People v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 13 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 1-90-2101,1-90-2101
• Citation: 247 Ill.App.3d 1,616 N.E.2d 1242,186 Ill.Dec. 610
• Parties: , 186 Ill.Dec. 610 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1242

616 N.E.2d 1242

247 Ill.App.3d 1, 186 Ill.Dec. 610

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-90-2101.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Second Division.

April 13, 1993.

Rehearing Denied June 7, 1993.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant. (Alan D. Goldberg, Asst. Appellate Defender, of Counsel).

Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee. (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Asst. State's Attys., Ann L. Benedek, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., of counsel).

Justice SCARIANO delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Marvin Griffin, Duane Calhoun (Calhoun), and Brian Jackson (Jackson) were charged with eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, two counts of criminal sexual assault, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping, for events occurring on June 13, 1988. The aggravated criminal sexual assault counts included two violations each of the following subsections of section 12-14 of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14): (1) that defendants committed a criminal sexual assault and caused great bodily harm to the victim (section 12-14(a)(2)); (2) that defendants, who were 17 years of age or older, committed a sexual penetration of a victim who was under the age of 13 (section 12-14(b)(1)); (3) that defendants committed a criminal sexual assault and threatened or endangered the life of the victim (section 12-14(a)(3)); and (4) that defendants committed a criminal sexual assault during the commission of another felony (section 12-14(a)(4)). Prior to trial the State nolle-prossed the four alleged violations of sections 12-14(a)(3) and (a)(4) as well as the aggravated kidnapping counts. The causes of the three codefendants were severed, and defendant was tried for two counts each of aggravated criminal sexual assault in violation of sections 12-14(a)(2) and (b)(1), as well as for two counts of criminal sexual assault.

The State presented the following evidence at defendant's trial. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on June 13, 1988, the complainant, M.G., a 12-year-old girl, testified that she went to Roy's Food and Liquor Store in Robbins, Illinois with her 12-year-old cousin R.H. in order to purchase a bottle of soda. After making the purchase, the girls began to walk toward their home about two blocks away when two young men called out to them. M.G. recognized that one of the boys was Calhoun, and R.H. saw that the other was Jackson; the girls knew the men from the Robbins Community Center. While the girls were talking with Calhoun and Jackson, they noticed defendant, whom neither of the girls knew, standing near a brown station wagon parked on the street.

After conversing for several minutes, the men asked the girls if they wanted a ride home, and when they refused and began to walk away, Calhoun and Jackson grabbed M.G.'s arms and threw her into the station wagon. M.G. was forced into the back seat with Calhoun, Jackson was in the front passenger seat, and defendant was driving. At the time, M.G. thought the men were "fooling around" and thus told them to "stop playing."

Defying M.G.'s plea that she be taken home, defendant drove the station wagon to the Woodlawn projects approximately four blocks away. Calhoun tried to remove M.G.'s shirt, and when she resisted, he took off her shoes. M.G. then escaped from the vehicle, and the three men chased after her in the car. As they neared M.G., Calhoun alighted and pulled her back into the vehicle. Defendant then drove away and parked the station wagon on a side street near the Midlothian Turnpike, where Calhoun tore off M.G.'s shorts and underwear and, while striking her on the head, forced her to have vaginal intercourse with him. M.G. continued to resist Calhoun's efforts, but he fought her off and continued to have intercourse with her.

When Calhoun finished sexually assaulting M.G., Jackson joined the two in the back seat and forced her to have intercourse with him as well. Although she again pleaded with the men to leave her alone, Calhoun told her to shut up and continued to pummel her on the head while Jackson was forcing her to have intercourse with him. Defendant remained in the front seat during the entire assault and, although she was screaming loudly, he did nothing to help her.

After Calhoun and Jackson finished sexually assaulting M.G., defendant drove the four toward her aunt's home and stopped on Spaulding Avenue, where they allowed M.G. to leave. She was barefoot and crying, had bruises on her face, and had a lump on her head. Before she left, however, Calhoun told her that if she told anyone about the incident, he would "throw [her] in the canal and that he [would] kill [her] before he go [sic] to jail, because he wasn't going to go jail for nothing [sic] like that."

Meanwhile, R.H. had notified the police that M.G. had been abducted by three men. At about 12:30 a.m., R.H. was talking to Robbins police officer Charles Harris when she noticed the car into which M.G. had been forced pass by. Officer Harris pursued the vehicle driven by defendant, and by the time he apprehended it, M.G. had already been released. Eventually, both M.G. and R.H. arrived at the scene and identified Calhoun, Jackson and defendant as the abductors. M.G. told Officer Harris that she had been sexually assaulted by the men, and he placed them under arrest.

After defendant was taken into custody and read his Miranda warnings, he gave a statement to Assistant State's Attorney Terry Takash which was later reduced to writing and read to the jury. In that statement, defendant admitted being in the presence of Calhoun and Jackson when M.G. was sexually assaulted. He stated, however that he drove the car only while Jackson was sexually assaulting her; but he did admit that he knew that Calhoun had hit the victim and that he had heard him threaten her life. According to his statement, however, Jackson was driving the car when M.G. was released.

After the State rested, defendant presented the character testimony of Constance Moody, who stated that defendant was a peaceful, law-abiding citizen. Finally, defendant took the stand and related substantially the same story that he gave Takash shortly after his arrest. He added, however, that: (1) he thought Calhoun and Jackson were just playing until Jackson began to sexually assault M.G.; in other words, he did not realize that Calhoun was sexually assaulting her; (2) he exited the car while Calhoun was assaulting her; and (3) after Calhoun and Jackson finished sexually assaulting M.G., he got in the back seat with her so they would not hurt her any more.

The jury returned a single general verdict finding defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault and of criminal sexual assault. The jury's aggravated criminal sexual assault verdict did not indicate upon which count it was based. After denying defendant's post-trial motion and hearing argument in mitigation and aggravation, the court merged the two aggravated criminal sexual assault counts based on section 12-14(b)(1) (age) and the two criminal sexual assault counts into the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts based on section 12-14(a)(2) (bodily harm), and sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of seven years in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.

I.

Defendant asserts that the evidence in this case was insufficient to convict him of aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual assault based on accomplice liability. In People v. Sutherland (1992), 155 Ill.2d 1, 182 Ill.Dec. 577, 610 N.E.2d 1, our supreme court had occasion to summarize the standard of review which we must apply to sufficiency of evidence claims. The court stated:

"When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry for the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The reviewing courts apply this standard regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. [Citations.] This standard of review does not allow the appellate court to 'substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses [citation].' [Citation.] Therefore, [a reviewing] court will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so 'unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt [citation].' [Citation.]" Sutherland, at 17, 182 Ill.Dec. 577, 610 N.E.2d 1.

A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when, either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid such other person in the planning or commission of the offense. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 5-2(c); People v. J.H. (1990), 136 Ill.2d 1, 17, 143 Ill.Dec. 889, 896, 554 N.E.2d 961, 968.) Our supreme court, in interpreting this section, has endorsed the "common design" principle of accountability, as set forth in People v. Perez (1985), 108 Ill.2d 70, 90 Ill.Dec. 932, 483 N.E.2d 250:

" 'Evidence that one voluntarily attaches himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design supports an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain a conviction as a principal for a crime committed by another in furtherance of the venture. [Citation.] Proof of a common purpose need not be supported by words of agreement but can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the commission of an act by a group, and the fact that the criminal acts were not committed pursuant to a preconceived plan is not a defense if the evidence indicates involvement on the part of the...