People v. Geanakopoulos, 84.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1948
• Docket Number: No. 84.,84.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. GEANAKOPOULOS.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

320 Mich. 430

31 N.W.2d 683

PEOPLE

v.GEANAKOPOULOS.

No. 84.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 5, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; Shirley Stewart, judge.

George Geanakopoulos was convicted of statutory rape and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Before the Entire Bench, except DETHMERS, J.

Eugene F. Black, Atty. Gen. of Michigan, and Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, Reg. S. Atkins, Pros. Atty. for St. Clair County, of Port Huron, for the People.

Arthur J. Mann, Louis J. Colombo and Anthony A. Vermeulen, all of Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

NORTH, Justice.

George Geanakopoulos, having been convicted on trial by jury of statutory rape and sentenced, has appealed. The offense is charged to have been committed March 3, 1943, on one Katherine Bokach, who became 16 years of age March 20, 1943. Through Mrs. Geanakopoulos, Katherine, about the middle of February 1943, was employed to work in a Port Huron restaurant which was owned and operated by George Geanakopoulos. Incident to her employment it was arranged that Katherine should have an upstair room at the Geanakopoulos home in Port Huron. Her hours of employment were from midnight to 8:00 a.m.

According to Katherine's testimony, as she came down the stairs in the Geanakopoulos household shortly before midnight, March 3, 1943, on her way to her work, the defendant who was in the hallway, took hold of Katherine's arm and ‘pulled’ her to the adjoining sitting room. That he kissed her several times, and then took her by the arm into his bedroom which was ‘next to this sitting room’, and there had sexual intercourse with her.

In his testimony the defendant denied having had sexual intercourse with Katherine or that he was present in the Geanakopoulos home at the time of the alleged offense. He sought to prove a defense in the nature of an alibi by witnesses who testified that at the time of the alleged offense he was at his restaurant. He also presented character witnesses who testified in his behalf.

Without the matter having been previously in any way referred to at the trial, the attorney who then represented defendant, on cross examination of Katherine had her testify in response to his questions that on a later date (March 27, 1943) than the offense charged and shortly after Katherine became 16 years of age, she had sexual intercourse with defendant in her upstair room at the Geanakopoulos home. The attorneys representing defendant on this appeal now assert that the admission of the testimony as to subsequent sexual relations constituted error, and also that the trial judge was in error in charging the jury that the only use the jury could make of the testimony relating to subsequent relations would be in passing upon ‘the credibility of either of the two witnesses', meaning Katherine and defendant. There is no merit to either of these alleged grounds of error. The record clearly discloses that attorney Mann, defendant's trial counsel, even after the court had called to his attention that the testimony of subsequent acts was at least of doubtful admissibility, insisted it was admissible as bearing upon credibility. In defendant's brief his counsel now say: ‘The testimony of the incidents of March 27, 1943, was not admissible for any purpose, and the trial court should have charged the jury not to consider it for any purpose whatsoever.’

The position now taken by defendant's counsel is directly contrary to that taken by defendant's attorney at the trial; and further defendant did not request the court to charge the jury that the testimony should not be considered for any purpose. See People v. Barringer, 311 Mich. 345, 18 N.W.2d 850; 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 17322, Stat.Ann. § 28.1052. As indicated, the testimony of which defendant now complains was brought into the case in his behalf by his own attorney. Hence it might well be said in the instant case, as in People v. Prevost, 219 Mich. 233, 245, 189 N.W. 92, 96: ‘* * * if any ill effects resulted from it in the minds of the jurors, the defendant has the satisfaction of knowing that no one was to blame for the outbreak but himself.’ ^* Earlier in the Court's opinion in the Prevost case, concerning an alleged prejudicial answer made by a witness on cross examination by the prosecutor, it is said: ‘This was not responsive to the prosecutor's question; but defendant's counsel made no objection to the answer, nor did they move to strike it out. Failing to do this, they cannot now complain.’

Another alleged error is presented by the following question in defendant's brief: ‘Did the trial court err in refusing to permit defendant to cross-examine prosecutrix as to having boy friends in her room after March 3, 1943?’

In the above respect the contents of the record is indicated by the following questions asked on cross examination of Katherine:

‘Q. Did you ever have soldier friends come over to see you? * * *

‘Q. And during the time you were there (at the Geanakopoulos home), were there soldiers and sailors that came to see you? * * *

‘Q. Were soldiers and sailors in your room upstairs?’

Objection to each of the above questions was sustained; but the court ruled that the inquiry would be proper if ‘confined to prior to the date of this' alleged offense. Thereupon the cross examination continued as follows:

‘Q. Now, between that date that you went there (to the Geanakopoulos home) and the 3rd of March did you have soldiers and sailors in your room upstairs? A. No, I didn't. * * *

‘Q. You swear there weren't soldiers and sailors in your room between the time you went there and March 3rd, 1943? A. No, there wasn't any there.’

The court's ruling did not constitute prejudicial error. The fact that Katherine may have had boy friends as callers would not have a material bearing upon her credibility. Defendant's counsel at no time advised the court he proposed to prove that there were immoral relations between Katherine and her callers, nor is such a claim asserted in this Court.

Defendant further contends the trial court erred in permitting, over objection, on defendant's cross examination, the following:

‘Q. Were you responsible, George, for a child being born to a woman in your employ at one time? A. No, sir, the first time I ever hear in my life anything like that.

‘Q. Your answer then to that question is ‘no’? A. No.'

Defendant on direct examination had testified that he previously had pleaded guilty to a charge of adultery and in that answer he stated: ‘That is the only time I have ever been involved with the law.’ Regardless of whether there was any connection between his direct testimony and the above cross examination, the latter did not constitute error. In People v. LaLonde, 197 Mich. 76, 163 N.W. 490, a headnote reads: ‘In a criminal prosecution for (statutory) rape, a question asked defendant on crossexamination as to whether he had been responsible for the birth of a child by a woman employed in his office a number of years prior to the offense charged, while inadmissible to show that defendant had been guilty of similar offenses, was admissible as affecting his credibility.’

Incident to another phase of this appeal, defendant presents the following questions:

‘Did the trial court err in stating to the jury that prosecutrix was not arrested, that she was in custody of the Probate Court, when, as a matter of fact, she was in the custody of the Port Huron Police.

‘Was it error to permit the arresting officers of Katherine Bokach to testify to a collateral issue that the proceedings for the unlawful taking of the fur coat of defendant's daughter were dismissed.’

Presentation of the pertinent factual background necessitates recital of the following. Defendant's daughter Lillian, who was living in her parent's home, went on a visit to Detroit. In Lillian's absence Katherine and a girl friend, who at times stayed in Katherine's room,...