People v. Gelikkaya

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CIPARICK; KAYE
• Citation: People v. Gelikkaya, 618 N.Y.S.2d 895, 84 N.Y.2d 456, 643 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1994)
• Decision Date: 01 December 1994
• Parties: , 643 N.E.2d 517 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ali Riza GELIKKAYA, Appellant.

Page 895

618 N.Y.S.2d 895

84 N.Y.2d 456, 643 N.E.2d 517

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ali Riza GELIKKAYA, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 1, 1994.

[84 N.Y.2d 457] [643 N.E.2d 518] Ira Mickenberg and Sarah Arnholz, New York City, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. of New York County, New York City (Tami J. Aisenson and Morrie I. Kleinbart, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CIPARICK, Judge.

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree. On this appeal, defendant challenges the prosecution's use of portions of his Grand Jury testimony to impeach him on cross-examination. Although defendant concedes that he voluntarily waived his immunity and testified before the Grand Jury, he argues that the Trial Judge improperly admitted his Grand Jury testimony because it was given when he was incompetent, rendering the testimony inherently unreliable and inadmissible. We conclude that the Trial Judge, in the exercise of his discretion, properly denied the motion in limine and admitted defendant's Grand Jury testimony for the limited purpose of impeachment.

On February 19, 1988, defendant was arrested in connection with his involvement in a skirmish in a lower Manhattan mosque. Defendant allegedly lunged at the spiritual leader of the mosque, yelling "I will kill you," and punched him. A group of worshippers purportedly restrained defendant, who then retrieved a knife concealed in his clothing. While lashing out at the individuals restraining him, defendant struck the complainant in his forearm and lower back, causing injuries which required medical attention.

On February 22, 1988, defendant appeared in Criminal Court with counsel, and was arraigned on a felony complaint charging him with attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25), assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05[2] and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01[2]. During this proceeding, defendant advised the court of his intent to testify before the Grand Jury. Defendant's competence was not raised as an issue at this time.

Two days later, defendant appeared before the Grand Jury, accompanied by counsel and an interpreter. Defendant proceeded to waive his immunity. The prosecutor, however, directed defendant to confer with his attorney before accepting the waiver and testimony. After a 20-minute conference with his counsel outside the presence of the Grand Jury, defendant swore that his waiver was voluntary and that he wished to testify (see, CPL 190.45[2]. At no time was defendant's competency or the voluntariness of his waiver or testimony in issue. The Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant with one count of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25[1] and assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05[2].

At the March 14, 1988 arraignment on the indictment, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty on behalf of defendant, who appeared with counsel. Now, for the first time, the issue of defendant's competency was raised, and the trial court ordered that defendant undergo a competency examination pursuant to CPL 730.30. Approximately three weeks later, two psychiatrists independently determined that defendant was suffering from a psychiatric disorder that deprived him of the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense. The trial court executed an order committing defendant for treatment. Fifteen months later, after a regimen of medication and counselling, defendant was declared fit to proceed. Eight months thereafter, defendant's trial commenced.

At the trial, four eyewitnesses testified to the circumstances of the skirmish. Before defendant took the stand on his own behalf, defense counsel moved to preclude use of the Grand Jury testimony to impeach defendant because of defendant's alleged incompetency at the time of that proceeding. Counsel argued that defendant's Grand Jury testimony was not rational and, at that time, defendant was unable to rely on his advice. In fact, defendant testified before the Grand Jury despite his counsel's advice to the contrary. Counsel further asserted that defendant had expressed his distrust of the interpreter assigned to assist him before the Grand Jury, whom he had just met, a sentiment counsel indicated defendant harbored against him, as well. The Trial Judge denied the motion, and the People introduced portions of the Grand Jury testimony that were inconsistent with defendant's trial testimony on several minor points.

The jury returned a verdict convicting defendant of attempted murder in the second degree. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison sentence of 8 to 24 years.

The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting defendant's argument that his Grand Jury testimony was involuntary and inadmissible for any purpose (see, People v. Gelikkaya, 197 A.D.2d 405, 602 N.Y.S.2d 372). A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal, and we now affirm.

Defendant's appeal is premised on the ground that he was incompetent at the time he appeared before the Grand Jury, and was therefore unable to understand the proceedings or to rationally consult with counsel at the time he waived his immunity and testified before the Grand Jury. As there exists a presumption of sanity, " '[s]anity being the normal and usual condition of mankind' " (People v. Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475, 481, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915, 310 N.E.2d 520, citing Brotherton v. People, 75 N.Y. 159, 162; see also, People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 30, 511 N.Y.S.2d 559, 503 N.E.2d 990, cert. denied 480 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 1383, 94 L.Ed.2d 697), defendant is presumed to have been competent at the time of the Grand Jury proceeding. Just as it is an established fact that a prior history of mental imbalance does not in itself prove insanity at the...