People v. Galimanis, 95CA0401

• Decision Date: 06 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95CA0401,95CA0401
• Citation: 944 P.2d 626
• Parties: 21 Colorado Journal 167 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Philip GALIMANIS, Defendant-Appellant. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 626

944 P.2d 626

21 Colorado Journal 167

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Philip GALIMANIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95CA0401.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. V.

Feb. 6, 1997.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 1997.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 20, 1997.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Robert M. Petrusak, Sr. Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.

Defendant, Philip Leslie Galimanis, appeals from the judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him sane at the time of commission of first degree murder, motor vehicle theft, and crime of violence. He contends that the trial court erred by excluding expert opinion testimony regarding his sanity two years prior to his killing of the victim, and by excluding certain specific evidence of his insanity that occurred after the killing. He also contends that the trial court erred by failing to submit certain instructions to the jury. We affirm.

The facts of this case are set forth in People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644 (Colo.App.1988), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1238, 111 S.Ct. 2872, 115 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1991).

In 1983, victim was found dead on the floor of her apartment. She had been beaten, stabbed, and decapitated. Defendant fled the scene in victim's car and was later discovered asleep in that vehicle. Charged with first degree murder, motor vehicle theft, and crime of violence, defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Two separate trials were held. In the first, a sanity trial conducted pursuant to § 16-8-104, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), a jury found defendant sane. In the second, a jury found defendant guilty of the crimes charged.

Defendant appealed, and a division of this court in People v. Galimanis, supra, reversed on the ground that defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights had been improperly used as evidence of his sanity. The case was remanded for a new sanity trial.

In 1991, after certiorari had been denied by both the Colorado and the United States Supreme Courts, defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the state hospital. Three years later, in 1994, defendant was determined to be competent to stand trial. At this second sanity trial, a jury found defendant sane, and this appeal followed.

I.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by not allowing an expert witness for the defense to offer an opinion on defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong in 1981, two years before the killing. We perceive no error.

A trial court may admit expert testimony if it will assist a trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. CRE 702; People v. Williams, 790 P.2d 796 (Colo.1990). Whether expert testimony will aid the jury in resolving an issue is within the discretion of the trial court, Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495 (Colo.1992), and appellate courts may not overturn a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Williams, supra.

Moreover, the trial court retains discretionary authority under CRE 403 to exclude relevant expert testimony if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo.1991). A determination as to relevancy will not be reversed on review absent abuse of discretion. See CRE 403; People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983).

A clinical psychologist, who had examined defendant on three occasions in 1981 at defendant's mother's behest, appeared as an expert witness for the defense. He testified that he had diagnosed defendant at that time as suffering from borderline psychosis. The trial court allowed the expert to testify to any and all factual evidence of defendant's insanity, to his clinical diagnosis of defendant's behavior, and, particularly, that someone suffering from borderline psychosis could fall within the legal definition of insanity. The court, though, precluded the psychologist's opinion as to whether defendant was capable, in 1981, of distinguishing right from wrong--that is, the expert was precluded from offering an opinion as to whether defendant was legally insane in 1981.

We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excluding that portion of the psychologist's testimony. Here, the single issue to be determined by the jury was defendant's legal sanity or insanity at the time of the killing in 1983. Hence, an opinion on defendant's legal sanity at any other time--unlike evidence of psychotic behavior, or psychological diagnosis of such behavior--simply did not appear to be pertinent. Similarly, because the jury was expressly instructed to determine defendant's sanity specifically at the time of the killing, any such opinion would have been extremely confusing. Hence, any marginal relevance of the expert's opinion would have been substantially outweighed by its likely prejudicial effect.

II.

Defendant next contends that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of specific instances of defendant's conduct that occurred during defendant's confinement at the state hospital. Again, we disagree.

Traditionally, the scope of evidence admissible on the issue of insanity is broad. People v. Wright, 648 P.2d 665 (Colo.1982). While it is proper to inquire into the mental condition of the defendant both before and after the commission of the act, the admissibility of evidence in an insanity trial depends on whether "the inquiry bears such relation to the person's condition of mind at the time of the crime as to be worthy of consideration in respect thereto." See Garrison v. People, 151 Colo. 388, 392, 378 P.2d 401, 403 (1963). And, a determination as to such relevancy, being within the sound discretion of the trial court, will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See CRE 403; People v. Lowe, supra.

At trial, two psychiatrists who had examined defendant in the months subsequent to the killing appeared as expert witnesses for the defense. Both testified as to specific instances of what they termed psychotic behavior on defendant's part during their meetings. They noted, for example, that he often appeared to be lost in conversations with himself and that he appeared to react constantly to internal stimuli. They also cited inappropriate laughing and smiling, incoherent mumbling, and bizarre eruptive gestures.

One expert testified that he had diagnosed defendant as suffering from atypical psychosis, and testified that he believed that if he had spent more time with defendant, he would likely have been able to characterize defendant's disorder as rising to the level of schizophrenia. The other diagnosed defendant as suffering from schizophrenia and that he was "borderline."

The trial court also permitted these experts to testify as to diagnoses made by hospital staff while defendant was at the state hospital--defendant was diagnosed, at six-month intervals, as suffering from "chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia"--but did not permit either psychiatrist to testify to evidence in the hospital records of the specific instances of conduct occurring at the hospital. The court determined that to allow the defense to present specific instances of conduct demonstrating defendant's insanity would also require it to allow the prosecution to present specific acts revealing defendant's sanity. The trial court reasoned that such an inquiry would be overly time consuming and confusing to the jury. Furthermore, it determined that such an inquiry would not be relevant to the determination of defendant's sanity at the time of the killing.

Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion on the trial court's exclusion of this evidence.

III.

Defendant's primary contention is that the trial court erred in failing to provide, sua sponte, certain instructions to the jury. We disagree.

All jury instructions must be read and considered together, and if, collectively, they adequately inform the jury of the law, there is no reversible error. People v. Orona, 907 P.2d 659 (Colo.App.1995).

Here, the trial court submitted the following jury instruction on the affirmative defense of insanity, to which defendant had no objection at trial:

A person who is so diseased or defective in mind at the time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act, or being able so to distinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease or defect as to destroy the will power and render him incapable of choosing the right and refraining from doing the wrong is not accountable; and this is so howsoever such insanity may be manifested, by irresistible impulse or otherwise, but care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives, and kindred evil conditions, for when the act is induced by any of these causes the person is accountable to the law.

This instruction tracked the definition of insanity set forth by statute as well as the pattern jury instruction defining insanity. By statute, an instruction of this nature is required to be given to the jury. See § 16-8-101, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A); see also COLJI-Crim. No. 3:09-A (1993 Supp.).

A.

Defendant argues that the trial court was required to submit an additional instruction, set forth in COLJI-Crim. No. 3:10-A (1993 Supp.), informing the jury that:

[T]he phrase 'incapable of distinguishing right from wrong' refers to a cognitive ability, due to a...