People v. Grant
| Citation | 2021 COA 53,492 P.3d 345 |
| Decision Date | 22 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 18CA1139 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric William GRANT, Defendant-Appellant. |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Casey J. Mulligan, Alternate Defense Counsel, Mary Claire Mulligan, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD
¶ 1 In Colorado, discovery in a criminal case — the process by which the prosecution and the defense exchange information — is governed by Crim. P. 16. Among other things, the Rule imposes deadlines for this exchange so that the parties can be prepared for trial. For example, as is pertinent to this case, the prosecution must provide the defense with any statements that the defendant made to the police no later than twenty-one days after either the defendant first appears in court or the prosecution files charges.
¶ 2 The Rule also requires the prosecution to give the defense information that has been gathered by police departments that have (1) participated in the investigation of the case; and (2) reported to the prosecution about the case. Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3). But what if the police department that meets these criteria is located more than a thousand miles away? The Rule does not make any exceptions for geographic distance, or for departments that have never before reported to Colorado prosecutors, or for departments that have just a small amount of information about a case. Therefore, if the two requirements of Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3) are met, then the prosecution is obligated to turn over information from out-of-state police departments to the defense.
¶ 3 This appeal involves a seemingly straightforward application of Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3). The Philadelphia police arrested a fugitive from Colorado, and, while being booked, the fugitive made a statement that was potentially inculpatory. But the Philadelphia police did not inform the Colorado police or the Colorado prosecution about the statement until the seventh day of the fugitive's Colorado trial. In turn, the trial court was faced with the decision of whether the prosecution had violated Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3) by making this admittedly late disclosure, and, if so, what to do about it.
¶ 4 We used the word "seemingly" in the previous paragraph because, although it appears that Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3) was violated (and that is what the trial court concluded), the Attorney General argues it was not. Rather, the Attorney General, relying on a nearly forty-year-old opinion from a division of this court, which, in turn, harkened back to an almost fifty-year-old supreme court opinion, contends that the prosecution's disclosure requirements are limited to information in the possession of police departments that are located in the county or district where the case is to be tried.
¶ 5 We respectfully disagree with the Attorney General's contention because we conclude that, although the opinion from a division of this court was decided years after the operative language of Crim. P. 16 took effect, it nonetheless relied on a case that construed an old version of the Rule. And, as our supreme court pointed out in 1984, the current version of the Rule clearly applies to out-of-state police departments that meet the two requirements of Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(3). So we decide, as we will explain in more detail below, that there was a discovery violation in this case.
¶ 6 But that is not the end of the inquiry. Once a court determines that a discovery violation occurred, what should it do? For reasons that we shall explain, we further conclude that the trial court in this case crafted an appropriate sanction that eliminated the prejudice that flowed from the Rule violation.
¶ 7 A jury convicted defendant, Eric William Grant, of first degree murder, first degree assault, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. He appeals. We affirm.
¶ 8 One day in July 2017, the owner of an automobile repair shop in Colorado Springs was talking with a customer. A third man wearing a yellow construction vest and a hard hat entered the back door, announcing, "Springs Utilities." As the customer turned to leave, a fourth man, wearing an orange construction vest and a baseball cap, grabbed him from behind and put a gun to his head. The man in the yellow vest then ordered the owner to open the business's safe. When the owner hesitated, the man in the yellow vest struck him in the head with a pistol, knocking him to the ground.
¶ 9 The two robbers ransacked the shop. On his way out, the one wearing the yellow vest kicked the owner repeatedly, kicked and pistol-whipped the customer, and stole the latter's wallet and watch. The customer sustained serious injuries. The owner died at the scene.
¶ 10 After a portion of the surveillance video recorded during the incident was released to the public, a person came forward and identified defendant as the robber who wore the yellow vest. A jury eventually found him guilty of first degree murder after deliberation, first degree felony murder, first degree assault, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.
¶ 11 Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it allowed (1) the prosecution to introduce a statement that he made to an out-of-state police officer even though the defense was not informed of its existence until the seventh day of trial; (2) a detective to testify that, in his opinion, defendant was one of the suspects in the surveillance video; and (3) testimony about another similar crime that he had committed months before the robbery. We disagree with each of these contentions.
¶ 12 We review each of these contentions for an abuse of discretion. People v. Bueno , 2013 COA 151, ¶ 10, 411 P.3d 62 (); Campbell v. People , 2019 CO 66, ¶ 21, 443 P.3d 72 (evidentiary issues); Yusem v. People , 210 P.3d 458, 463 (Colo. 2009) (). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, People v. Lee , 18 P.3d 192, 196 (Colo. 2001) (discovery issues); Campbell , ¶ 21 (evidentiary issues); Yusem , 210 P.3d at 463 (), or when it misapplies the law, Rains v. Barber , 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8, 420 P.3d 969.
¶ 13 Once defendant was identified as a suspect, it took the Colorado Springs police nearly three months to track him down. They eventually learned that he had been hiding in Philadelphia, where he was arrested in October 2017. When the Philadelphia officers asked him if he had identification, he remarked,
¶ 14 But the prosecution and the Colorado Springs police did not learn about this statement until the trial's seventh day. During a recess, the prosecutor told the court and defense counsel that the prosecution had just received a report from a Philadelphia detective containing the statement.
¶ 15 Defense counsel promptly asked the court to prevent the prosecution from introducing the statement into evidence as a sanction for not giving it to the defense before trial within the time parameters established by Crim. P. 16.
¶ 16 She then explained the potential prejudice to defendant of admitting his statement to the Philadelphia police. First, she said that the statement would undermine defendant's theory of defense, mistaken identity, which the defense had laid out during its opening statement. Second, she asserted that, had the statement been disclosed before trial, the defense would have asked the court to suppress it for Fifth Amendment reasons.
¶ 17 But she did not ask the court to continue the trial or to declare a mistrial.
¶ 18 The court agreed that the mid-trial disclosure of the Philadelphia statement violated Crim. P. 16, but it found that the prosecution had not intentionally kept the statement from the defense. So it decided that, as a sanction to remedy the Rule violation, it would hold a hearing outside of the jury's presence to decide whether to suppress the statement on Fifth Amendment grounds. Defense counsel replied, "Judge, that's what we're asking for."
¶ 19 At the end of the hearing, the court denied the motion to suppress. The Philadelphia detective then testified before the jury about defendant's statement.
¶ 20 In every criminal case, the parties are obligated to disclose certain information to each other before trial. "By permitting the prosecution and defense to obtain relevant information prior to trial," our supreme court has explained, "[the discovery rules] promote fairness in the criminal process by reducing the risk of trial by ambush." Lanari v. People , 827 P.2d 495, 499 (Colo. 1992). The disclosure requirements are spelled out in Crim. P. 16.
¶ 21 As is relevant to this case, the prosecution must provide the defense with certain "material and information which is within the possession or control of the prosecuting attorney," including any police and arrest reports concerning the pending case, as well as "[a]ny written or recorded statements of the accused ... and the substance of any oral statements made to the police or prosecution by the accused." Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1)(I), (VIII). The prosecution must disclose this information, with exceptions that do not apply in this case, "as soon as practicable but not later than 21 days after the defendant's first appearance at the time of or following the filing of charges." Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(1).
¶ 22 Getting to the core of the issue before us, the prosecution's disclosure...
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