People v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 31 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73--16,73--16
• Citation: 318 N.E.2d 671,23 Ill.App.3d 461
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jewell GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 671

318 N.E.2d 671

23 Ill.App.3d 461

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jewell GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 73--16.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Oct. 31, 1974.

Thomas A. Dunn, Dunn, Stefanich, McGarry & Kennedy, Joliet, for defendant-appellant.

George S. Bellas, Asst. State's Atty., Will County, Joliet, for plaintiff-appellee.

DIXON, Justice.

The defendant Jewell Griffin was charged with the offense of armed robbery. After a bench trial he was found guilty and sentenced by the Circuit Court of Will County to not less that 5 years nor more than 15 years.

From this conviction defendant appeals contending: (1) that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence of flight, (2) that the court erred in the admission of evidence which tended to prove other crimes, (3) that there was error in receiving evidence of statements of accused, (4) that testimony of an 'eavesdropper' should not have been admitted and (5) the State's use of identification procedure violated due process.

During the course of defendant's trial the State introduced testimony which indicated that on Dec. 24, 1971, some time after the commission of the offense, the defendant was observed standing in the doorway of a store by Officer Breen then in plain-clothes. The officer testified that he recognized the defendant and when the defendant saw the officer signal to another plain-clothed officer, the defendant ran from the area. At this time there was a warrant outstanding for the arrest of the defendant. The officer further testified that he was a uniformed policeman for 40 months prior to Dec. 24 and that defendant had seen him while he had been in uniform and he assumed the defendant knew him to be a policeman. ¹ The only objection raised at the trial was that since the crime occurred on Nov. 12, the occurrence on Dec. 24 was too remote. The trial court properly overruled the objection since evidence of flight is generally admissible regardless of time. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 625b; People v. Wright, 30 Ill.2d 519, 198 N.E.2d 316.

It is defendant's position on appeal that to show flight from arrest there must be independent foundation evidence showing that he had knowledge that he was suspect and, apparently, conclusive proof that he knew the officer to be a policeman. The argument is founded on People v. Cox, 74 Ill.App.2d 342, 220 N.E.2d 7, where there was no evidence in the record that the defendant knew or should have known that he was a suspect. Cox was based on People v. Harris, 23 Ill.2d 270, 178 N.E.2d 291 and People v. Herbert, 361 Ill. 64, 196 N.E. 821.

Flight in criminal law is defined as the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention, or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The term signifies in legal parlance, not merely a leaving, but a leaving or concealment under a consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading arrest. Such consciousness and purpose is that which gives to the act of leaving its real incriminating character. Herbert supra 361 Ill. 73, 196 N.E. 821; 14 A I.L.P. Criminal Law, Sec. 720.

In Illinois evidence of an accused's flight has long been admissible as a circumstance from which an inference of guilty may be drawn. It is evidence of a consciousness of guilt and thus probative of guilt itself. Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual, 1972 Supp. Rule 55; People v. Smith, 127 Ill.App.2d 199, 262 N.E.2d 165; People v. Rossini, 25 Ill.2d 617, 185 N.E.2d 831.

Direct proof that accused had actual knowledge of his possible arrest is not necessary to render admissible evidence of flight, particularly where there is evidence in the case from which such fact may be inferred. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law, page 467. If the circumstances were such as to give the defendant 'reason to know' that Breen was an officer the trier of fact would be warranted in drawing the inference of actual knowledge. Further, when a crime has been committed on the person, as here, the other facts and circumstances in the case may be considered to draw an inference that defendant knew or should have known that he was accused or suspected of the crime.

We believe that the evidence of defendant's flight was properly allowed into evidence by the trial court.

During Officer Breen's testimony it was brought out that on Dec. 24 he had been assigned to a special shoplifting unit thus accounting for his presence in plain-clothes. Defendant contends that this is proof of other crimes by innuendo. We cannot agree that this either shows or tends to show that accused has committed another crime wholly independent of, and unconnected with, that for which he was on trial. The testimony was not evidence of other crimes and there is no merit to defendant's contention. Further, evidence of flight is admissible even though it tends to show other offenses against the criminal law.

After the defendant was eventually arrested he gave a statement. Officer Breen testified that prior to any questioning the defendant 'was advised of his constitutional rights of a person in custody and a standard form of our department was used, made, filled out, and signed by Mr. Griffin.' No objection as to the propriety of this foundation for the introduction of the statement was made and the statement was admitted without objection. Defendant now contends that it was error to admit the statement without a specific detailing of the commands of miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. It is true that a knowing and intelligent waiver of a defendant's rights cannot be assumed on a record which is silent. This record is not silent and further, the exact point was raised in People v. Hicks, 44 Ill.2d 550, 256 N.E.2d 823. There, as here, defense counsel neither requested a preliminary hearing, nor objected to the testimony. The court said, 'In light of these failures, defendant cannot complain on appeal.'

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce testimony as to a telephone communication made by defendant while he was in custody. At the trial defendant objected on the ground that he had a right of privacy while phoning friends. Officer Wagoner testified that while on duty as a jailer, the defendant asked to use the telephone and was allowed to do so. The jailer overheard the defendant tell the person on the other end of the line to tell defendant's lawyer that he was with the defendant on the night of the robbery. The telephone used was on the jailer's desk and he sat about 4 feet from the defendant while the conversation took place.

The facts of this situation do not indicate any expectation of privacy at any time on the part of defendant. The statements overheard were not elicited by interrogation by or on behalf of the police and are thus excluded from the application of the Miranda holding. People v. Brooks, 51 Ill.2d 156, 161, 281 N.E.2d 326. Once the defendant has been informed of his Miranda rights as here and indicates that he understands these...