People v. Gayheart

• Decision Date: 30 July 2009
• Docket Number: Docket No. 282690.
• Citation: 776 N.W.2d 330,285 Mich. App. 202
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GAYHEART.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

776 N.W.2d 330

285 Mich. App. 202

PEOPLE v. GAYHEART.

Docket No. 282690.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 8, 2009, at Grand Rapids.

Decided July 30, 2009, at 9:00 a.m.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, Douglas K. Fisher, Prosecuting Attorney, and William

E. Molner, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.

Bennett Law Office (by P.E. Bennett) for the defendant.

Before: SAAD, C.J., and JANSEN and HOEKSTRA, JJ.

JANSEN, J.

Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial conviction of first-degree murder,¹ for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. We affirm.

I

The evidence presented at trial established that the victim, Rosemary Reinel, had lived in an apartment complex in St. Joseph County, Michigan, since 2001. Defendant briefly lived in the same apartment complex with a roommate. At some point, the victim became interested in moving to Florida. Defendant apparently learned of this and asked the victim to allow him to drive with her in her car to Florida. Defendant wanted to go to Florida so that he could visit Teresa Mock, a woman with whom he had been romantically involved in the past. The victim initially agreed to allow defendant to drive with her to Florida, but later changed her mind when she learned that defendant was on parole for an unrelated offense.

The victim was last seen on September 20, 2005. The police found the victim's white automobile in a Florida parking lot on September 29, 2005. Defendant was then arrested in Florida after breaking into Mock's home.

On November 1, 2005, the victim's body was discovered in a cornfield in northern Indiana. The cornfield was less than 100 feet from the boundary between Michigan and Indiana. A witness testified that she had seen a white car similar to the victim's automobile parked in a lane leading to the cornfield in late September 2005. The witness remembered the event as unusual because she had never before seen an automobile parked in that lane. A friend of the victim identified certain items that were found near the victim's body as personal property of the victim, which had been stored in the victim's car. A forensic entomologist testified that his observations and calculations indicated that the victim had likely died between September 14, 2005, and September 21, 2005. Cellular phone records indicated that defendant had placed a phone call from the vicinity of the northern Indiana cornfield on the morning of September 20, 2005.

Defendant's roommate testified that defendant had left the apartment "real early" on the morning of September 20, 2005, and that defendant appeared "agitated" when he returned home at about noon that day. When defendant returned, his roommate saw him washing and cleaning a pair of Channellock pliers. Defendant's roommate testified that "what [defendant] was wiping off was red" and that "there looked like pieces of hair" on the pliers. Defendant left the apartment shortly thereafter, but later called his roommate and asked him to "lie for him to the police." When the roommate saw defendant again a day or two later, defendant had "a whole wad of money," which was "quite . . . big" and consisted of "hundreds, fifties, [and] twenties."² Defendant's roommate never again saw the pair of Channellock pliers.

A maintenance man who worked for the apartment complex where defendant lived testified that sometime after September 20, 2005, he realized that a large pair of Channellock pliers was missing or had been stolen from a utility room on the premises. No one on the apartment complex maintenance staff could account for what had happened to the pliers, which were never seen again.

It was the prosecution's theory that defendant had taken the missing Channellock pliers and had used them to kill the victim by inflicting several blows to her head. Although the victim's body was partially decomposed when it was found, the evidence showed that she had sustained serious head trauma. On the basis of the pattern of skull fractures, it was determined that there had likely been between seven and nine individual blows to the head with a blunt object.

The jury was properly instructed with respect to the elements of both premeditated murder and felony murder.³ The jury was further instructed, with respect to both charges, that "[i]n this case the prosecutor must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the victim] was a resident of the State of Michigan, St. Joseph County, at the time of her death, and that the Defendant committed some act toward the commission of the crime while within the State of Michigan, County of St. Joseph. . . ." The verdict form contained in the lower court file indicates that the jury returned verdicts of guilty on both charges.

II

Defendant argues that because the victim's body was discovered in Indiana, there was insufficient proof that the crime took place in Michigan. He contends that the trial court was without statutory jurisdiction to try him. He also contends that his trial violated due process. As noted previously, the jury convicted defendant of both premeditated murder and felony murder. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that territorial jurisdiction existed under MCL 762.2 to try defendant for both charged offenses in this case. We further conclude that defendant's trial did not violate the constitutional guarantee of due process.

A

We review de novo issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation, as well as all other questions of law. People v. McCuller, 479 Mich. 672, 681, 739 N.W.2d 563 (2007); People v. Katt, 468 Mich. 272, 278, 662 N.W.2d 12 (2003).

B

Relying in part on People v. Blume, 443 Mich. 476, 505 N.W.2d 843 (1993), defendant argues that the state of Michigan was without authority to exercise territorial jurisdiction with respect to the murder at issue in this case because the crime occurred in Indiana and its detrimental effects were not intended to be felt in Michigan. "The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established," and "[a]ny attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits" constitutes "an illegitimate assumption of power." Stewart v. Eaton, 287 Mich. 466, 474, 283 N.W. 651 (1939). However, nearly 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm. . . ." Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct. 558, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1911). Until 2002, the common-law rule in Michigan, which drew heavily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strassheim, was that the state could not exercise territorial jurisdiction over criminal conduct committed in another state unless that conduct was intended to have, and did in fact have, "a detrimental effect within the state." Blume, 443 Mich. at 477, 505 N.W.2d 843. The Blume Court observed that "[u]nlike some states, Michigan has not enacted legislation generally defining the reach of its criminal statutes." Id. at 480 n. 7, 505 N.W.2d 843.

The Legislature responded in 2002 by enacting MCL 762.2, which provides:

(1) A person may be prosecuted for a criminal offense he or she commits while he or she is physically located within this state or outside of this state if any of the following circumstances exist:

(a) He or she commits a criminal offense wholly or partly within this state.

(b) His or her conduct constitutes an attempt to commit a criminal offense within this state.

(c) His or her conduct constitutes a conspiracy to commit a criminal offense within this state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed within this state by the offender, or at his or her instigation, or by another member of the conspiracy.

(d) A victim of the offense or an employee or agent of a governmental unit posing as a victim resides in this state or is located in this state at the time the criminal offense is committed.

(e) The criminal offense produces substantial and detrimental effects within this state.

(2) A criminal offense is considered under subsection (1) to be committed partly within this state if any of the following apply:

(a) An act constituting an element of the criminal offense is committed within this state.

(b) The result or consequences of an act constituting an element of the criminal offense occur within this state.

(c) The criminal offense produces consequences that have a materially harmful impact upon the system of government or the community welfare of this state, or results in persons within this state being defrauded or otherwise harmed.

It is well settled that the Legislature has the power to alter or abrogate the common law. Const. 1963, art. 3, § 7; People v. Lively, 470 Mich. 248, 252, 680 N.W.2d 878 (2004). The language of MCL 762.2 has broadened the scope of Michigan's extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal matters, significantly expanding upon the common-law rule explained in Blume. For instance, pursuant to MCL 762.2(1)(a) and (2)(a), Michigan now has statutory territorial jurisdiction "over any crime where any act constituting an element of the crime is committed within Michigan," People v. King, 271 Mich.App. 235, 243, 721 N.W.2d 271 (2006), even if there is no indication that the accused actually intended the detrimental effects of the offense to be felt in this state.

C

The elements of premeditated murder are (1) an intentional killing of a human being (2) with premeditation and deliberation. MCL 750.316(1)(a); People v. Unger, 278 Mich.App. 210, 223, 229, 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008); People v. Marsack, 231 Mich.App. 364, 370-371, 586 N.W.2d 234 (1998). The elements of felony murder are (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm...