People v. Goss

• Decision Date: 07 June 1993
• Docket Number: Docket No. 147711
• Citation: 200 Mich.App. 9,503 N.W.2d 682
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Darryl Steven GOSS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 682

503 N.W.2d 682

200 Mich.App. 9

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Darryl Steven GOSS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 147711.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1993, at Detroit.

Decided June 7, 1993, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication Aug. 24, 1993.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the People.

Angela Palmieri, Garden City, for defendant.

Before RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, P.J., and SHEPHERD and FITZGERALD, JJ.

SHEPHERD, Judge.

After a remand by the Supreme Court for retrial on the charge of felony murder, the prosecution appeals the trial court's denial of its motion in limine that, on retrial, the jury be instructed that the element of armed robbery necessary to establish felony murder had already been proven and that it was not an issue for the jury to decide. We affirm.

I

Following a prior jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, two counts of assault with intent to murder, M.C.L. § 750.83; M.S.A. § 28.278, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. § 750.520b(1); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1), kidnapping, M.C.L. § 750.349; M.S.A. § 28.581, and armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion per curiam, decided March 3, 1989 (Docket No. 99743), affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction of felony murder, but affirmed his convictions in all other respects. People v. Goss, 437 Mich. 1021, 470 N.W.2d 400 (1991).

The prosecution argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion in limine because the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the underlying charge of armed robbery. According to the prosecution, when this case is retried, the jury should be instructed that defendant has been found guilty of the underlying felony, and that its responsibility is only to determine whether he is also guilty of aiding and abetting the murder that occurred during the commission of the felony. We disagree.

II

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in the prior proceeding. People v. Gates, 434 Mich. 146, 154, 452 N.W.2d 627 (1990), cert. den. 497 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 3238, 111 L.Ed.2d 749 (1990).

Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel has been applied to criminal cases in Michigan ¹ as well as in other jurisdictions, ² the issue whether the prosecution may use collateral estoppel affirmatively to establish facts relating to an essential element of an offense in a subsequent proceeding of a criminal case appears to be one of first impression.

As various courts have observed, the affirmative use of collateral estoppel by the prosecution in a criminal case does not rest upon any constitutional mandate. State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 209, 432 A.2d 912 (1981). The doctrine, which originated in civil litigation, has been applied in criminal cases for reasons of judicial economy and expediency. State v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518 (1980). As the Court of Appeals of New York stated, "the doctrine, however, is not to be rigidly or mechanically applied and must on occasion, yield to more fundamental concerns." Id.

A review of other jurisdictions reveals that courts are generally reluctant to support the affirmative use of collateral estoppel to establish facts relating to the essential element of an offense against a defendant in a subsequent criminal proceeding.

In United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F.Supp. 619, 625 (S.D.Cal.1959), a watershed case in which a federal district court reviewed the jurisprudence of collateral estoppel in criminal cases at some length, the court observed that the majority of reported cases, both federal and state, viewed collateral estoppel as unavailable to the prosecutor. Id. at 622-625. Nonetheless, it held that collateral estoppel was applicable to the issue of alienage where a prior conviction of illegal entry into the United States necessarily adjudicated that issue. Id. at 626-627. The court explained:

The wise public policy underlying the doctrine, and common-sense judicial administration as well, combine to advocate application of collateral estoppel against a defendant in a criminal case, at least as to certain issues, where such issues have been in fact litigated and necessarily adjudicated in a prior criminal case between the identical prosecutor and the identical accused. Issues as to status, for example, would seem most appropriate for application of the doctrine. [Id. at 625.]

In Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 787 (CA 9, 1968), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the holding of Rangel-Perez, stating that where the issue of a defendant's alienage was necessarily litigated fully in a criminal case, collateral estoppel may be applied to the issue in a later criminal case.

Subsequently, in United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1 (CA 9, 1975), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the application of collateral estoppel beyond the issue of status. In that case, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to promote illegal gambling. Facts established at that trial, concerning money received from his coconspirator's illegal operations, were judged admissible as proven in the defendant's later trial for federal income tax evasion, and the jury was so instructed. Id. at 2-3. The appellate court upheld that decision, saying:

Appellant argues that if Rangel-Perez and Pena-Cabanillas are interpreted to mean that the court may instruct the jury on facts which have been directly and necessarily adjudicated in a prior trial without production of any further evidence, their holding would ignore the defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and his right to have all the facts decided by the jury. We cannot agree. With respect to all facts which were essential to a determination of the charges against appellant in the 1971 conspiracy trial, the appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses against him and was accorded his constitutional right to trial by jury. While Rangel-Perez and Pena-Cabanillas are limited to the question of defendant's status, we conclude that the rationale of those cases is equally applicable to those facts actually decided which were essential to the judgment in the prior case. [Id. at 5-6.]

See also United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (CA 9, 1980), another case involving alienage, which confirmed that a conviction based on a guilty plea, like a trial-based conviction, estopped a defendant from relitigating a common material fact in subsequent proceedings. Bejar-Matrecios cited an earlier Eighth Circuit case, again involving the issue of alienage, which came to the same conclusion, Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (CA 8, 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1057, 96 S.Ct. 791, 46 L.Ed.2d 647 (1976). See also Otherson v. Dep't of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Service, 228 U.S.App.D.C. 481, 711 F.2d 267 (1983), and Howard v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 930 F.2d 432 (CA 5, 1991), which held that facts adjudicated in a prior criminal conviction could not be recontested in a later administrative proceeding.

However, federal courts have also opposed the use of collateral estoppel against a defendant in a subsequent criminal proceeding. In United States v. Carlisi, 32 F.Supp. 479, 482 (E.D.N.Y., 1940), the court stated:

In transplanting the doctrine [of res judicata to criminal law], the requirement of mutuality had to be abandoned. A prior adjudication with respect to an element of a subsequently tried offense is not binding upon the accused. This is so, because the defendant, charged with crime, always has the right to have the jury or the triers of the facts determine anew every element of guilt.

This view was more recently echoed in United States v. Bruno, 333 F.Supp. 570, 576 (E.D.Pa.1986), citing United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (CA 3, 1943):

The application of collateral estoppel to criminal cases has been favored despite the fact that there can never be mutuality between the prosecution and the defense. An accused is always constitutionally entitled to a trial de novo of the facts alleged and in support of each offense charged against him, and collateral estoppel is available as a defense, even though it can never be raised offensively by the prosecution.

See also Bejar-Matrecios, supra at 83, n. 2 where the court, in allowing the application of collateral estoppel in an alienage case, nonetheless observed:

Because of its potential implication for a defendant's rights to confrontation and jury trial, other courts have been reluctant to decide whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel is appropriate in successive criminal proceedings. See United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 892 n. 23, (D.C.Cir.1979) (Robinson, J., dissenting in part); United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir.1977).

Further, state courts have generally refused to extend the doctrine when fundamental constitutional rights are implicated. In Ingenito, supra, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel, when so used, violates the right to trial by jury. As the court observed:

Most of these cases [permitting the affirmative use of collateral estoppel by the prosecution] are limited to instances where the issue foreclosed involved status or did not go to the core of the crime charged or where the proceeding in which estoppel was invoked did not involve a jury trial. Other cases cited ... date back almost a century or more [citing Commonwealth v. Ellis, 160 Mass. 165, 35 N.E....