People v. Grant

• Decision Date: 18 May 1987
• Citation: 515 N.Y.S.2d 604,130 A.D.2d 683
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Richard GRANT, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 604

515 N.Y.S.2d 604

130 A.D.2d 683

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Richard GRANT, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

May 18, 1987.

Donald E. Gilbert, New York City for appellant.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Felix M. Hester, of counsel), for respondent.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and NIEHOFF, KOOPER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pitaro, J.), rendered October 30, 1984, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, in part, after a hearing (Chetta, J.), of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and identification testimony.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

After receiving a radio transmission advising of a robbery committed in the vicinity of 217th Street and Hollis Avenue by a black man wearing leather pants and a dark jacket, Police Officers Martino and Whitfield, on route to that location, observed an individual at Hollis Avenue and 205th Street whose appearance matched that of the radio description. The officers detained the individual, the defendant herein, and radioed their fellow officers, who were with the complainants, to transport the complainants to the scene. The complainants arrived within minutes, and while seated in a police car, identified the defendant as the robber. At the time the identification took place, the defendant was standing on a crowded street without handcuffs, between two plainclothes officers whose identity as policemen had not been revealed to the complainants. The hearing court denied, in part, those branches of the defendant's motion which were to suppress physical evidence and identification testimony, concluding that the officers' actions had been supported by reasonable suspicion and that the subsequent identification procedure was permissible under the circumstances.

Contrary to the defendant's contentions on appeal, the police conduct was justified in its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible (see e.g., People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562; People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 324 N.E.2d 872). After receiving a radio description of a robber who had recently committed a robbery in the area, the officers were justified in briefly detaining defendant--whose appearance matched the description--so as to permit a prompt, on-the-scene viewing by the complainants who were nearby, and who could either identify the defendant as the robber or confirm that he had not been the perpetrator of the robbery (see e.g., People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 500 N.E.2d 861; People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023, 457 N.Y.S.2d 474, 443 N.E.2d 948). Accordingly, "[a] speedy on the scene viewing thus was of value both to law enforcement authorities and to defendant, and [thus] was appropriate here" (People v. Hicks, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 242, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 500 N.E.2d 861). The defendant's contention that the showup subsequently employed was unduly suggestive is without merit. Here, the identification...