People v. Gates, Docket No. 98229

• Decision Date: 08 June 1988
• Docket Number: Docket No. 98229
• Citation: 168 Mich.App. 384,423 N.W.2d 668
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gregory Steven GATES, Defendant-Appellee. 168 Mich.App. 384, 423 N.W.2d 668
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 668

423 N.W.2d 668

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gregory Steven GATES, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 98229.

168 Mich.App. 384, 423 N.W.2d 668

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 9, 1988.

Decided May 2, 1988.

Released for Publication June 8, 1988.

[168 MICHAPP 385] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Joseph S. Filip, Pros. Atty., and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Atty., for the People.

Nicholas Smith, Southfield, for defendant-appellee.

Before MAHER, P.J., and SHEPHERD and TERTZAG, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The people appeal as of right from the order of the Jackson Circuit Court holding that the criminal prosecution of defendant for second-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520c(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(3)(1)(a), was barred by collateral estoppel for the reason that a probate court jury had previously found, at an adjudicative hearing in that court, that defendant had not sexually abused the subject child. We affirm.

On February 18, 1986, a juvenile petition was filed in the Jackson County Probate Court requesting court intervention due to defendant's alleged sexual abuse of his daughter, who was then three years and ten months old. The petition alleged that sometime on or around February 13, 1986, [168 MICHAPP 386] defendant had touched the child's genitals for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Prior to a preliminary examination on the petition, defendant was also charged in the Jackson Circuit Court with second- degree CSC, arising from the same occurrence.

On June 16 and 17, 1986, a jury trial in the Jackson County Probate Court was held on the juvenile petition. In his opening statement, the prosecutor explained that he would show that defendant had touched his daughter in a sexual manner and this warranted the probate court's jurisdiction and intervention. During the prosecution's proofs, the daughter testified that she was asleep in a chair at defendant's home when he touched her hard in the vaginal area, awakening her. She also said that defendant told her not to tell her mother, from whom defendant was divorced and with whom defendant shared the child's custody, or the judge about the touching. A Catholic Social Services therapist testified that in her opinion the child had been sexually molested. The girl's mother and another social worker testified regarding the child's marked mood change. No other evidence was presented to show neglect, cruelty, or defendant's unfitness to parent, aside from the alleged sexual touching.

The probate court instructed the jury that if it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant's home was unfit for the child because of neglect, cruelty, criminality, or depravity by defendant then it should find that the court has jurisdiction over the child. The jury returned a verdict that the court did not have jurisdiction over the child. When polled, all six jury members agreed that they believed the child had not been neglected in the manner alleged by the Department of Social Services.

[168 MICHAPP 387] On June 20, 1986, the DSS filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the probate court granted. That order was subsequently reversed by the circuit court, and the juvenile petition was ordered dismissed.

On August 6, 1986, defendant moved to dismiss the criminal charges on the ground that the prosecution was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The trial court granted that motion and dismissed the second-degree CSC charges against defendant. This appeal of right followed.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues previously decided where such issues are raised in a subsequent suit by the same parties based upon a different cause of action. People v. Watt, 115 Mich.App. 172, 175, 320 N.W.2d 333 (1982), lv. den. 413 Mich. 926 (1982). However, only those issues actually litigated in a prior litigation are conclusively decided for purposes of any subsequent action. Id.

The identical issue as presented herein was discussed by this Court in Watt, supra. There, the DSS terminated defendant's welfare benefits for the reason that she had committed fraud by failing to inform it that her former spouse resided with her. Defendant challenged the termination of her benefits and a hearing officer found in her favor. The officer held that there was insufficient evidence that defendant's former spouse resided with her and, consequently, ordered that benefits be reinstated. The DSS did not appeal that decision. Thereafter, criminal charges were brought against defendant for...