People v. Garcia
| Citation | 89 Cal.App.4th 1321,107 Cal.Rptr.2d 889 |
| Decision Date | 15 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. H018134.,H018134. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Antonio Trujillo GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant. |
Lori Quick, By Appointment of the Sixth District Appellate Program, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Asst. Atty. General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Asst. Atty. General, Ronald E. Niver, Supervising Deputy Atty. General, Amy Haddix, Deputy Atty. General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Antonio Trujillo Garcia appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of spousal rape. He raises several claims of trial court error, primarily centered around the requirement of corroboration mandated by Penal Code section 262, subdivision (b).1 He contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the charge of spousal rape for lack of corroboration; (2) insufficient evidence supported the conviction due to insufficient corroboration; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to determine whether the prosecution was commenced within the appropriate time period; (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a November 1996 battery on the victim; and (5) the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for new trial based on jury misconduct. We find no errors and conclude the trial court properly used evidence of defendant's other acts of domestic violence to corroborate the victim's allegation of spousal rape as required by section 262, subdivision (b).
Defendant was charged on September 8, 1997, with one count of rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), one count of rape in concert (§ 264.1), and one count of spousal rape (§ 262, subd. (a)(1)). The information further alleged that each offense was a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7.
Jury trial began on November 19, 1997. The trial court struck the allegation of rape in count one and the jury convicted defendant of spousal rape. A mistrial was declared on the rape in concert charge after the jury reported that it was unable to reach a verdict on that count.
On February 11, 1998, the trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial and sentenced him to serve eight years in prison. The rape in concert charge was dismissed in the interests of justice.
Viewed in accord with the usual rules on appeal (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388), the record reflects the following facts: In August of 1995, E.G. separated from her husband of 14 years, defendant here, and he was served with a domestic violence temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring him to stay 50 yards away from her and to call 24 hours in advance to arrange visitation with their two children. The same day he was served with the restraining order, he violated it twice by coming to E.G.'s house. She called the police, who located defendant and warned him not to violate the restraining order. Defendant said that he understood and would comply with the order. However, he later threatened E.G. that if she refused to take him back, she would "pay for this."
Defendant frequently violated the restraining order by coming to E.G.'s house. Neighbors saw him stand outside, whistle at her, rattle the fence and knock on the windows. She did not respond or allow him into the house. At least three other specific incidents happened which she reported each time to the police. On August 20, 1995, defendant went to E.G.'s church and tried to speak to her. She refused and he grabbed her hand. An 11-year-old girl witnessed the incident and told defendant to leave E.G. alone. When defendant began yelling at the girl, she ran in and called the police. They came and arrested defendant, who had an odor of alcohol on his breath. On October 1, 1995, E.G. was walking home from work along her usual route, which passed through a field with a wooded area on the other side. Defendant appeared and chased her, but she got away. She reported this incident to the police one week later. Then on October 7, 1995, defendant came to E.G.'s house and banged on the window trying to get in. He warned her that she would be sorry if she did not take him back. She called the police, who found defendant hiding in a crawl space with their son. Defendant appeared intoxicated and challenged the officer to a fight. Defendant was arrested.
Then on November 14, 1995, E.G. was walking home from work about 5:30 p.m., as it was beginning to get dark. As she passed the field, she was struck from behind in the shoulder. Someone placed a hand over her mouth and then gagged her with a handkerchief. Her hands were bound behind her back and she was knocked to the ground. E.G. then saw defendant and another man, whom she did not recognize, standing over her. The two men pulled her pants down and pulled her blouse up. Defendant then fondled her breasts and raped her. He turned to the other man and said, The other man then raped her. The men laughed and threatened to have a gang of "[C]holos" rape her if she reported the assault to the police. The men fled; she freed herself and walked home.
E.G. was scared and embarrassed. She was not injured, but her clothes were dirty. She showered, fed her children dinner and then went to her evening class at a nearby elementary school. Defendant then showed up outside her class and whistled outside a window. A janitor saw she was upset and waited with her while she called the police from a telephone. E.G. was visibly upset while talking to the police officers who arrived. She told them about the restraining order and asked them to arrest defendant, but she did not report the rape that had occurred earlier that evening. At trial, she testified that she was too embarrassed and scared to tell anyone about the rape. The officers could not find defendant.
In December of 1995, E.G. filed for divorce. Defendant continued to harass her and was arrested on two more restraining order violations in September 1996. On November 5, 1996, defendant was arrested for punching E.G. in the face when he saw her walking with another man, J.O. When E.G. went to the police station to report the assault, her face was red and swollen and she was crying.
E.G. married J.O. in January 1997. After that, she confided in him that she had been raped by defendant and another man. J.O. insisted that she report the rape to the police. She did so approximately one week later, on February 9, 1997, some 15 months after the rape occurred.
In her report to the police, E.G. used an interpreter. Some of the details in her report differed from her later testimony at trial. To the police, she failed to mention that she was struck from behind. She stated that the stranger pulled down her pants and defendant pulled down her underwear. She also told the officers the men slapped her in the face and ripped her blouse open. She did not report fondling of her breasts.
Police officers interviewed defendant the day after E.G.'s report. He initially denied having any sexual contact with E.G. following their separation. He then changed his story, saying that they had one act of consensual intercourse during August or September of 1995. Defendant said that he came across her walking home from work. They talked, engaged in consensual foreplay and then had sex in the nearby field. He repeatedly denied raping E.G.
At trial, defendant testified. He admitted that he did not want the separation and that he had violated the restraining order several times. He also admitted pleading guilty to three counts of violating the restraining order and one count of assault against her. Defendant denied raping E.G. or threatening her in any way. He said they had engaged in one act of consensual sex soon after they had separated, but he described the incident as a meeting at a specified location. He also explained other violations of the restraining order as inadvertent, as when he saw E.G. on November 14, 1995, at the school because he was watching his son play soccer. He insisted the girl who testified to the incident at the church was lying, as was E.G. He also denied striking her in the face even though he had admitted pleading guilty to the assault.
Section 262, subdivision (b) [hereafter section 262(b)] provides that the six-year statute of limitations set forth in section 800 shall apply to the charge of spousal rape. The section further provides that:
Defendant raises several challenges to the validity of his prosecution for spousal rape under this subdivision, but the essence of the various claims is that the victim's allegation of the offense was not corroborated by independent evidence, and therefore no prosecution should have ensued due to her late reporting of the incident. Specifically, defendant asserts that his motion to dismiss for insufficient corroborating evidence should have been granted, that the jury should have been instructed to determine whether sufficient corroborating evidence brought the prosecution within the statute of limitations and that the evidence of his violations of the TRO should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant and prejudicial.
During pretrial motions in...
To continue reading
Request your trial