People v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 19 December 2016
• Docket Number: C074779
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. QUANTIS DEMON GRIFFIN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. QUANTIS DEMON GRIFFIN, Defendant and Appellant.

C074779

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Placer)

December 19, 2016

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 6212720)

Defendant Quantis Demon Griffin -- having previously been sentenced for possession of a firearm by a felon and false impersonation subjecting the other person to prosecution or penalty -- appeals from the trial court's order finding him ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126, on the ground he was armed with a firearm in committing the offense(s). (Unless otherwise stated, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code.) Defendant contends the trial court erred because his third- strike sentence was not "imposed" for being "armed"; there was no pleading or proof that he was armed; and the factual record does not show he was armed. We reject the contentions and affirm the order.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On September 18, 2000, as part of a negotiated plea agreement disposing of an information that charged four counts, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon ([former] § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, Stats. 2010, ch. 711, §§ 4, 6), personating another so as to make that person liable (§ 529, former subd. (3), now subd. (a)(3) [false personation while doing any act where the person falsely personated might become liable to suit or prosecution or penalty, or the person doing the personating or a third party might benefit]), and perjury in applying for a driver's license (§ 118, subd. (a)). He also admitted five prior strikes under the three-strikes law. The plea agreement specified a sentencing lid of 34 years to life in prison, which included a nine-year determinate term from a different case.

In January 2001, the trial court denied defendant's request to strike priors (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 25 years to life for the possession and personation offenses, consecutive to the nine-year determinate term. The court dismissed the perjury count in the interests of justice (§ 1385).

After the November 2012 election approving Proposition 36, defendant in March 2013 filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.126, subdivision (e).

The prosecution opposed the petition on alternative grounds that (1) defendant was statutorily ineligible for sentencing because he was armed with a firearm during commission of the possession charge and the personating Darrell Sloan charge, and (2) defendant poses an unreasonable risk to public safety if released.

Defendant filed a response, arguing the record of conviction established only that it was his gun that was in the woman's purse; there was no evidence that he knew the gun was in the purse.

The factual basis for the plea, as stated by the prosecutor at the hearing in the trial court, was as follows:

"[O]n December 31st, 1999, the defendant was asked during a vehicle stop by Officer Frank Ortiz in the city of Roseville, Placer County, California, if [defendant] was one of five individuals, including a driver, who were in that vehicle. Officer Ortiz perceived the odor of alcohol in the car and at least four of the individuals appeared to be under age so he asked them to step out of the car.

"Captain Chuck Knuthson also arrived on the scene to assist. Captain Knuthson removed a woman's purse from the back seat near the floorboard area where the defendant had been sitting on the passenger -- I'm sorry, on the driver's side of the vehicle. Captain Knuthson handed that purse to Officer Ortiz [who], feeling its excessively heavy weight, removed a loaded .25 caliber firearm. [¶] The purse belonged to an individual . . . who denied ownership of the gun, but since the gun was in her purse, she was the one arrested. A few days later Roseville PD received the information that [sic] the individuals in the car, the defendant in this case who had falsely identified himself at the scene as Darrell Sloan, was not, in fact, Darrell Sloan but was, in fact, Quantis Griffin, the defendant we have here in court. The gun found in the purse was not, in fact, [the female's] but was, in fact, Quantis Griffin's.

"From there the investigation continued. The other individuals in the car were interviewed. They all verified those statements. Videotaped statements were taken from [the female], the defendant, and some of the other involved individuals, including Darrell Sloan, the person personated. They all verified it was, in fact, the defendant in the car and that was, in fact, his gun.

"With respect to Count Four [perjury], the defendant was arrested on March 2nd, the year 2000, while at his place of employment, a Safeway Store. He had in his possession a California driver's license in the name of Julius Lee Thompson. Since the individual who arrested the defendant knew that he was, in fact, Quantis Griffin, not Julius Lee Thompson, investigation revealed that this particular defendant had obtained two different driver's licenses, one in his own name and one in the name of Julius Lee Thompson as verified by the same thumb print on both applications."

With respect to the prior felony convictions, defendant was convicted in March 1998 on five counts of violating section 245, subdivision (a)(2), with a section 12022, subdivision (a), armed with firearm allegation attached to each count, and also five counts of robbery (§ 211). The 10 counts all arose out of the same incident.

The prosecutor stated, "I would stipulate that that, in conjunction with the 190 pages of discovery and the approximately five videotaped tapes that we have provided and the defendant's criminal history from both this case and the robbery case, constitutes the factual basis."

The trial court asked, "Defense counsel accept the factual basis as stated?" Defendant himself said, "Yes," and defense counsel also said, "Yes."

Thus, although the prosecutor did not repeat verbally his assertion in the written opposition that the purse's owner said defendant put the gun in her purse that night, defendant expressly accepted the factual basis that included the exhibits. The parties stipulated that the exhibits be returned to the prosecution. No one has made them part of the record on appeal.

The trial court issued a written ruling finding defendant statutorily ineligible for resentencing. The court said it "reviewed factual information contained within the court record, specifically, the transcript of the plea and the preliminary hearing transcript. Based upon the Court's review, [defendant] was a backseat passenger during a vehicle stop. On the backseat floorboard near where the defendant had been sitting was a pursecontaining a handgun. [¶] [Defendant] argues the record is insufficient to establish that he was aware that the weapon was near him. The Court disagrees. The Court finds that during the commission of the present offense [defendant] was 'armed with a firearm,' as defined in People v. Bland [(1995)] 10 Cal.4th 991, 997 [Bland]. The firearm was near to where the defendant was seated in the vehicle and available for use either offensively or defensively. Further, during his plea, the defendant admitted possession of the firearm, an element of the offense." The trial court noted defendant did not admit, nor was any sentence imposed for, an arming enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The court viewed section 1170.126 as "arguably unclear" but found "the clear intent of the voters was to prohibit resentencing for felonies committed when the defendant was armed with a handgun, regardless of whether an arming enhancement was admitted or a sentence imposed for that particular enhancement. . . . The Court finds that because [defendant] was armed with a firearm during the commission of his present offense, he is ineligible for resentencing."

DISCUSSION

This appeal presents questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1332.)

ISentence Imposed for Being Armed During Commission of Offense

Defendant argues that, because his three-strikes sentence was not "imposed" for being armed "in the commission" of the offense, he was not statutorily ineligible. He acknowledges his position is undermined by People v. (Mark Anthony) White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512 (White) but argues White was wrongly decided and in any event is distinguishable. However, arguments similar to those made by defendant have been repeatedly rejected by this and other courts while this appeal was pending.

Section 1170.126, subdivision (e), provides: "An inmate is eligible for resentencing if: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The inmate's current sentence was not imposed for any of the offenses appearing in clauses (i) to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or clauses (i) to (iii), inclusive, of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 1170.12." (Italics added.)

The referenced three-strikes sentencing statute, section 667, provides in subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii): "If a defendant has two or more prior serious and/or violent felony convictions as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c ) of Section 1192.7 that have been pled and proved, and the current offense is not a serious or violent felony as defined in subdivision (d), the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) [twice the term rather than three times the term] unless the prosecution pleads and proves any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (iii) During the commission of the current offense, the...