People v. Galan
| Citation | 229 Ill.2d 484,893 N.E.2d 597 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 103845.,103845. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jesse GALAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
John R. Deleon, Sam Adam and Samuel E. Adam, Chicago, for appellee.
In November 2001, defendant, Jesse Galan, was indicted for possession with intent to deliver 900 or more grams of cocaine and more than 5,000 grams of cannabis. The evidence against him was suppressed by the circuit court of Cook County and the State filed a "Certificate of Substantial Impairment" and brought an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)). The appellate court affirmed. 367 Ill.App.3d 876, 305 Ill.Dec. 706, 856 N.E.2d 511. After its petition for rehearing was denied, the State filed and was granted leave to appeal to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315).
There are two issues in this case: first, whether Illinois courts must inquire into extradition irregularities for crimes committed within Illinois' borders; and, second, whether exclusion is the appropriate remedy when Illinois police violate a postarrest provision of another state's fresh pursuit statute. We reverse.
On October 11, 2001, defendant drove his truck onto the Chicago Skyway, entering the Skyway from an Illinois on-ramp. After continuing onto a tollbooth 0.8 miles into Indiana, defendant was stopped by several Chicago police officers. Defendant's vehicle was searched, and police recovered two boxes filled with marijuana. Defendant was arrested and taken to his mother's house at 8521 South Burley Avenue in Chicago, where he sometimes resided. Police conducted a search of the house in the presence of defendant and his mother and stepfather, eventually recovering two pistols, approximately $10,000 in cash, and cocaine. A probable cause hearing was held and defendant was eventually indicted by a Cook County grand jury, as indicated above.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The motion was filed on July 23, 2002, and requested the trial court to "[q]uash [defendant's] arrest, because of the absence of authority of probable cause to effect it, and to suppress from introduction into evidence in this cause, the following: (a) Physical evidence discovered and as a result of arrest and detention; (b) Statements, utterances, reports of gestures and responses by petitioner during the detention following the arrest[] i.e. oral statements of defendant[;] (c) All other knowledge and fruits thereof, witnesses statements, whether written, or oral or gestural and products of the arrest." Defendant asserted that during his arrest and subsequent detention, the State "became aware of the existence of physical evidence all the direct and indirect fruits of the arrest and detention, which connect petitioner with the instant offense." The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 17, 2003.
Defendant testified that he was driving his truck toward Indiana when he was stopped at the tollbooth, past the "mile 1" marker located in Indiana. He stated that several men dressed in plain clothes, who it soon became apparent were Chicago police officers, approached him at the tollbooth with guns drawn and ordered him out of his truck, placed him in handcuffs, and forced him onto the ground. Defendant testified that he did not give the men permission to search his truck. Defendant acknowledged that when the truck was searched, police recovered two boxes of marijuana and told him he was under arrest.
Defendant testified that the police then took him back to his mother's house in Illinois. He stated that he occasionally resided at his mother's house and had come from that address when he was stopped at the tollbooth. Defendant testified that officers knocked on the door of his mother's house and asked him if they could search the house. Defendant testified that he told the officers they could not search the house. He also testified, though, that his mother eventually opened the door and, upon learning that the police had "busted [defendant] with some marijuana," agreed, after being asked, to allow the officers to search the home. Defendant maintained that while he later signed a consent to search, he only did so after officers threatened to arrest his mother and stepfather. Defendant acknowledged that in searching the house, police found other contraband. He asserted, however, that this contraband was found before he signed the consent to search.
On cross-examination, defendant testified that after he was removed from his truck by the police, the officers moved him away from traffic and told him he was under arrest. Defendant stated that at this point officers began searching his truck and found the two boxes containing marijuana in the truck's backseat. Defendant testified that the officers eventually informed him that he was in trouble and they were planning to take him back to the house he had come from, which he understood to be his mother's house. Following this testimony, defendant answered several more questions regarding the circumstances surrounding the search of his mother's home.
The State called Officer Brian Luce, one of the Chicago police officers involved in arresting defendant. Luce testified that he was part of the Chicago police department's narcotics and gangs investigation section. Luce stated that after obtaining information from a confidential informant, police became interested in defendant. This informant indicated that defendant lived at 8521 South Burley Avenue and 9735 Avenue M in Chicago. Moreover, the informant stated that defendant was storing, selling, and manufacturing large quantities of marijuana. Based on this information, the Chicago police department began an investigation, in which Luce took part.
Luce testified that on October 11, 2001, he was conducting surveillance on the Avenue M address as part of the ongoing investigation. Luce indicated that other officers were conducting surveillance on the Burley Avenue address. Luce observed defendant and another individual, Jose Mojica, leave the Avenue M address and drive to the Burley Avenue address in defendant's truck. Luce saw defendant and Mojica get out of the truck and enter the house at 8521 South Burley. At this point, Luce picked a surveillance spot around the block while another officer set up surveillance on the front door. Luce then received a radio communication from the other officer that defendant and Mojica, who was carrying a white bag, left the house, got back in the truck, and headed back to the Avenue M address.
Luce followed the men back to the Avenue M address and observed Mojica, still carrying the white bag, exit the truck and get into a Nissan Maxima by himself. At this point, part of the surveillance team, including Luce, followed the Nissan, while another part of the surveillance team remained at the Avenue M address. Eventually, a marked police car pulled Mojica over and Luce was informed by radio that Mojica did not have a valid driver's license and was going to be taken to a police station for a traffic violator bond. Luce further testified that the beige Maxima was taken to the police station, where a custodial search was performed and the white bag, the same bag that was observed going into the car, was found to contain a large amount of currency.
After being informed that Mojica was in custody and a large amount of currency was found, Luce was told to go back to Avenue M and continue surveillance. Luce observed defendant again leave the Avenue M address and return to the Burley Avenue address. Luce testified that another officer saw defendant enter the house and then exit, carrying a brown box. Luce testified that the other officer told him that while taking the box to his truck, defendant was looking up and down the street. Defendant then repeated this action, entering the house, leaving with a second brown box, and taking it to his truck, nervously looking up and down the street.
Luce stated that after defendant entered the truck he pulled away, only to stop approximately 50 to 100 feet from the Burley Avenue address and look up and down the street, watching the cars as they passed. Luce, who was then following defendant, had to drive by in his unmarked vehicle. In driving by, Luce observed defendant looking out his driver's side window in several different directions. Luce testified that based upon his experience as a Chicago police officer, defendant's actions constituted countersurveillance or tactics used to see if police are in the area.
After driving by defendant, Luce drove around the block and was informed over the radio that defendant made an illegal U-turn, crossing two lanes. Luce was eventually able to reposition himself behind defendant's truck. Luce testified that officers continued "moving surveillance" and observed defendant travel from Burley Avenue to Indianapolis Boulevard and then onto 106th Street, where he veered from the far left to the far right lane, without signaling, across three or four lanes of traffic, traveling to the Skyway on-ramp. Luce stated that defendant's "erratic move from the left [lane] all the way to the right [lane]" led police to believe that their surveillance was compromised. Again, Luce and other officers believed that defendant's conduct indicated that he was either trying to get away or utilizing countersurveillance tactics to see if he was being followed. At that point, Luce and the other officers agreed to stop defendant's vehicle to investigate.
Luce testified that officers stopped defendant's...
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