People v. Guevara
| Decision Date | 06 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 97299.,No. 97070.,97070.,97299. |
| Citation | 216 Ill.2d 533,837 N.E.2d 901 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Ernesto GUEVARA, Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Frank J. Waltrip, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Joseph E. Birkett, State's Attorney, Wheaton (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin and Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Mark G. Levine, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee.
These consolidated appeals present another question about the "15/20/25-to-life" sentencing provisions of Public Act 91-404 : namely, whether the 15-year sentence enhancement that accompanies the offense of home invasion with a firearm (see 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3), (c) (West 2000)) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11). We conclude that it does not. We reverse the trial court in No. 97070 and remand the cause for further proceedings; we affirm the appellate court in No. 97299.
Before January 1, 2000, section 12-11(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 split home invasion into two categories:
"A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present and
(1) While armed with a dangerous weapon uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or
(2) Intentionally causes any injury to any person or persons within such dwelling place." 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a) (West 1998).
Home invasion under both section 12-11(a)(1) and section 12-11(a)(2) was a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 1998)), which carried a sentence of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2002)).
Effective January 1, 2000, Public Act 91-404 amended various felony offenses, including home invasion, to add sentence enhancements for firearm use. The amended version of section 12-11 retained the original two categories of home invasion, but it also added three new categories related to firearm use:
"A person who is not a peace officer acting in the line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present and
* * *
(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or
(4) Uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury occurs and during the commission of the offense personally discharges a firearm, or
(5) Personally discharges a firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person within such dwelling place[.]" 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) through (a)(5) (West 2000).
Home invasion is still a Class X felony, but these new categories of home invasion carry greater sentencing ranges:
720 ILCS 5/12-11(c) (West 2000).
The defendants here were both charged with violating section 12-11(a)(3), home invasion while armed with a firearm. We turn to the specifics of their cases.
No. 97070 — Ernesto Guevara
On June 18, 2002, Guevara was charged by information with two counts of armed robbery for taking a wallet and currency from Ofir Manter and Juan Ojeda while carrying a handgun and threatening the imminent use of force. See 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 2000). On June 27, 2002, he was charged by indictment on four counts: the two original armed robbery counts and two additional home invasion counts. Count III specified that Guevara violated section 12-11(a)(3) when he "knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling of Juan Ojeda, and while armed with a firearm, * * * threatened the imminent use of force upon" him. Count IV contained an additional charge of home invasion that is not at issue in this appeal.
Guevara filed a motion to dismiss the entire indictment on various grounds. He argued, inter alia, that the sentencing range for home invasion with a firearm was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentencing range for the similar offense of armed violence. The State responded that the 15-year sentence enhancement that tracks section 12-11(a)(3) survived a proportionate penalties clause challenge in People v. Hill, 199 Ill.2d 440, 264 Ill.Dec. 670, 771 N.E.2d 374 (2002). The circuit court of Du Page County stated that Hill "pretty much is dispositive" of the proportionate penalties clause issue, but continued the case, so the parties could file supplemental briefs.
Guevara filed an amended motion to dismiss only the home invasion counts. He relied upon People v. Moss, 206 Ill.2d 503, 276 Ill.Dec. 855, 795 N.E.2d 208 (2003), where this court purportedly "found that the less serious conduct proscribed in Public Act 91-404 offenses involving possession of a firearm and personal discharge of a firearm is punished more harshly than is the more serious conduct targeted by the statutes for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm." Defendant further argued that subsection (a)(3) of the home invasion statute contains an impermissible double enhancement because the presence of a firearm is used both to create the offense and to punish the offense more severely. The trial court found Moss dispositive on the proportionate penalties clause issue, declared section 12-11(a)(3) unconstitutional, and dismissed count III of the indictment.1 In explaining its reasons for dismissing count III, the trial court also stated that it agreed with defendant that subsection (a)(3) contained an impermissible double enhancement. The trial court believed that the presence of a firearm was used once to create the offense of home invasion with a firearm and a second time to enhance the offense with an additional 15-year sentencing enhancement. The State brought an interlocutory appeal directly to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 603.
No. 97299—Frank Waltrip
On September 5, 2002, Waltrip was charged by information with home invasion and residential burglary. On September 30, 2002, he was charged by indictment with three counts: the original home invasion and residential burglary counts, and an additional unlawful use of weapons count. Count II specified that Waltrip violated section 12-11(a)(3) when he "knowingly and without authority [ ] entered the dwelling place of Carl Lentz * * * and while armed with a firearm threatened the imminent use of force against" him.
Waltrip entered a guilty plea on the home invasion count in exchange for the State's dismissing the other two counts. Waltrip agreed to a sentencing cap of 40 years, and he received a 40-year sentence: a 25-year term with a mandatory 15-year add-on. The sentence was to run consecutively to "any sentence imposed in cause No. 02-CF-1053 pending in Morgan County." Waltrip filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that (1) his sentence was excessive when compared to the 35-year term received by his codefendant, Paul Clark; (2) the consecutive sentence was imposed in violation of section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 2000)) because he had not been sentenced in Morgan County at the time of his sentencing; and (3) his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because it did not reflect his rehabilitative potential. Waltrip did not argue that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause when compared to the sentence for another offense. The circuit court of Adams County denied Waltrip's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but reduced his sentence to 35 years and vacated the consecutive-sentence provision of its order. Waltrip appealed.
On appeal, Waltrip argued that the sentence for home invasion with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11). Defendant contended that aggravated battery with a firearm was a more serious offense that was punished as a mere Class X felony, while home invasion while armed with a firearm was punished as a Class X felony with a 15-year add-on. The appellate court affirmed Waltrip's conviction and sentence. No. 4-03-0164 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court noted that, in determining the legislative purpose of Public Act 91-404 in the course of other proportionate penalties clause challenges, this court "has declined to determine the purpose of the offense from the underlying offense itself, * * * but has focused on the purpose in enacting...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. McCarty
...Constitution. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Guevara, 216 Ill.2d 533, 541, 297 Ill.Dec. 450, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005). In general, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and a party challenging a statute has the b......
-
People v. Hauschild
...cross-comparison analysis. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 516-21, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492; see also People v. Guevara, 216 Ill.2d 533, 543-45, 297 Ill.Dec. 450, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005). The Sharpe court characterized cross-comparison analysis as "problematic" and "unworkable" (Sharpe, 216 Ill......
-
People v. Lee
...denied, 219 Ill.2d 580, 303 Ill.Dec. 837, 852 N.E.2d 244 (2006), and upon our supreme court's holding in People v. Guevara, 216 Ill.2d 533, 297 Ill.Dec. 450, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005). Defendant filed a petition for rehearing and this court ordered the State to file an answer and allowed defend......
-
People v. Jackson
...As a general matter, this court will not interpret a statute as permitting double enhancements. People v. Guevara , 216 Ill. 2d 533, 545, 297 Ill.Dec. 450, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005). The only time that prohibition may be lifted is if "the legislature clearly intends for there to be a double enh......