People v. Grever

• Decision Date: 02 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 99930.,No. 99945.,99930.,99945.
• Citation: 222 Ill.2d 321,856 N.E.2d 378,305 Ill.Dec. 573
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Robert GREVER, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

856 N.E.2d 378

222 Ill.2d 321

305 Ill.Dec. 573

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Robert GREVER, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

No. 99930.

No. 99945.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 2, 2006.

Rehearing Denied September 25, 2006.

Gregory E. Pelini, Champaign, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Michael J. Waller, State's Attorney, Waukegan (Norbert J. Goetten, Martin P. Moltz and Jean M. Kripke, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, of counsel), for the People.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Defendant, Robert Grever, is a former township supervisor of Ela Township, Lake County. Defendant was found guilty of 12 counts of official misconduct (720 ILCS 5/33-3(a), (c) (West 1998)), for his failure to report amounts his wife owed to the township for his mother-in-law's care at the county nursing home.

Defendant was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Lake County with multiple counts of official misconduct. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of all charges. The appellate court reversed five and affirmed three of the convictions. 353 Ill.App.3d 736, 289 Ill. Dec. 94, 819 N.E.2d 6.

The State and defendant filed petitions for leave to appeal. This court allowed each petition and consolidated the two. 177 Ill.2d R. 315. The central, overarching issue in this appeal is whether the indictment was sufficient to state a charge of official misconduct for these convictions. We now affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND

On February 13, 2002, defendant was charged by indictment with 12 counts of official misconduct. The first six counts pertained to a different year from 1993 through 1998, and charged that defendant, while acting in his official capacity as the Ela Township supervisor:

"intentionally failed to perform a mandatory act, in that he failed to inform the Ela Township Board of [i]ndebtedness of Mae Chvojka and Ruth Grever to the Winchester House paid for by Ela Township within 30 days of the annual township meeting as required by [60 ILCS 1/70-15(c)(v)], in violation of 720 ILCS 5/22-3(a) * * *."

Counts VII, VIII, and IX of the indictment each referenced a different person who benefitted from defendant's alleged official misconduct and charged that defendant:

"with the intent to obtain a personal benefit for [Mae Chvojka (count VII), Ruth Grever (count VIII), and Robert Grever (count IX)] performed acts in excess of his lawful authority, in a series of acts designed to promote a single intent, he submitted bills to the Ela Township Board for payment by the township for the stay of Mae Chvojka at the Winchester House despite the fact that neither Mae Chvojka, nor any representative on her behalf [was] reimbursing the township as required by Ela Township, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3(c) * * *."

Counts X, XI, and XII of the indictment each pertained to a different person who benefitted from defendant's alleged official misconduct from 1992 through 1998, and charged that defendant:

"with the intent to obtain a personal benefit to [Mae Chvojka (count X), Ruth Grever (count XI), Robert Grever (count XII)], performed acts in excess of his official authority in a series of acts designed to promote a single intent, in that he concealed the existence of a debt owed by his wife, Ruth Grever, and her mother, Mae Chvojka, to Ela Township and withheld collection action regarding said debt, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33-3(c) * * *."

Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on statute of limitations grounds was denied. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty on all 12 counts charged in the indictment. Defendant's posttrial motions, including a motion in arrest of judgment, were denied. Counts VIII, IX, XI, and XII of the indictment were merged with counts VII and X, and convictions were entered on counts I through VI, VII, and X of the indictment.

The appellate court reversed the convictions for counts I, II, and III, finding them to be outside the statute of limitations, and reversed the conviction for count VII, finding it failed to state an offense, and further concluding that the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court also reversed the conviction for count X, noting that count X failed to state an offense, and determining that the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed the convictions for counts IV, V, and VI. 353 Ill.App.3d 736, 289 Ill.Dec. 94, 819 N.E.2d 6.

The State filed a petition for leave to appeal the reversal of counts VII and X, and defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal the affirmance of counts IV, V, and VI. This court allowed each petition and consolidated the two. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

In a posttrial motion in arrest of judgment, defendant argued that the indictment was insufficient to state a charge of official misconduct. Defendant appeals the appellate court's affirming the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment on counts IV, V, and VI. The State appeals the appellate court's reversal of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion in arrest of judgment on counts VII and X.

The United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution afford criminal defendants the right to be informed of "the nature and cause" of the accusations against them. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8. Further, section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires that a charging instrument set forth "the nature and elements of the offense charged." 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 1998). A motion in arrest of judgment must be granted by the trial court when the indictment does not set forth the elements of an offense. 725 ILCS 5/116-2(b)(1) (West 1998); People v. Lutz, 73 Ill.2d 204, 209, 22 Ill.Dec. 695, 383 N.E.2d 171 (1978). We must, therefore, determine whether counts IV, V, VI, VII, and X of the indictment charge offenses punishable by the criminal law of the State of Illinois.

I. Defendant's Appeal

Defendant stands convicted of three counts of official misconduct for failing to include the indebtedness of his wife for his mother-in-law's nursing home services paid by Ela Township in his annual statement of the township's financial affairs. Counts IV, V, and VI of the indictment charged violations of subsection (a) of the official misconduct statute, requiring proof that defendant, in his official capacity, intentionally or recklessly failed to perform a mandatory duty as required by law. 720 ILCS 5/33-3(a) (West 1998).

Section 70-15(c) of the Township Code (Code) (60 ILCS 1/70-15(c) (West 1998)) requires the supervisor to file with the township clerk an annual statement of the township's financial affairs showing:

"(i) the balance (if any) received by the supervisor from his or her predecessor in office or from any other source; (ii) the amount of tax levied the preceding year for the payment of township indebtedness and charges; (iii) the amount collected and paid over to the supervisor as supervisor; (iv) the amount paid out by the supervisor and on what account, including any amount paid out on township indebtedness, specifying the nature and amount of the township indebtedness, the amount paid on the indebtedness, the amount paid on principal, and the amount paid on interest account; and (v) the amount and kind of all outstanding indebtedness due and unpaid, the amount and kind of indebtedness not yet due, and when the indebtedness not yet due will mature." 60 ILCS 1/70-15(c) (West 1998).

The indictment was predicated on defendant's alleged intentional failure to report the amounts specified in subparagraph (v) of section 70-15(c). In his posttrial motion in arrest of judgment, defendant argued that counts IV, V, and VI of the indictment failed to charge an offense because subparagraph (v) only required him to report indebtedness and did not require him to report amounts due the township. The trial court rejected this argument and denied defendant's motion. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the plain language of the statute requires the conclusion that the phrase "the amount and kind of all outstanding indebtedness due and unpaid" means "both the amount the township owes to others that is due and has not been paid and the amount that others owe to the township that is due and has not been paid." 353 Ill.App.3d at 751, 289 Ill.Dec. 94, 819 N.E.2d 6.

Defendant's appeal presents an issue of statutory construction. The construction of a statute is a question of law, and thus review is de novo. People v. Collins, 214 Ill.2d 206, 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005). Our primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d 264, 279, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003). The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative intent. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d at 279, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139. The statute should be evaluated as a whole, and each provision construed in connection with every other section. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 466, 250 Ill.Dec. 758, 739 N.E.2d 521 (2000). When the language is unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resorting to further aids of statutory construction. People v. Glisson, 202 Ill.2d 499, 504-05, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002).

The appellate court noted that "indebtedness" means the condition or state of owing money. 353 Ill.App.3d at 751-52, 289 Ill.Dec. 94, 819 N.E.2d 6, citing Black's Law Dictionary 771 (7th ed.1999). Subparagraph (ii) refers to the amount of tax levied for payment of "township indebtedness and charges." Subparagraph (iv) refers to amounts paid on "township indebtedness." Subparagraph (v), on the other hand, refers to "all outstanding indebtedness." According to the appellate...