People v. Glover

• Decision Date: 12 July 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 4–16–0586,4–16–0586
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael A. GLOVER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2017 IL App (4th) 160586

85 N.E.3d 815

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Michael A. GLOVER, Defendant–Appellant.

NO. 4–16–0586

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Order filed July 12, 2017

Opinion Modified upon denial of rehearing September 27, 2017

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and James Ryan Williams, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and James C. Majors, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In November 2012, the State charged defendant, Michael A. Glover, with nine felony offenses allegedly committed while he was released on bond from Coles County. In December 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, a Class 2 felony ( 625 ILCS 5/4–103(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)). In January 2014, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After this court twice remanded the cause for strict compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), newly appointed counsel filed another motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea. In August 2016, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

¶ 2 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) this court should allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because (a) his erroneous belief that he faced 60 years' imprisonment was objectively reasonable and (b) trial counsel erroneously advised him that he faced 60 years' imprisonment, thereby rendering ineffective assistance of counsel and precluding a knowing and voluntary plea; and (2) the circuit clerk improperly imposed numerous fines.

¶ 3 We affirmed in part and vacated in part. On August 2, 2017, defendant filed a petition for rehearing pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367 (eff. July 1, 2017), asking this court to reconsider in light of Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017), which was issued after the completion of briefing in this case. We now modify our decision upon denial of defendant's petition for rehearing to address Lee. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In November 2012, the State charged defendant with the following felony offenses allegedly committed while out on bond from Coles County: (1) home invasion with injury intentionally caused to Sara Stephenson (count I) and Steve Martin (count II), Class X felonies ( 720 ILCS 5/12–11(a)(2), (c) (West 2010)); (2) criminal damage to property, a Class 4 felony ( 720 ILCS 5/21–1(1)(a), (2) (West 2010)) (count III); stalking where he knew or should have known his course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety, a Class 4 felony ( 720 ILCS 5/12–7.3(a), (b) (West 2010)) (count IV); (3) stalking where on at least two occasions he followed or placed Stephenson under surveillance and transmitted a threat of bodily harm, Class 4 felonies ( 720 ILCS 5/12–7.3(a–3), (b) (West 2010)) (counts V and VI); (4) aggravated stalking where he knew or should have known his course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety and he caused Stephenson bodily harm, a Class 3 felony ( 720 ILCS 5/12–7.4(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)) (count VII); (5) aggravated fleeing, a Class 4 felony ( 625 ILCS 5/11–204.1(a)(4), (b) (West 2010)) (count VIII); and (6) unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, a Class 2 felony ( 625 ILCS 5/4–103(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)) (count IX). In each count, the State alleged that any sentence imposed would be mandatorily consecutive to any sentences imposed in Coles County case Nos. 12–CF–236, 12–CF–329, and 12–CF–355. Defendant was eligible for extended-term sentencing on counts III through IX based on his 2008 conviction of a Class 2 felony. The record shows defendant was also charged with domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor ( 720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)) (count X), and battery, a Class A misdemeanor ( 720 ILCS 5/12–3(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)) (count XI).

¶ 6 In January 2013, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's desire to proceed pro se. The court admonished defendant regarding the charges against him and the minimum and maximum penalties he faced. With respect to counts I and II, the court informed defendant that the Class X felonies required a mandatory period of incarceration of 6 to 30 years, which would be served mandatorily consecutively to any sentences of incarceration imposed in Coles County case Nos. 12–CF–236, 12–CF–329, and 12–CF–355, and a 3–year period of mandatory supervised release. Upon inquiry, the State indicated it believed sentences on counts I and II were mandatorily consecutive to each other. Accordingly, the court informed defendant, if he were convicted of both counts I and II, the sentences imposed would be mandatorily consecutive. Ultimately, defendant did not waive his right to counsel and proceeded to a guilty plea hearing represented by Diana Lenik.

¶ 7 A. Guilty Plea

¶ 8 On December 23, 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to count IX—unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. Prior to hearing the factual basis and accepting defendant's guilty plea, the trial court informed defendant unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle was a Class 2 felony and, because of defendant's prior Class 2 felony conviction, the charge carried a minimum sentence of 3 years' imprisonment and a maximum sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, followed by a 2–year period of mandatory supervised release. The court also asked defendant, "Is your plea of guilty today voluntary? Is this of your own free will?" Defendant responded, "Yes, it is."

¶ 9 The plea agreement provided defendant would be sentenced to an extended term of 9 years' imprisonment, with credit for 399 days previously served in custody, and a 2–year term of mandatory supervised release. Defendant also agreed to pay a Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act fee and the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis fee, if applicable, and he had a credit of $1995 for time spent in custody. At the hearing, counsel informed the court defendant had already submitted his DNA to the Illinois State Police.

¶ 10 After the trial court heard the terms of the plea agreement, the following colloquy occurred:

"THE COURT: All right. Mr. Glover, you heard what the lawyers have said. Is that the agreement that you have?

MR. GLOVER: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything else?

MR. GLOVER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Has anyone forced you or threatened you?

MR. GLOVER: No, your Honor."

The court then asked for the factual basis for the plea, which we summarize briefly. In November 2012, police were summoned to a reported domestic violence incident. Defendant was reportedly on a roof, confronting his girlfriend through a window. When officers arrived, defendant was back on the ground. Although police ordered him to stay put, defendant left the scene in a Cadillac. He later hit a fire hydrant before leaving the vehicle and hiding in a nearby apartment. Later, the police identified the Cadillac as stolen the day before in Charleston, Illinois, defendant's admitted location before coming to Champaign. After hearing the factual basis, the court accepted defendant's plea of guilty to count IX and dismissed the remaining charges. The court did not address fines or fees at the hearing.

¶ 11 The written sentencing order imposed (1) a Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act fee (with no amount specified) and (2) a DNA analysis fee if not previously paid. The order also included the following language: "The Defendant shall pay all fines, fees[,] and costs as authorized by statute." The certified fines and fees sheet indicates the circuit clerk assessed, in part, the following: (1) $50 "court finance fee," (2) $40 "State's attorney," (3) $2 "State's attorney au[tomation]," (4) $10 "arrestee's medical," (5) $10 "probation oper[ations] ass[istance]," (6) $250 "state offender DN[A]," (7) $10 "tr[affic]/cr[iminal] sur[charge]," (8) $100 "violent crime vict[ims assistance]," (9) $10 St[ate] Police services," (10) $10 "St[ate] Police operatio[ns]," and (11) $10 "clerk op & admin f[ee]."

¶ 12 B. Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea

¶ 13 On January 17, 2014, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging (1) he did not understand the consequences of his plea due to being under the influence of trazodone, a medication for depression and (2) his plea was involuntary because his Coles County attorney said the assistant State's Attorney would cause him to receive a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment on the Coles County charges if he did not plead guilty in Champaign County case No. 12–CF–1913.

¶ 14 In March 2014, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant appealed, and this court docketed the case as No. 4–14–0203. In August 2014, this court summarily remanded the cause for strict compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). People v. Glover, No. 4–14–0203 (Aug. 18, 2014) (summary order). That same month, counsel for defendant filed an amended Rule 604(d) certificate. Following a September 2014 hearing, the court again denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant again appealed, and this court docketed the case as No. 4–14–0816. In June 2016, this court again remanded for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). People v. Glover, No. 4–14–0816 (June 3, 2016) (summary order).

¶ 15 On remand, newly appointed counsel for defendant filed a new motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion, in pertinent part, alleged (1) defendant's plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into because, at the time of the plea, (a) he was under the influence of trazodone and did not understand what was said to him by his lawyer or the judge and (b) he misunderstood...