People v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 23 January 1981 |
| Citation | 115 Cal.App.3d 85,171 Cal.Rptr. 169 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary Helene GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 35491. |
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Hahn, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John R. Gorey, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant Mary Helene Garcia appeals from a judgment of conviction following trial by jury. Her pretrial motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was denied and defendant was found guilty of violation of Penal Code section 187, first degree murder, and violation of Penal Code section 211, robbery. Defendant was sentenced to state prison on the murder conviction for the term prescribed by law. Sentence on the robbery conviction was stayed.
On January 6, 1978, Mary Helene Garcia (appellant) met Thomas Empey (Empey) and Jerry Martin (Martin) at her apartment in Fort Worth, Texas. In her presence, Empey and Martin discussed plans to rob a local spa (Spa) and to steal a pickup truck owned by the manager, Robert Faust (Faust). She drove the men to the Spa and immediately proceeded to another location. Martin and Empey, wearing ski masks, entered armed with Martin's .32-caliber pistol. Empey seized a 12-gauge shotgun which they used together with Martin's pistol to steal some cash, a pellet gun and a single-shot shotgun. They abducted Faust and an employee, Richard Suominen (Suominen); took Faust's pickup truck and drove to an isolated spot where Empey shot and killed Faust. Their efforts to kill Suominen were thwarted by Suominen's escape. The surviving victim reported the crimes to the Fort Worth authorities. 1
Martin and Empey returned to appellant's apartment and divided the proceeds of the robbery. Appellant arrived a short time later, and the two men told her of the events that occurred after she left them at the Spa. She accompanied them to an isolated area where they burned Faust's truck. They then drove to a location where Martin and Empey met with two women who knew of their involvement in the Spa robbery. She was present when they paid the potential informants for their silence. Upon their return to her apartment, Empey stored the stolen single-shot shotgun in a closet.
Armed with Martin's pistol and the stolen 12-gauge shotgun, the trio left Fort Worth in Martin's station wagon (registered to his estranged wife) and eventually arrived in Las Vegas. Enroute, when it appeared that they would be stopped by a state policeman, appellant removed the pistol from the glove compartment, at Martin's request, and placed it on the seat beside him. Sometime later, Martin told appellant and Empey that he would not be taken alive. He further suggested that they rob a gas station should they run short of funds.
After two days in Las Vegas, Empey surreptitiously left Martin and appellant and returned to Fort Worth. On January 10 or 11, 1978, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and made a full confession implicating his former companions.
Unaware of Empey's confession, Martin and appellant drove to California where Martin's station wagon ultimately broke down on a main thoroughfare in Santa Barbara. Their funds were exhausted and they abandoned the station wagon.
About 6 o'clock on the evening of January 15, 1978, Martin, accompanied by a woman described as having long black hair similar to that of appellant, in a white Volkswagen Rabbit (Rabbit) purchased gasoline in Santa Barbara. The Rabbit was the car that the victim in the instant case, William Knox (Knox) had driven to Santa Barbara.
Knox had checked out of a Santa Barbara motel on the morning of January 15th. Four days later his body was discovered in a roadside ravine in Santa Barbara. He had been shot repeatedly in the chest and abdomen with Martin's .32-caliber pistol.
On January 12, 1978, the Tarrant County Sheriff's Department obtained a search warrant for appellant's apartment and seized the single-shot shotgun. Warrants of arrest were issued for Martin and appellant.
Several days later, the Fort Worth police became aware that appellant and Martin had returned to the area and Detective Goodwin (Goodwin), assisted by an informant (Wilson), formulated plans to effect Martin's arrest. By happenstance, Goodwin was in Wilson's home when Martin telephoned and made arrangements with Wilson for a "marijuana buy." Goodwin and another officer waited for Martin to arrive pursuant to the arrangements. Both officers had prior information from Empey that Martin and appellant were traveling armed.
Goodwin observed Martin and appellant as they arrived in the Rabbit. Following their entry into the Wilson residence, Goodwin arrested Martin. A search of Martin's person yielded a loaded .32-caliber pistol and another loaded clip. Simultaneously, the other officer held a gun on appellant, told her not to move, took her purse from her hands and upended it. From the contents that spilled out he found some .32-caliber shells and a ski mask similar to the ones worn during the Spa robbery, at which juncture appellant was formally placed under arrest.
Both appellant and Martin were given their Miranda warnings. Both waived their privilege against self-incrimination and made statements to the police. When Martin was asked if the Rabbit was his, he replied that he had stolen the car in California. When asked what was in it, he stated that there was a shotgun in the back. The 12-gauge shotgun was removed and the car was subsequently impounded. Martin later made a statement to the Santa Barbara police regarding the instant case. This statement was admitted into evidence at appellant's trial, following Martin's death under undisclosed circumstances. Testimony regarding the Fort Worth crimes and the flight to Las Vegas was also admitted into evidence.
Appellant testified that she drove Empey and Martin to the Spa on January 6, 1978, and knew that they intended to commit a robbery. She did not see them again until she returned to her apartment. As she returned, Empey and Martin were walking out of her apartment. Appellant first heard of the events relative to the Spa robbery and Faust murder when she accompanied them on the drive that culminated in their burning the pickup truck.
During their travels after leaving Fort Worth, appellant knew guns were in the car and occasionally carried the pistol into a motel room. She had handed the pistol to Martin from the glove compartment in the station wagon when they were stopped by the state police. When they reached Santa Barbara, they slept by the road one night and a police officer approached and talked to Martin. He made no move to obtain the pistol.
Appellant further testified that after Martin's station wagon broke down, she was aware that they needed to obtain another automobile. While she did not want When they came to an isolated area, Martin stopped and told Knox that he would be released there. Martin and Knox walked to the rear of the car to remove the luggage. After they reached the rear of the car, appellant heard a gunshot. Until that moment, she was unaware that Martin intended to kill Knox. Hearing the volley of shots, appellant testified she was shocked and that she tried to stop Martin and convince him to leave.
Martin to steal one, she feared that he might. When Martin saw Knox's car, he told her that he intended to steal it. Martin told Knox that appellant was ill; Knox offered them transportation to a hospital. When appellant and Martin entered the car with Knox, she was unaware of Martin's exact plan. He had not stated that he would use the pistol. However, Martin did produce the pistol and point it at Knox. During the drive, Martin continually told Knox that he would not be harmed. Appellant believed that Martin intended to free Knox.
A psychiatrist testified on behalf of appellant that she was immature and detached with a poor self-concept. She was somewhat schizoid and very attached to Martin as something of a father figure. In the psychiatrist's opinion, appellant would tend to believe anything Martin said.
1. Whether the trial court erroneously denied appellant's 1538.5 motion to suppress the following evidence:
a. The single-shot shotgun seized from appellant's Fort Worth apartment pursuant to a search warrant alleged to be invalid;
b. .32-caliber shells and a ski mask seized from appellant's purse in a search incident to her arrest also alleged to be invalid;
c. Evidence seized from the white Volkswagen Rabbit in a warrantless search.
2. Whether the admission into evidence of Jerry Martin's extrajudicial statement, as a declaration against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230, denied appellant her right to confront witnesses as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
3. Whether it was prejudicial error for the trial court to admit evidence of the Texas crimes pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1101(b) and 352.
4. Whether Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 required the trial court to obtain a California Youth Authority diagnostic report before sentencing appellant to state prison.
5. Whether the juvenile court's order certifying appellant as unfit for juvenile court treatment, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), denied her the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
6. Whether appellant is entitled to presentence good time/work time Sage credits.
Appellant first contends that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to suppress evidence pursuant...
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