People v. Galak

• Decision Date: 06 July 1993
• Citation: 81 N.Y.2d 463,616 N.E.2d 842,600 N.Y.S.2d 185
• Parties: , 616 N.E.2d 842 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Martin GALAK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 185

600 N.Y.S.2d 185

81 N.Y.2d 463, 616 N.E.2d 842

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Martin GALAK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 6, 1993.

Mahler & Harris, P.C., Kew Gardens (Stephen R. Mahler, of counsel), for appellant.

[81 N.Y.2d 465] Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty. of Queens County, Kew Gardens (Mitchell Silverman and Steven J. Chananie, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

Police stopped and arrested defendant while he was operating a white panel truck a few blocks from his residence in Queens and charged him with illegal possession of a vehicle identification number (VIN) plate and failure to have a proper license. Following the arrest, the police conducted a warrantless search of the truck and found an assortment of stolen auto parts.

On this appeal, defendant asserts that evidence obtained from the truck should have been suppressed because there was an insufficient "nexus" between the circumstances of his arrest and the probable cause for the search. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the police search was permissible under both the Federal and State Constitutions and therefore affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

At the suppression hearing, the arresting officers testified that the Auto Crime Division had begun an investigation of defendant several months earlier when an officer followed a trail of oil from the shell of a stolen vehicle to defendant's home. Thereafter they maintained a surveillance of him, his vehicles and his residence and as a result discovered, among other things, that the license plates on defendant's truck were from a Long Island car that had been stolen and stripped of its major components and that the truck's VIN plate was from another vehicle.

In the hours preceding the arrest, police saw a dismantled vehicle in defendant's garage and saw defendant loading fenders into the back of his truck. They waited until defendant's truck pulled away from his home, followed it a few blocks and then, when they suspected that defendant had become aware they were following him, stopped the truck. Defendant was unable to produce a license. He did produce a registration but it indicated the vehicle was owned by the woman on Long Island whose car had been stolen. Defendant stated that the woman was a friend who had lent the truck to him, but police knew from their earlier investigation that she did not own a truck.

Defendant was arrested for illegal possession of a VIN plate and failure to have a valid license. Police then searched the truck and discovered an assortment of vehicle parts and an itemized price list for them. The officers also determined that the truck was stolen. Based in part on the evidence uncovered during the truck search, police obtained a search warrant for defendant's residence and found additional incriminating evidence there.

Following Supreme Court's denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of the truck, defendant pleaded guilty to several charges of criminal possession of stolen property and related offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed. 186 A.D.2d 756, 589 N.Y.S.2d 797.

Defendant does not challenge the findings below that the police had both probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search. Instead he maintains that the People failed to establish the necessary "nexus" between the circumstances of the arrest and the probable cause justifying the search. Under defendant's theory, the search of his truck was improper because the probable cause supporting it arose from acts allegedly committed at another time and place unrelated to the arrest. As defendant sees it, a search can be justified under the automobile exception only when the search is necessary to locate evidence related either to the crimes for which the arrest was made or for crimes of which they become aware during the stop. Because possessing an illegal VIN plate and driving without a license are not crimes for which evidence will be found inside the vehicle, defendant asserts the courts below erred in not granting suppression.

Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a search conducted without a warrant issued by an impartial Magistrate is per se unreasonable unless one of the established exceptions applies (California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576). One such exception is the so-called "automobile exception", under which State actors may search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that evidence or contraband will be found there (California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068, 85 L.Ed.2d 406; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543). Elimination of the warrant requirement in these cases has been justified both by the mobility of vehicles--and the concomitant likelihood that evidence or contraband will disappear if the search is delayed--and by the diminished expectation of privacy held by those who occupy motor vehicles (California v. Carney, supra, 471 U.S. at 392-393, 105 S.Ct. at 2070). Although the search may proceed without a warrant, it must still be supported by probable cause (id., at 394-395, 105 S.Ct. at 2071; Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 154, 45 S.Ct. at 285). ^* Inasmuch as the police had probable cause to search the truck, their doing so was permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

When applying our State Constitution we have held that the police must not only have probable cause to search the vehicle but that there must also be a nexus between the arrest and the probable cause to search (People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y.2d 673, 543 N.Y.S.2d 40, 541 N.E.2d 40; People v. Langen, 60 N.Y.2d 170, 180-181, 469 N.Y.S.2d 44, 456 N.E.2d 1167, cert. denied 465 U.S. 1028, 104 S.Ct. 1287, 79 L.Ed.2d 690; People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 432 N.E.2d 745; see, N.Y. Const., art. I, § 12). Though Langen characterized the nexus as a connection "between the probable cause to search and the crime for which...