People v. Guerrero

• Decision Date: 20 April 1976
• Docket Number: Cr. 18942
• Citation: 129 Cal.Rptr. 166,548 P.2d 366,16 Cal.3d 719
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 548 P.2d 366 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard Charles GUERRERO, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 166

129 Cal.Rptr. 166

16 Cal.3d 719, 548 P.2d 366

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard Charles GUERRERO, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 18942.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

April 20, 1976.

David L. Armen, Woodlands Hills, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward T. Fogel, Jr., and Nancy A. Saggese, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant Richard Charles Guerrero, appealing from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder, attacks the admission of testimony concerning his commission of an uncharged rape occurring on an earlier occasion and involving a different victim.

Defendant was accused of murdering Roberta Santana, a 17-year-old girl. The trial court, after a lengthy hearing on the issue, decided that the testimony of Irene Lopez, who claimed that defendant had raped her six weeks before the alleged murder, could be introduced on the issues of identity and intent.

Miss Lopez, whose testimony before the jury was substantially the same as that presented at the court hearing, stated that one summer night she, two girl friends, defendant and two other males left a party together and went riding in defendant's automobile. There followed a haphazard sequence of 'cruising' up and down the same street, stopping at liquor stores and a hamburger stand, dropping off some passengers, picking up others. Miss Lopez, the only female remaining in the car, repeatedly asked to be taken home. Instead, defendant drove to a secluded area where he and two friends forced Miss Lopez to commit acts of oral copulation and to submit to sexual intercourse. One of defendant's friends warned Miss Lopez not to report the rapes or 'we will tell everyone what we did.' A few minutes later defendant, while driving, picked up a lug wrench with his right hand, turned to Miss Lopez, and smiled. She interpreted this gesture to be a threat.

Six weeks later, Miss Santana--the present victim--was walking to a party with a girl friend when defendant and another male offered them a ride. Finding no such party, the four 'cruised,' bought some liquor, and stopped in a parking lot. Defendant then dropped off his friend and the victim's girl friend, telling them he would take Miss Santana home and return in an hour. A few hours later, Miss Santana's body was found by a passerby. She was fully clothed; while her blouse was above her brassiere, that garment was in place. There was no evidence of sexual molestation; an investigation revealed no trace of sperm or vaginal trauma.

Much of the trial was focused on the conflicting testimony of two pathologists. The defense expert testified that the victim could have died as a result of jumping or falling from the car; the pathologist called by the People declared that only blows to the head by a blunt instrument could have caused Miss Santana's death. These blows could have been inflicted by a lug wrench, he testified. Despite a thorough search of defendant's car, no wrench was found.

In ruling that testimony concerning the Lopez rape could be admitted, the court pointed to a number of asserted similarities between the rape and the charged murder: (1) each offense involved the use of a maroon Pontiac Le Mans automobile, with defendant driving; (2) the victims were approximately the same age (i.e., 17); (3) on both occasions defendant initially had other males with him in the car; (4) in each offense defendant drove around the city, stopping at the same parking lot; (5) in each case the parties made stops to buy beer and wine and each time defendant drove while drinking Budweiser beer; (6) each offense involved 'sexually oriented activity'; (7) both times 'the defendant took or attempted to take the girl home alone'; ¹ and (8) on both occasions 'the court can infer from the evidence that the defendant used a wrench.'

We must determine whether the court committed prejudicial error in admitting testimony concerning the rape of Miss Lopez and testimony about defendant's threat with a lug wrench.

There is little controversy over the applicable principles of law. It is well established that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the accused had the propensity or disposition to commit the crime charged. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (a); People v. Kelley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, 238, 57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947.) The reason for this rule is not that such evidence is never relevant; to the contrary, the evidence is excluded because it has too much probative value. 'The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal . . . is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge.' (1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) p. 646, quoted in People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 773, fn. 6, 80 Cal.Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841.)

It is equally well settled that evidence may be admitted, even though it embraces evidence of the commission of another crime, if it logically tends to prove a material element in the People's case. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v. Kelley, supra, 66 Cal.2d 232, 239, 57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947.) However, 'It has frequently been recognized . . . that because of the sound reasons behind the general rule of exclusion, the relevancy of evidence of other crimes, and therefore its admissibility, must be examined with care. (Citation.) The evidence should be received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. (Citations.)' (Id. at p. 239, 57 Cal.Rptr. at p. 370, 424 P.2d at p. 954.)

Thus, admission of other crimes evidence cannot be justified merely by asserting an admissible purpose. Such evidence may only be admitted if it '(a) 'tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference' to prove the issue upon which it is offered; (b) is offered upon an issue which will ultimately prove to be material to the People's case; and (c) is not merely cumulative with respect to other evidence which the People may use to prove the same issue.' (People v. Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d 761, 775, 80 Cal.Rptr. 19, 457 P.2d 841, 849.)

Applying these principles, we conclude first that the testimony concerning the rape cannot be admitted on the issue of identity. Defendant's presence at the scene of the crime was well established by other evidence. He was the last person seen with the victim; they were witnessed driving together just a few hours before her body was found. The grandmother of defendant's child told an investigator that defendant 'said he was innocent and that the girl jumped from the car,' further evidence of defendant's presence. When defendant visited his girl friend on the day of the crime, he parked his car behind her apartment house, rather than on the street where he usually left it. Near Miss Santana's body investigators found a wine bottle bearing the same brand as one defendant bought earlier. Blood was found on some of defendant's clothes. When police arrested defendant on the day of the alleged murder, he said, 'I didn't kill her,' a statement suggesting he knew of Miss Santana's death. All this evidence, in addition to the lack of an alibi defense, points to the fact that defendant was with Miss Santana at or near the time she died.

On the issue of identity the evidence of the Lopez crime is not only cumulative, it is also irrelevant. Few of the asserted similarities between the Lopez and Santana offenses aid in placing defendant at the scene of the alleged murder. For example, the evidence in the present case established that defendant, having spent an evening 'cruising' and drinking Budweiser, was seen driving with the victim in his maroon Pontiac a few hours before her body was found. The fact that defendant also drank beer and cruised around the city six weeks earlier prior to committing a rape adds nothing on the issue of identity. If the victim had been attacked in a distinctive manner that was identical to a previous crime defendant had committed, then the evidence of the other crime might have probative value. But the only claimed connection that has any logical relevance is evidence of 'sexual activity' in both cases and the possible use of a wrench. Even if both facts were established--which, as will be discussed, is highly dubious--it could not reasonably be claimed that the two offenses were committed in a particularly distinct manner that tends to inculpate defendant. (People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 248, 70 Cal.Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91.) The testimony concerning the Lopez rape and the threat with a wrench, therefore, is inadmissible on the issue of identity.

The next question is whether the testimony is admissible to show defendant's intent. In this regard, the People maintain that evidence of the Lopez offense shows that defendant killed Miss Santana in the course of an attempted rape. ²

The People rely on a portion of People v. Kelley, supra, 66 Cal.2d 232, 242--243, 57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947, in which we declared that other-crimes evidence may be introduced to show intent where the proof of such intent is ambiguous. They argue that the facts of the Santana offense are ambiguous, and thus evidence of the Lopez rape is admissible to show that defendant 'had the intent and motive to achieve sexual gratification from (Miss Santana).' They also contend that the Lopez offense may be used to prove defendant's premeditated intent to kill Miss Santana.

The major flaw in the People's rationale is that it misinterprets Kelley to mean that evidence of other crimes may be introduced to show the otherwise ambiguous intent behind an act even when there is...