People v. Hill

• Decision Date: 03 March 2009
• Docket Number: Docket No. 281375.
• Citation: 766 N.W.2d 17,282 Mich. App. 538
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
• Parties: PEOPLE v. HILL.

766 N.W.2d 17

282 Mich. App. 538

PEOPLE v. HILL.

Docket No. 281375.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted February 10, 2009, at Detroit.

Decided March 3, 2009, at 9:00 a.m.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jason W. Williams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Christine A. Pagac) and Thomas Hill, in propria persona.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and METER and FORT HOOD, JJ.

FORT HOOD, J.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and carjacking, MCL 750.529a(1), but acquitted of additional charges of possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced as a third-felony habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 20 to 40 years for each conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.

Defendant was convicted of stealing the victim's car and money while threatening her with a gun. The victim identified defendant, whom she had known for several months, as the perpetrator.

I. LIMITATIONS ON CROSS-EXAMINATION

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously prevented him from thoroughly cross-examining the victim and police detective Edwardo Torres, and that these limitations on cross-examination violated his right of confrontation and his right to present a complete defense. Constitutional claims of due process violations are reviewed de novo. People v. Pitts, 222 Mich.App. 260, 263, 564 N.W.2d 93 (1997).

A. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right of confrontation by precluding him from questioning the victim concerning her drug use. We disagree.

The Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const., Am. VI, states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...." "`The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.'" Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (citation and emphasis omitted). "[T]he cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness." Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. Exposing a witness's motivation, bias, and prejudices is a crucial part of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Id. at 316-317, 94 S.Ct. 1105. However, the Confrontation Clause does not confer a right to impeach the general credibility of a witness. Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 737-738 (C.A.6, 2000).

In the present case, the victim's drug use was relevant to her ability to perceive and recall the events that transpired and, therefore, was relevant to her credibility. However, the victim admitted having a drug habit. She denied using drugs on the day of the crimes, and defendant did not proffer any evidence showing otherwise. Defendant has failed to explain how the victim's drug of choice, which he does not identify, has any further bearing on her credibility. In other words, defendant made no attempt to show that the victim was using a drug that had some lingering effects on the victim's perception and memory.

By allowing inquiry into the victim's drug use on the day of the crimes, the trial court sufficiently permitted defendant to cross-examine the victim concerning her perception and memory. Davis, supra at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. While defendant was entitled to attempt to discredit the victim, he was not entitled to do so by way of a general attack on her character. Boggs, supra at 737-738. Inquiry into her drugs of choice was such a general character attack. Therefore, the trial court correctly refused to allow it, absent a particular showing of relevance.

B. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

Defendant also argues that the trial court violated his right to present a complete defense by preventing him from eliciting testimony that the victim may have traded the car for drugs.

Along with the right of confrontation, the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant "`"a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."'" Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (citations omitted). "This right is abridged by evidence rules that `infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused' and are `"arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."'" Id. (citations omitted). However, a trial court may exclude evidence where the probative value is outweighed by certain other factors, such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. Id. at 326, 126 S.Ct. 1727. This includes evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant, or that poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues. Id.

Applying this balancing test in the context of evidence proffered to show that someone else may have committed the crime charged, evidence may be introduced "`when it is inconsistent with, and raises a reasonable doubt of, [the defendant's] own guilt,'" but not when the evidence is "`remote'" and lacks a sufficient "`connection with the crime.'" Id. at 327, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (citations omitted). Accordingly, evidence tending to inculpate another may be introduced when it tends to prove that another person may have committed the crime, but it may be excluded "`where it does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant's trial.'" Id. (citation omitted); see also People v. Kent, 157 Mich.App. 780, 793, 404 N.W.2d 668 (1987).

In questioning Detective Torres, defendant's goal was to raise the possibility that the victim gave the car to someone in exchange for drugs, and that she was lying about the robbery and carjacking. However, defendant did not proffer any evidence tending to support that theory. Defendant's general inquiry into whether there are people who trade cars for drugs was speculative and remote, and lacked sufficient connection with the crime. Holmes, supra at 327, 126 S.Ct. 1727. At best, defendant sought to create only a mere suspicion that the victim fabricated the entire story. Kent, supra at 793, 404 N.W.2d 668. The trial court did not err in preventing defendant from cross-examining Detective Torres on this issue.

II. DEFENDANT'S PRO SE BRIEF

Defendant raises several issues in a pro se supplemental brief, none of which has merit.

A. THE ARREST WARRANT AND CONDUCT OF THE POLICE AND THE PROSECUTOR

Defendant argues that there was no probable cause to support issuing a warrant for his arrest, and that misconduct by the police and the prosecutor affected the validity of his arrest. We disagree.

Chapter IV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 764.1 et seq., governs the issuance of arrest warrants. In particular, MCL 764.1a states, in relevant part:

(1) A magistrate shall issue a warrant upon presentation of a proper complaint alleging the commission of an offense and a finding of reasonable cause to believe that the individual accused in the complaint committed that offense. The complaint shall be sworn to before a magistrate or clerk.

(2) The finding of reasonable cause by the magistrate may be based upon 1 or more of the following:

(a) Factual allegations of the complainant contained in the complaint.

(b) The complainant's sworn testimony.

(c) The complainant's affidavit.

(d) Any supplemental sworn testimony or affidavits of other individuals presented by the complainant or required by the magistrate.

(3) The magistrate may require sworn testimony of the complainant or other individuals. Supplemental affidavits may be sworn to before an individual authorized by law to administer oaths. The factual allegations contained in the complaint, testimony, or affidavits may be based upon personal knowledge, information and belief, or both. [Emphasis added.]

The prosecutor must authorize a felony complaint. MCL 764.1(1). "A complaint shall recite the substance of the accusation against the accused" and "may contain factual allegations establishing reasonable cause." MCL 764.1d.

In this case, defendant was charged with armed robbery, carjacking, possession of a firearm by a felon, and felony-firearm. The complaint contains factual allegations made by the victim to Detective Torres, on the officer's information and belief, supporting the elements of each of the offenses charged. Contrary to what defendant argues, the sworn complaint satisfied the requirements of MCL 764.1a and was sufficient to enable a magistrate to find that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the four offenses charged.

Defendant argues that there was no evidence to support Detective Torres's trial testimony that he knew defendant by the name "June." The propriety of this trial testimony has no bearing on whether an arrest warrant was properly issued. Regardless of whether Detective Torres personally knew defendant as June, the victim identified defendant as her assailant from a photographic array.

Defendant argues that Detective Torres committed misconduct because he did not thoroughly investigate this case and, therefore, the arrest warrant was invalid. We again disagree. Defendant cites no authority for his argument that a reviewing court may second-guess the police investigation of a case in the context of determining whether a warrant was properly issued. The statutory warrant requirements address only whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crimes charged. Other matters—including the weight and the credibility of the...