People v. Garcia

• Docket Number: C093430
• Decision Date: 02 September 2022
• Citation: 82 Cal.App.5th 956,299 Cal.Rptr.3d 131
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Albert GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

82 Cal.App.5th 956

299 Cal.Rptr.3d 131

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Albert GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

C093430

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed September 2, 2022

Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Melissa Lipon and Ismah Ahmad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Duarte, J.

In 1993, defendant Albert Garcia physically assaulted and stole money from an 82-year-old man, who died about an hour later from lethal cardiac arrhythmia

, i.e., irregular beating of the heart. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder ( Pen. Code, § 187 )¹ and robbery (§ 211). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 27 years to life in prison, and we affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. ( People v. Garcia (Oct. 22, 1996, C020253) [nonpub. opn.] (Garcia I ).) In affirming defendant's murder conviction, we noted that the prosecution's theory was felony murder, and concluded that the felony-murder rule applied to the facts of this case because there was substantial evidence the robbery, either the physical altercation or the emotional stress, caused the victim's death. (Garcia I, supra , C020253.)

In 2019, after the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which narrowed the class of persons liable for felony murder, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95 ).² Following the appointment of counsel, briefing,³ and a hearing, the trial court denied the petition in August 2020. The court found that defendant was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because he was the "actual killer," a felony-murder theory that remains valid after the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437.

Defendant timely appealed; after delays for record augments and multiple continuances in the parties’ briefing, the case was fully briefed on February 7, 2022, and assigned to the panel as presently constituted on May 5, 2022.

On appeal, defendant raises two contentions. First, he claims the trial court improperly evaluated the validity of his murder conviction under the "actual killer" provision of section 189, subdivision (e)(1), as there is no "actual killer" within the meaning of the revised felony-murder rule when death results from a preexisting medical condition aggravated by the stress of the underlying felony. Second, defendant argues the trial court erroneously relied upon a sufficiency of the evidence standard in denying his petition for resentencing rather than determining whether the prosecution had met its burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of murder under current law.

As we next explain, because we disagree with defendant on his first contention, we need not reach his second. Here defendant was the actual killer; accordingly, we shall affirm the order denying his petition for resentencing.

BACKGROUND

We summarize the pertinent facts, which are taken from our prior opinion. (Garcia I, supra , C020253.)

At about 3:00 p.m. on October 12, 1993, Regina and Todd Nishihara (collectively, the Nishiharas) saw defendant drive by and flagged him down for a ride. Defendant, who was an acquaintance of the Nishiharas, agreed to give them a ride but explained he had to make a stop on the way.

As defendant pulled into an alley, the Nishiharas saw a "tall, Caucasian man in his mid-thirties." (Garcia I, supra , C020253.) Defendant drove down the alley and stopped about 75 to 100 feet from the house where 82-year-old Joseph Souza lived. Defendant asked Mrs. Nishihara to knock on Souza's door, ask for water, and look around the house to see if anyone else was present; she refused. The Nishiharas got out of the car and began walking out of the alley. Mrs. Nishihara last saw defendant at the back door of Souza's house.

As the Nishiharas left the alley, Mrs. Nishihara saw the "Caucasian man" she had seen earlier approach defendant and ask him for "something." (Garcia I, supra , C020253.)

Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., another witness saw defendant and Souza on the front porch of Souza's house. Defendant had Souza in a headlock.

At about 3:20 p.m., Souza entered the furniture store located across the street from his home. He told William Seminario and Travis McDaniel that he had just been robbed and asked to use the phone. Souza appeared pale, upset, and frightened. He could hardly walk, his hands were shaking, and his speech was slurred. Although he did not seem coherent, he responded to questions. Souza explained that a "Mexican" had taken his wallet, which contained $15 to $30, and had knocked him out. At 3:25 p.m., Seminario called 911 and handed the phone to Souza, who told the 911 dispatcher that a Mexican, 25 to 30 years old, wearing a white T-shirt, hit him and took his money.

Souza left the furniture store and headed home because he had left the house unlocked; Seminario and McDaniel accompanied him. Souza's shoulder was covered with dry leaves and debris, and he had a large bump on his head. Souza became more incoherent; his eyes were glazed and his movements jerky. He sat down at the bottom of his stairs and gave more details about his assailant: a Mexican male in a white T-shirt came to his door asking for water while a second man stood in the alley; they had been to his house before asking for water. Souza refused to give them water and one of the men hit him on the back of his head. When a police officer arrived, Souza explained that his assailant was a Hispanic male, five feet seven inches tall, one hundred thirty-five pounds, with black hair and wearing a white T-shirt.

When Souza's condition deteriorated and he became unconscious, Seminario called an ambulance, which arrived at about 3:40 p.m. Resuscitative efforts were unsuccessful, and Souza was pronounced dead at 4:15 p.m. The immediate cause of death was lethal cardiac arrhythmia

, or irregular beating of the heart. Due to Souza's cardiovascular disease, either the stress of having been robbed or the physical altercation had caused the lethal arrhythmia.⁴

The next day, Mrs. Nishihara told a police officer about what she had observed in the alley, and defendant was subsequently taken into custody. Upon questioning, defendant recalled picking up the Nishiharas but denied going into the alley; he claimed that he dropped the Nishiharas off somewhere else.

DISCUSSION

IRelevant Legal Principles

A. Felony-Murder Liability Prior to Senate Bill No. 1437

Section 189, adopted in 1872, codified the felony-murder rule, under which a killing in the course of a statutorily enumerated felony (e.g., robbery) constituted first degree murder. ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465, 467 & fn. 14, 471-472, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697.) "For felony murder, the required mental state is the specific intent to commit the underlying felony." ( People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 175, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 722, 245 P.3d 366.)

The "felony-murder rule covers ‘a variety of unintended homicides resulting from reckless behavior, or ordinary negligence, or pure accident ....’ " ( People v. Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1068, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 425, 79 P.3d 542.) " ‘ "The purpose of the ... rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit." [Citation.] The Legislature has said in effect that this deterrent purpose outweighs the normal legislative policy of examining the individual state of mind of each person causing an unlawful killing to determine whether the killing was with or without malice, deliberate or accidental, and calibrating our treatment of the person accordingly. Once a person perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate one of the enumerated felonies, then in the judgment of the Legislature, he is no longer entitled to such fine judicial calibration, but will be deemed guilty of first degree murder for any homicide committed in the course thereof.’ " ( People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1121, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 210 P.3d 361.)

Liability for first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory is proper when the defendant kills during the commission of a robbery, but the prosecution must establish that the defendant intended to steal the victim's property either before or during the fatal assault. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 642, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.)

While the law does not require a strict causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the murder ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1259, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015 ), there must be some connection between the two. As our Supreme Court has explained: " ‘[T]he felony-murder rule requires both a causal relationship and a temporal relationship between the underlying felony and the act resulting in death.’ [Citation.] The causal relationship is established by a ‘logical nexus’ between the felony and the homicidal act, and ‘[t]he temporal relationship is established by proof the felony and the homicidal act were part of one continuous transaction.’ " ( People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 346-347, 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 519, 295 P.3d 903.)

Proximate cause is a " ‘universal factor common to all legal liability,’ " including criminal culpability. ( People v. Harrison (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 330, 333, 1 Cal.Rptr. 414, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Whitehorn (1963) 60 Cal.2d 256, 264, 32 Cal.Rptr. 199, 383 P.2d 783 and People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130.) California courts have long held "that there may be multiple proximate causes of a homicide, even where there is only one known actual or direct cause of death." ( People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 846, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209.) For example, " ‘ "[w]hen the...