People v. Griffith

• Decision Date: 20 November 1973
• Citation: 43 A.D.2d 20,349 N.Y.S.2d 94
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Matthew GRIFFITH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 94

349 N.Y.S.2d 94

43 A.D.2d 20

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Matthew GRIFFITH, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Nov. 20, 1973.

Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, of counsel (William E. Hellerstein, Robert Kasanof, New York City), for appellant.

Jeffrey Philip Sinensky, of counsel (Albert A. Capellini, New York City, with him on the brief; Mario Marola, Dist. Atty.), for respondent.

Before STEVENS, P.J., and MARKEWICH, NUNEZ, MURPHY and TILZER, JJ.

MURPHY, Justice.

Defendant was indicted for serious crimes, including robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree. After discussion among the Court, defense counsel and the assistant district attorney, defendant offered to plead guilty to the crime of robbery in the third degree, a Class D felony, to satisfy all counts in the indictment. After the assistant district attorney recommended acceptance of the plea and after ascertaining that it was being voluntarily made, the Court said:

'* * * there was a conference between your attorney, the Assistant District Attorney, and the Court with regard to what possible sentence may be meted out here, and that it was with the consent of the Court they thought that a reasonable sentence under the circumstances in this case will be three years. Now, the Court is prepared to sentence you to three years on the adjourned date after I receive the Probation report.'

Defendant then confessed to his involvement, the guilty plea was taken and a date fixed for sentence.

Later that day the case was recalled at the request of the assistant district attorney who had participated in the 'plea bargain'. The court was then informed that, unknown to this particular prosecutor, another member of the prosecutor's staff had previously rejected a three-year-maximum-sentence offer and had offered four years. In view of the foregoing, the prior three-year sentence recommendation was withdrawn. The court, however, after noting some of the serious consequences which might result if such withdrawal was permitted, denied the application, stating:

'* * * in the absence of any application from the defendant to withdraw his plea--I will allow the guilty plea to stand. I will sentence him on the adjourned date. And I will keep my promise for three years.'

Shortly thereafter the case was again recalled, this time at the request of the then District Attorney of Bronx County. He disclosed his awareness of the agreed-upon disposition of the case, but nevertheless requested the court to impose the maximum permissible sentence under the plea (7 years), thereby, Inter alia, overruling the previous recommendations of two of his assistants. In view of the prior proceedings, however, he agreed to voice no objection to a plea withdrawal application. Defendant refused to withdraw his plea. After some further discussion the court, recognizing that '(n)ew legal history (was being) written', vacated the guilty plea on its own motion and set the case down for trial. Some two weeks later, on November 22, 1971, the case was recalled to 'clear the record'. The court explained to defendant the reasons why it could not carry out its promise and, instead, offered to sentence defendant, if he would again plead guilty (since the previous plea had been vacated), on the basis of the probation report. Defendant then 'moved' to 'withdraw' his guilty plea and a date for trial was set. We previously denied and dismissed defendant's Article 78 proceeding to restrain prosecution of the trial (before another judge and a jury), which resulted in defendant's conviction on all four counts of the indictment and his sentence to State Prison for concurrent indeterminate terms not to exceed ten years. On this appeal, defendant asserts that he was entitled to specific performance of his 'plea bargain' and that his after-trial conviction was invalid since he had already been placed in jeopardy by the entry of his guilty plea to the same offense. Since we agree with appellant's first contention, we find it unnecessary to reach the second.

We are, of course, cognizant of the current criticism of 'plea bargaining', the call by segments of the public, the press and certain public officials for its abolition and of recent legislation curtailing it with respect to certain offenses. (Laws of 1973, ch. 276.) However, as Presiding Justice Stevens perceptively noted recently:

'The term 'plea bargaining' suffers either from an oversimplification, a lack of comprehension of its proper place in the system of criminal justice, or a tendency to ascribe to it any weaknesses or ills which presently exist in the system. If pleas were not allowed a trial of every felony indictment returned in a single year would result in a total breakdown of the Courts' operations.' (See 'Little Concern or Support Seen for Needs of Courts', N.Y.L.J., 5/1/73, pp. 25, 29, col. 1.)

In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260--261, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the significant role dispositions by agreement play in the administration of justice:

'Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.

'Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. * * *

'However, all of these considerations presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor.'

In addition to the reasons above set forth, a plea bargain often represents an honest evaluation by the prosecutor and defense counsel of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. In many instances grand juries 'over-indict' defendants and charge them with crimes which prosecutors cannot prove. The court must rely on the fact that the 'offer' of the District Attorney reflects his best estimate of the credibility of witnesses and proof available. 'Acceptance' of the plea reflects the estimate that the defendant and his counsel share in the prospect of acquittal at trial. Accordingly, what often appears to be a 'break' for an accused is nothing more than the mere acceptance of the true factual situation and a plea to the crime the accused actually committed; or the one the prosecutor believes he can, by the requisite evidence, prove his committed. The court should refuse a plea only if the agreement reached would 'tie the hands of the court' in that the scope of sentence provided is inadequate for the crime and the defendant involved.

All three prosecutors involved here agreed to permit defendant to plead guilty to robbery in the third degree, a Class D felony, to cover an indictment charging more serious crimes; the only disagreement arose after the plea in connection with the sentence recommended by the first prosecutor and accepted by the defendant and the Court. In passing, it is interesting to note that the District Attorney agrees that in an analogous situation but where a second defense counsel or the defendant himself decided the sentence to be too harsh, the People would insist on the sentence agreed upon. This Court is testament to the many 'meritless' appeals on this point. Equal justice requires application of the law equally to the People and to the defendant.

Prefatorily, we place no significance on what occurred on November 22, 1971, when defendant 'withdrew' his guilty plea, since that plea had already been unilaterally vacated by the court on November 8, 1971. Nor, on the record before us, can defendant be deemed to have ever abandoned his principal claim pressed on this appeal. The disposition of this appeal, then, must turn on the events of November 8, 1971, when the bargain was struck and then repudiated by the District Attorney and the court.

Appellant, of course, had no absolute right to have his plea of guilt accepted. (Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8...