People v. Giuca
| Decision Date | 11 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 38,38 |
| Citation | 33 N.Y.3d 462,104 N.Y.S.3d 577,128 N.E.3d 655 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John GIUCA, Respondent. |
33 N.Y.3d 462
128 N.E.3d 655
104 N.Y.S.3d 577
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,
v.
John GIUCA, Respondent.
No. 38
Court of Appeals of New York.
June 11, 2019
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chief Judge DiFIORE.
The question presented in this appeal is whether the People violated their obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ) by failing to disclose favorable impeachment material derived from the circumstances of a prosecution witness's pending burglary case and whether the People failed to correct false or misleading testimony provided by the witness on that subject at trial. We hold that, to the extent
there was any suppression of impeachment material, there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different if the information at issue had been disclosed.
In September 2005, defendant and his codefendant, Antonio Russo, were jointly tried before dual juries for the murder of Mark Fisher. The prosecution proceeded on theories of both intentional and felony murder. Relevant to this appeal, the majority of the People's witnesses, who were defendant's friends, testified that defendant made a series of incriminating statements, including that defendant believed the victim was "disrespecting" his home, that he supplied codefendant Russo with a gun for the purpose of robbing Fisher, that Russo intentionally shot and killed the victim, that defendant attempted to cover his role in the felony murder by asking his friends not to cooperate with the police, and that defendant arranged for the disposal of his gun after the crime.
In addition to defendant's inculpatory statements, the evidence at trial established that, after a night out in Manhattan, Fisher and several other individuals accompanied defendant to
his Brooklyn home, arriving at about 4:00 a.m. on October 12, 2003. Thereafter, Russo accompanied Fisher to a nearby ATM where Fisher
withdrew $ 20. Shortly after the two men returned to defendant's house, the gathering broke up and Fisher went to sleep on defendant's couch. At 6:40 am, Fisher was shot and killed. He was shot five times with a .22 caliber weapon – the same caliber gun that defendant owned prior to the shooting. Fisher's body was found a few blocks from defendant's house, on a distinctive blanket that defendant's mother identified as one that came from her house. The individual who disposed of the gun for defendant testified at trial that, a day or two after the murder, defendant gave him a bag containing a black gun and, pursuant to an arrangement made by defendant, another individual later took the bag in exchange for money. Phone records were also introduced at trial, showing that defendant and Russo placed an unusual volume of calls to each other in both the hours leading up to and the days following the murder.
A different version of events was provided by a jailhouse informant, JA, who testified that defendant made certain admissions to him while they were both incarcerated on Rikers Island – including that defendant himself had participated in the robbery and beating of the victim.
During JA's direct testimony, the prosecutor elicited that the witness met defendant while incarcerated on a burglary charge, that he had since pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary and that he was sentenced to an 18– to 24–month drug treatment program. JA testified that he had a 13–year history of drug abuse and "quite a lengthy criminal history" dating back to 1989. The People elicited from JA his 15 individual prior convictions, mostly for larcenous crimes. When asked how he was progressing in his current drug program, JA responded that he was "doing good." The ADA then asked JA if he had relapsed during the drug program and he admitted to one relapse. JA denied that he ever requested or received any promise or benefit in exchange for his trial testimony.
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited the following facts. JA entered the drug treatment program on April 28, 2005, as part of a conditional sentence in exchange for his guilty plea on his burglary case and that his next scheduled court appearance was October 6, 2005 – after his trial testimony. In fact, JA's negotiated guilty plea provided that if he successfully completed the drug treatment program, his burglary
case would be dismissed, but if he failed the program, he faced a
3½- to 7–year prison term. JA had committed several violations since entering the treatment program, including absconding from the program on the night of June 9, 2005. Earlier that same day, JA had appeared in treatment court, where the judge reminded him that he faced state prison if he failed the drug program. On June 13th, police officers associated with defendant's murder case returned JA to the drug court on the warrant for absconding.1 JA, who testified that he began cooperating with the police in June 2005, was not remanded after that violation. Nor was he remanded after he tested positive for drugs on June 16th, or after two additional violations (August 24th and September 2nd) – one of which was a second relapse. As JA admitted, despite his violations of the treatment program conditions, the prosecutors did not ask for bail. When questioned whether he thought this favorable outcome was related to his discussions
with the police on defendant's case, JA rejected that suggestion.
Defense counsel also elicited from JA that he was an admitted "career criminal" and, as JA further agreed, if counsel were to go through the facts of all of his prior convictions, "we'd be here until probably Sunday morning." Counsel then cross-examined JA as to his extensive criminal record, impeaching the witness when he attempted to mitigate the serious nature of the underlying facts of certain convictions.
On redirect, JA clarified that, after he absconded on June 9th, he contacted his drug counselor who (along with the police) walked him over to court, where his counselor and "the DA" spoke with the judge. Although the trial prosecutor clarified that the judge presiding in the witness's drug court was not the judge presiding in defendant's murder case, she failed to identify herself as "the DA" who appeared in court with JA on the return on the warrant. The witness also stated that he believed his drug counselor "got [him] another shot."
During the charge conference, defense counsel requested a jury instruction that JA received consideration for his testimony as a matter of law. Counsel asserted that the witness violated the terms of his initial guilty plea on five different occasions,
including leaving the drug program three times, and that the People's failure to request bail in JA's burglary case despite his criminal history and relapses was proof that "something [was] happening here to protect [JA]." The court denied the request, but agreed to give a general credibility charge that permitted the jury to consider a witness's motive for testifying, including any possible benefit or advantage the witness may have received.
Thereafter, during his summation, defense counsel attacked JA's credibility on multiple grounds. Defense counsel pointed out the misleading nature of JA's direct testimony regarding the imposition of his sentence on the burglary case. He further asserted that JA only contacted the police to provide false information on defendant's high profile case because he had absconded from his drug treatment program in June 2005 and emphasized that the officers in defendant's murder case accompanied JA to court on the return on the bench warrant. Counsel also maintained that JA, who was still "facing 3 and a half to 7 years," was not a sentenced prisoner testifying "out of the goodness of his heart." Finally, he argued that JA's testimony was an act of desperation by the People and it "completely destroyed" their case.
Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree on the theory of felony murder, robbery in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The count of intentional murder was not submitted to defendant's jury. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal ( 58 A.D.3d 750, 871 N.Y.S.2d 709 [2d Dept. 2009] ).2
In March 2015, defendant brought this CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction, alleging multiple claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Using JA as his primary source of sworn allegations, defendant asserted that the People had violated their Brady obligation by failing to turn over evidence that there was an agreement to confer a benefit on JA in exchange for his testimony at defendant's murder trial. In addition, defendant asserted that the trial prosecutor personally intervened in JA's
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