People v. Williams

Decision Date30 September 2016
Docket NumberNo. 1–13–3459.,1–13–3459.
Citation408 Ill.Dec. 1,64 N.E.3d 1086
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Halik WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Kieran M. Wiberg, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary P. Needham, and Margaret G. Lustig, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Halik Williams, the defendant, appeals from the circuit court's dismissal, upon the State's motion, of his petition and supplemental petition for relief pursuant to the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2004)). On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in dismissing the petitions because he made a substantial showing that he was denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. He also contends that the court erred because the petitions made a substantial showing of actual innocence based upon new evidence that establishes no one that defendant was accountable for caused the victim's death, and, therefore, the victim's death was not first degree murder. We affirm.

¶ 2 Following simultaneous, but severed, bench trials with codefendants Warren Hardy and David Sapp, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder based upon a theory of accountability. Defendant was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

¶ 3 The evidence at defendant's trial established that the victim, Anthony King, died from electrocution on the third rail of Chicago Transit Authority train tracks on September 5, 1999. The victim's death arose out of confrontation at the Morse Station platform between a group of Gangster Disciples consisting of defendant, codefendants and Jason Moody, and a group of current and former Vice Lords consisting of the victim, Jonathan Lejman, Dennis Myles, and Dwayne Johnson.

¶ 4 At trial, Jason Moody testified that he was walking when he heard a "woo, woo" so he looked up and saw codefendant Sapp on the "el" platform waving him up. As Moody continued walking, he saw Lawrence Brooks sitting in a parked car and codefendant Hardy on the street. Codefendant Hardy said that some "hooks" were on the platform. Moody explained that "hooks" was a disrespectful term for members of the Vice Lords gang. Moody was a member of the Gangster Disciples and the Morse "el" stop was part of the gang's territory.

¶ 5 Once on the platform, Moody saw the victim and codefendant Hardy fighting on the train tracks. Codefendant Hardy was punching the victim, and the victim was trying to push codefendant Hardy away. At one point, Moody "heard sparks." The victim was on the third rail and codefendant Hardy was on the platform. Moody then saw defendant hit the victim on the head with a cane five times. After the fifth blow, the cane broke.

¶ 6 Jonathan Lejman testified that he was a former member of the Vice Lords and grew up with the victim. On the night of the victim's death, Lehman, the victim, Myles, and Johnson were celebrating both the victim's release from prison and the victim's birthday. Although the group exited the train at the Morse stop, they "had no business over there" because it was Gangster Disciple territory, so they went back up to the platform. Lejman, Myles and the victim sat on a bench. Johnson went to the other entrance of the platform.

¶ 7 Defendant, who was holding a cane, and codefendant Sapp then approached. Defendant asked if Lejman was "White C." Lejman stood up and replied that "White C" was dead. He stated that his group was not "on any gang banging or none of that,"—that is, they were not looking for trouble. Codefendant Sapp replied, "We're hook killers." Lejman understood this to mean that codefendant Sapp's group belonged to the Vice Lords. As Lejman continued to say that his group was just trying to get home, he moved closer to defendant, who was "being fidgety" so that defendant would not be able to swing the cane at him. As Lejman moved closer, defendant said "Man, didn't I tell your bitch ass to back up off me?" Lejman backed up. Shortly thereafter, defendant swung the cane at Lejman. Lejman, the victim, and Myles all ran to the end of the platform. Lejman jumped on the tracks and kept running. He stopped when he did not hear anyone behind him. When Lejman turned around, he saw defendant swinging a cane at someone on the tracks. He ran back and discovered the victim on the tracks.

¶ 8 Dennis Myles testified that although he was in a gang, he was not "gang banging" that night. When defendant took a swing at Lejman with the cane, Lejman ran away. Myles and the victim followed. When Myles saw Lejman jump onto the tracks and defendant "fixing to go after him," Myles turned around. Although the victim initially turned around, the victim then jumped onto the tracks. Myles followed the victim onto the tracks and ran past him. Myles then heard "Oh, we got one!" and turned around to see the victim "on the floor." Defendant was on the tracks, and he hit the victim three times in the head with the cane. During cross- examination, Myles acknowledged that he had made a statement to police which indicated that the victim jumped off the platform. However, he testified that that the person who transcribed his statement "didn't hear [him] all the way right," and that the statement was incorrect.

¶ 9 Detective Steve Schorsch testified that he and another detective spoke with defendant on September 7, 1999, in an interview room at Area 3. He was also present when defendant later spoke to an assistant State's Attorney. Defendant declined to make a written or videotaped statement; rather, defendant agreed to say what had happened. Schorsch took notes as defendant spoke. Defendant later reviewed these notes and agreed that they were accurate.

¶ 10 Defendant stated that he was driving with codefendant Sapp and Sapp's cousin, Lawrence Brooks, when he looked up and saw "White C." He told Brooks to pull over. Defendant and codefendant Sapp got out of the car. Defendant was holding a cane. Once up on the platform, codefendant Sapp stated, "They were Vice Lord killers, hook killers." Codefendant Hardy and Moody were also on the platform. Defendant asked one of the men if he was "White C." At one point "White C." and the two men with him began to run. Defendant chased "White C." The other two men ran toward codefendant Hardy. As defendant turned, he saw codefendant Hardy grab one of the men. He watched as codefendant Hardy and the man fell onto the train tracks. Codefendant Hardy pushed the other man onto the tracks and that man was "electrified."

¶ 11 Assistant Chief Medical Examiner Mitra Kalelkar testified that she performed an autopsy on the victim. She noted electrical burns on the victim's abdomen, hands, and left wrist. There were also lacerations and cuts on the victim's head and face. After an internal and external examination, she concluded that the victim died as the result of electrocution.

¶ 12 In finding defendant and codefendants guilty of first degree murder, the trial court relied on the common design rule as stated in People v. Terry, 99 Ill.2d 508, 514–15, 77 Ill.Dec. 442, 460 N.E.2d 746 (1984). In denying defendant's motion for a new trial which argued, in pertinent part, that the victim's fall to the tracks was an accident after the completion of the underlying felony of assault or battery, the trial court stated that when two or more persons join together to commit an offense, even "a minor offense which involves violence," the parties are responsible for "everything" that occurs as a result of the agreement. The court stated that the circumstances of the case "all lead to the conclusion that these parties entered into an agreement to at least commit an assault or misdemeanor battery on the victim in this case, which resulted in his death." The court "agreed" that "perhaps" defendant and codefendants did not set out to commit a murder, "but they are responsible for all of the consequences of that which they did set out to do." The court then sentenced defendant to 30 years in prison.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of first degree murder pursuant to an accountability theory. Defendant argued, inter alia, that he did not have the intent or knowledge required to support a murder conviction.

¶ 14 In rejecting defendant's argument this court found that the evidence "clearly established" that defendant was not only present during the crime, but that he "actively devised and initiated the encounter" with the victim. See People v. Williams, No 1–03–0292 (2005), slip order at 9–10, 354 Ill.App.3d 1164, 318 Ill.Dec. 557, 883 N.E.2d 1151 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 ). This court noted that defendant was the first to notice the Vice Lords on the platform, he directed Brooks to park, he confronted the Vice Lords on the platform, and he struck the victim five times on the head with a cane after the victim was electrocuted. Id. We therefore concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that there was a common design to establish defendant's intent, and properly held defendant accountable for the victim's death. Id. at 9.

¶ 15 In 2005, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief alleging, inter alia, that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel by counsel's failure to impeach Jason Moody with an affidavit in which Moody averred that he struck the victim on the head with a cane and to argue at trial that defendant was actually innocent because it was Moody, rather than defendant, who struck the victim on the head with a cane. Attached to the petition in support was defendant's unnotarized affidavit.

¶ 16 In his affidavit, defendant averred that...

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