reasonably related to its purpose. Greer, 860 P.2d at 530. Only the first condition is at issue in this case.

¶ 9 Reasonable suspicion exists when the facts known to the officer, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, create a reasonable and articulable suspicionof criminal activity which justifies an intrusion into the defendant's personal privacy at the time of the stop. Id. To determine whether an investigatory stop was based on reasonable suspicion, a court must consider the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the intrusion. People v. Padgett, 932 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo.1997).

IV. Analysis

¶ 10 In this case, the facts and circumstances known to police at the time of the intrusion were: (1) it was 1:15 a.m.; (2) criminal activity had recently increased in the area; (3) Funez–Paiagua was standing on the private property of an auto body shop; (4) the shop was closed; (5) no other businesses in the area were open; (6) no other people were nearby; (7) the officer heard a loud crash; (8) Funez–Paiagua fled; and (9) Funez–Paiagua was carrying bags. We conclude that these facts, viewed together and in light of the officer's training and experience, create reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.

¶ 11 We note at the outset that the trial court's ruling mentioned only the late hour and the fact that Funez–Paiagua was standing on private property. Although the trial court did not make specific findings of fact regarding the other undisputed facts listed above, the trial court specifically found the officers' testimony credible. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not disbelieve these other relevant facts. Rather, it appears that the trial court focused on the facts known to the officer when the officer first decided to approach the place where Funez–Paiagua had been standing. We must, however, analyze the facts and circumstances known to the officer when the officer ordered Funez–Paiagua to stop. Padgett, 932 P.2d at 815 (we must analyze reasonable suspicion based on facts known to the officer at the time of the intrusion upon an individual's personal privacy). We therefore undertake our analysis by considering all of the facts listed above.

¶ 12 In Revoal, we recently determined that reasonable suspicion did not exist where a person stood on private property in a high-crime area late at night, the person looked left and right while aimlessly walking across a parking lot, and the person changed direction and walked away after noticing a police car. 2012 CO 8, ¶ 12, 269 P.3d 1238. We noted that there is nothing unusual or suspicious about a person standing on a street corner, or walking up and down the street. Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22–23, 88 S.Ct. 1868). We reasoned that this principle was especially applicable in Revoal because other businesses in the area were open and other people were present. Id. In this case, Funez–Paiagua was also standing on private property in a high-crime area late at night. Unlike in Revoal, however, in this case no other businesses were open and there were no other people nearby. Funez–Paiagua's presence on the property of the auto body shop in this case is therefore more suspicious than Revoal's presence in the parking lot.

¶ 13 Furthermore, we recognize that an attempt to avoid coming into contact with police does not, without more, justify an investigatory stop. Id. at ¶ 18. This case, however, involves more. In Revoal, the defendant was already walking aimlessly through a parking lot and then changed direction and walked away from a police car. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 18. We determined that the “change in direction did not convert the relatively innocuous set of circumstances the police observed into justification for an investigatory stop.” Id. at ¶ 18. Here, by contrast, the officer heard the loud crash of a car stereo amplifier falling to the ground on the property of the auto body shop, which housed a number of cars. The officer then noticed Funez–Paiagua fleeing and carrying bags. Under these circumstances, an officer could reasonably suspect that Funez–Paiagua had stolen some items from the shop or from the cars parked on the shop property and had stored them in the bags he was carrying as he hurried away from the officer. Moreover, as we noted above, Funez–Paiagua's presence on the shop's property was already more suspicious than Revoal's presence in the parking lot. Considering all of these facts and circumstances together, we conclude that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to order Funez–Paiagua to stop. The trial court therefore incorrectly suppressed the evidence collected in the search incident to arrest after the discovery of the outstanding warrants resulting from the initial stop.

V. Conclusion

¶ 14 We conclude that the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop create reasonable suspicion. The investigatory stop was...