People v. Goins

• Decision Date: 19 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 62583,62583
• Citation: 116 Ill.Dec. 193,518 N.E.2d 1014,119 Ill.2d 259
• Parties: , 116 Ill.Dec. 193 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Alvin GOINS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1014

518 N.E.2d 1014

119 Ill.2d 259, 116 Ill.Dec. 193

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Alvin GOINS, Appellant.

No. 62583.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 19, 1988.

Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Pamela Peters, Asst. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma J. Stewart, Sol. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Kenneth A. Fedinets, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, for appellee.

Justice WARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County, defendant, Alvin Goins, was convicted of residential burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19-3), and sentenced to a term of 5 1/2 years. The appellate court affirmed (136 Ill.App.3d 582, 91 Ill.Dec. 356, 483 N.E.2d 702), and we allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (103 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).

The defendant was taken into custody on July 7, 1983, in Kane County, and charged with the offense of residential burglary. An indictment was returned in Kane County upon the prosecutor's belief that the residence burglarized was in Kane County, but investigation disclosed it to be in Du Page County. While the defendant remained in custody in Kane County, an indictment was returned on November 22, 1983, in the circuit court of Du Page County charging him with the same offense as the Kane County indictment charged. The Kane County indictment was nol-prossed, and on November 30, 1983, the defendant was transferred to the custody of the sheriff of Du Page County. It was stipulated by the State's Attorney and the defendant that the defendant had been in custody since his arrest in Kane County on July 7, 1983.

On February 23, 1984, defendant moved for discharge pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the so-called 120-day statute to insure a speedy trial (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a)). The motion stated that on July 7, 1983, he had been placed in custody for the offense charged, that he had not been released on bond or tried within 120 days and that the delay of trial was not attributable to him.

Section 103-5(a) provides:

"(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a).

The circuit court denied the defendant's motion on March 12, 1984, holding that the circuit court of Du Page County did not have jurisdiction to try defendant for the offense until November 30, 1983, and as of the date of the motion to discharge the statutory period of 120 days had not elapsed. The defendant was convicted by a jury of residential burglary in Du Page County, and the appellate court affirmed. Citing People v. Rogers (1953), 415 Ill. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398, that court held that, because the circuit court of Du Page County was the only court having jurisdiction of the offense, the statutory time for trial did not commence until defendant was in custody in Du Page County.

The defendant contends that, because his incarceration in Kane County was for the same offense for which he was charged and convicted in Du Page County, the 120 days commenced on the date of his incarceration in Kane County. Citing People v. Fosdick (1967), 36 Ill.2d 524, 224 N.E.2d 242, he argues that the statute must be liberally construed and that its salutary purpose may not be defeated by technical evasion. He urges that the dismissal of the Kane County indictment did not toll the running of the 120 days because he remained in custody on the identical charge.

Relying principally on People v. Rogers (1953), 415 Ill. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398, the State contends that the appellate court correctly held that the circuit court of Kane County was without jurisdiction of the offense and that the statutory period commenced to run when the defendant was incarcerated in Du Page County. The State argues that when the General Assembly enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1961, it retained the language of the existing speedy-trial statute, which included the words "court having jurisdiction," which the Rogers court construed to mean the court with venue to try the case. It says that in retaining the language, the legislature showed it intended to retain the Rogers interpretation of the statute. (See Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, par. 103-5, Committee Comments, at 58 (Smith-Hurd 1980).) The State argues that it is clear that the appellate court therefore correctly held that the legislature intended the words "court having jurisdiction" in the speedy-trial statute to mean the court where venue lies. 136 Ill.App.3d 582, 586, 91 Ill.Dec. 356, 483 N.E.2d 702.

The Rogers court held that only the court in the county where the crime was committed has jurisdiction of the offense, which in effect equated jurisdiction with venue for purposes of the speedy-trial act. In Rogers, the defendant was indicted for rape and taken into custody in Cook County, but later was taken to Lake County, where the offense had been committed. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the speedy-trial term should be calculated from the date he was confined in Cook County, stating:

"Cook County did not have jurisdiction because of the lack of venue. * * * The uncontradicted proof in the instant case demonstrates that the crime, if any, was committed in Lake County. Therefore, the circuit court of Lake County and not Cook County was the only court that had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Since the trial occurred in that county within the statutory period, the court properly ruled that the defendant was not entitled to the relief sought under section 18 [of Division XIII of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, ch. 38, par. 748) ]." 415 Ill. 343, 347, 114 N.E.2d 398.

The decision in Rogers must be explained in the context of the law existing at the time. The speedy-trial provision of the criminal code in effect when Rogers was decided was essentially the same as the current statute. Unlike the current statutory provisions relating to jurisdiction and venue, however, there was a statutory provision: "The local jurisdiction of all offenses, not otherwise provided for by law, shall be in the county where the offense was committed." Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, ch. 38, par. 703.

The Rogers court thus was interpreting the speedy-trial statute when the legislature did not distinguish between venue and jurisdiction. (People v. Goulet (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 609, 611, 10 Ill.Dec. 436, 367 N.E.2d 1045; see also People v. Adams (1921), 300 Ill. 20, 132 N.E. 765.) The Rogers court regarded the term "jurisdiction" in the speedy-trial statute as referring to the county where the crime occurred, thereby equating the concept of jurisdiction with that of venue.

Contrary to what existed when Rogers was handed down, the 1961 criminal code draws a sharp distinction between jurisdiction and venue. (See People v. Goulet (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 609, 10 Ill.Dec. 436, 367 N.E.2d 1045.) Jurisdiction, the authority or power of a court to take cognizance of and adjudicate cases, is conferred by section 9 of article VI of the Constitution of Illinois, which provides that circuit courts have "original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters." (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 9; People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill.2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456.) Venue, or the place of trial, is fixed by section 1-6 of the Criminal Code, which provides that "[c]riminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, par. 1-6(a).) It will be observed that this statute, unlike the provision applicable when Rogers was decided (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, ch. 38, par. 703), makes no mention of jurisdiction.

Unlike the statutes in effect when Rogers was decided, the current statutes draw a clear distinction between venue and jurisdiction. The committee comments to section 1-6(a) note that the place of trial is to be distinguished from State criminal jurisdiction. (Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 38, par. 1-6, Committee Comments, at 23 (Smith-Hurd 1972)). Following the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961 this court expressly held that the place of trial is not jurisdictional. (People v. Ondrey (1976), 65 Ill.2d 360, 2 Ill.Dec. 717, 357 N.E.2d 1160.) Although a defendant unquestionably has a right to trial in the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8; Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, ch. 38, par. 1-6(a)), examination of our statutory scheme shows that when, through error, an indictment was returned in Kane County the only consequence was that an indictment had been returned in a county that was not the proper place for trial. It did not mean that the circuit court of that county was without jurisdiction.

Though the language of the speedy-trial statute was retained, we agree with the defendant that when the General Assembly distinguished jurisdiction and venue in the 1961 criminal code, it intended this distinction to be effective throughout the code, including the speedy-trial statute. When construing a statute, courts must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Washburn (1986), 112 Ill.2d 486, 492, 98 Ill.Dec. 50, 493 N.E.2d 1071.) Typically the statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent, and when that language is clear and unambiguous, courts will not read into the statute exceptions, limitations and conditions. Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen (1970), 45 Ill.2d 75, 256 N.E.2d 758; Helland v. Larson (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 1, 92 Ill.Dec. 646, 485 N.E.2d 457.

The language of the speedy-trial statute is susceptible to only one interpretation. It unambiguously states that an accused "shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a)); the...