People v. King

• Decision Date: 06 June 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 259295.
• Citation: 721 N.W.2d 271,271 Mich. App. 235
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Genevieve Violarose KING, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

721 N.W.2d 271

271 Mich. App. 235

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Genevieve Violarose KING, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 259295.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 11, 2006, at Petoskey.

Decided June 6, 2006, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication August 31, 2006.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Anthony J. Cicchelli, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian Neill, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.

Law Office of Patrick Dougherty, PLC (by Patrick A. Dougherty), Manistee, for the defendant.

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and KELLY and DAVIS, JJ.

SAWYER, P.J.

We are asked in this case to determine what constitutes the corpus delicti for a charge of accessory after the fact. In light of the purpose of the rule, we determine that the corpus delicti of accessory after the fact is the same as the corpus delicti of the underlying crime itself. In this case, because the prosecutor had established the corpus delicti for both murder and unlawfully driving away an automobile, the trial court properly admitted defendant's confession to being an accessory after the fact to murder and an accessory after the fact to unlawfully driving away an automobile. We also determine that jurisdiction to try a charge of accessory after the fact properly lies in the county in which the underlying crime occurred, even if the actual assistance was rendered outside that county.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of accessory after the fact,¹ one as an accessory to murder and the other as an accessory to unlawfully driving away an automobile (UDAA). She was sentenced to two years' probation. Her convictions arise out of the murder of Lillian Ross by Ross's grandson, John Robertson, and another individual, Robert Eckstein, at Ross's home in Benzie County. One of Ross's neighbors reported that she had seen Robertson, Eckstein, and a female the night before Ross's body was discovered. Deputy Troy Lamerson was the first officer responding to the scene and testified that upon his arrival, the garage door was open, but no vehicle was present. The deputy also received a report from the Mason County library that a jar containing money had been stolen the same day that Ross was found murdered and that the persons who had stolen the jar signed a computer log with the names of Eckstein and defendant.

Robertson and defendant were later located in Las Cruces, New Mexico. They were arrested, and Deputy Lamerson, along with Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant Mark Henschell, went to New Mexico to interview defendant. During the interview, defendant stated that she had met Robertson on a bus two weeks before the interview. Robertson and Eckstein later picked her up from her father's house. The three traveled to the Traverse City area and spent the night in a camper behind the victim's house. Defendant further stated that she woke up about 9 a.m., but Robertson told her to stay in the camper and get some sleep and that he and Eckstein had some business to take care of and would be back in about half an hour. Upon their return, Robertson told defendant to get into the victim's car. She and Robertson left in the victim's car, with Eckstein following in his own vehicle.

Defendant further told the officers that they stopped at the Mason County library to check e-mail and Robertson stole the money jar. Defendant stated that it was at this point that Robertson told her what he and Eckstein had done to the victim. The three traveled in the two separate cars until reaching Oklahoma, when the victim's car developed brake trouble. Defendant wiped down the car at Robertson's direction, and then all three left in Eckstein's vehicle. Upon reaching the bus station in Oklahoma City, defendant and Robertson parted ways with Eckstein with defendant and Robertson traveling to Las Cruces, where they were arrested.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing her confession to be introduced before establishing the corpus delicti of the crimes. We disagree. We review a lower court's decision regarding corpus delicti for an abuse of discretion. People v. Burns.² Burns³ reviewed the general principles of the corpus delicti rule:

The corpus delicti rule requires that a preponderance of direct or circumstantial evidence, independent of a defendant's inculpatory statements, establish the occurrence of a specific injury and criminal agency as the source of the injury before such statements may be admitted as evidence. People v. McMahan, 451 Mich. 543, 548-549, 548 N.W.2d 199 (1996); People v. Konrad, 449 Mich. 263, 269-270, 536 N.W.2d 517 (1995); People v. Metzler, 193 Mich.App. 541, 547, 484 N.W.2d 695 (1992); People v. Brasic, 171 Mich.App. 222, 227, 429 N.W.2d 860 (1988).

The question regarding what must be shown to establish the corpus delicti of accessory after the fact appears to be one of first impression in Michigan. An accessory after the fact is one who, with knowledge of the principal's guilt, renders assistance to hinder the detection, arrest, trial, or punishment of the principal.⁴ The question becomes whether, to establish the corpus delicti of accessory after the fact, it is necessary to merely establish the corpus delicti of the underlying crime, or whether there must also be some evidence independent of the confession to establish that assistance was rendered to the principal.

Defendant cites cases from Arizona and California that suggest that there must, in fact, be a showing of some assistance being rendered in order to establish the corpus delicti of accessory after the fact. In State v. Hernandez,⁵ the Arizona Supreme Court held that, to establish the corpus delicti, it was necessary to show that the evidence, if true, would warrant a reasonable inference that some person committed the crime charged.⁶ The Court concluded that, in the case of accessory to kidnapping, it was necessary to establish a reasonable inference that somebody concealed the kidnapping or harbored and protected the kidnapper. Similarly, in In re IM,⁷ the California Court of Appeal concluded that there had to be some evidence of the defendant rendering assistance to the principal beyond the defendant's confession to rendering such assistance in order to satisfy the corpus delicti rule.

If we were to follow these cases and conclude that the corpus delicti rule requires in an accessory after the fact case that some evidence be introduced independent of the confession that showed that someone provided assistance to the principal, the evidence in the case at bar would be limited. There was certainly more than adequate evidence introduced establishing the corpus delicti of murder and unlawfully driving away an automobile. But evidence of assistance being provided by a third person was minimal at best. There was evidence of a female being seen with the principal. But that does little to establish assistance being rendered. Somewhat stronger is the evidence that defendant may have been involved in the theft of money from the library after the murder. Money would certainly provide...