People v. Hauschild

• Decision Date: 08 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2-03-0857.,2-03-0857.
• Citation: 845 N.E.2d 74,300 Ill.Dec. 653
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph A. HAUSCHILD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

845 N.E.2d 74

300 Ill.Dec. 653

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph A. HAUSCHILD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-03-0857.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

March 8, 2006.

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Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Paul Alexander Rogers (Court-appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Joseph A. Hauschild.

John A. Barsanti, Kane County State's Attorney, St. Charles, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Patrick D. Daly, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, for the People.

Presiding Justice GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Joseph A. Hauschild, was found guilty of attempted first-degree murder, home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated battery with a firearm, and criminal damage to property. The trial court merged the aggravated-battery-with-a-firearm conviction into the attempted-first-degree-murder conviction. The court then sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of 35 years' imprisonment for home invasion, 18 years' imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder, and 12 years' imprisonment for armed robbery. In addition, the court imposed a concurrent term of two years' imprisonment for criminal damage to property. Defendant appealed, challenging his convictions of home invasion, armed robbery, and criminal damage to property. Defendant also asked us to reduce his sentences, which he characterized as excessive.

On October 5, 2005, this court filed its opinion. People v. Hauschild, No. 2-03-0857 (October 5, 2005). We affirmed defendant's conviction of criminal damage to property. However, invoking the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11), we reversed defendant's convictions of armed robbery and home invasion and vacated the sentences imposed for those offenses. At the time we decided defendant's appeal, Illinois courts evaluated proportionate-penalties challenges in three distinct ways. See People v. Moss, 206 Ill.2d 503, 522, 276 Ill.Dec. 855, 795 N.E.2d 208 (2003), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 516-23, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005); People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 394, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), overruled by Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 516-23, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492. First, a penalty would violate the proportionate-penalties clause if it was cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. Second, a penalty would violate the proportionate-penalties clause where similar offenses were compared and conduct that created a less serious threat to the public health and safety was punished more severely. Finally, a penalty would violate the proportionate-penalties clause where offenses with identical elements were given different sentences. Using the second method, which is commonly referred to as cross-comparison analysis, we determined that the penalties imposed for the home-invasion and armed-robbery offenses with which defendant was charged violated the proportionate-penalties clause. Hauschild, slip op. at 9-10, 21-22. We further determined that the penalties were not severable from the substantive offenses. Hauschild, slip op. at 10-15, 24. Thus, we reversed defendant's convictions of those two offenses and vacated the sentences imposed thereon. Hauschild, slip op. at 16, 24. However, at defendant's request, we supplanted his conviction of armed robbery with a conviction of simple robbery and remanded the cause for resentencing. Hauschild, slip op. at 16. In light of our decision to remand the cause for resentencing, we did not address defendant's additional claim that his sentence was excessive. Hauschild, slip op. at 27.

On October 6, 2005, our supreme court decided Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492. In Sharpe, the supreme court abandoned cross-comparison analysis. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 516-21, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492; see also People v. Guevara, 216 Ill.2d 533, 543-45, 297 Ill.Dec. 450, 837 N.E.2d 901 (2005). The Sharpe court characterized cross-comparison analysis as "problematic" and "unworkable" (Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 519, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492) and concluded that a defendant may no longer challenge a penalty under the proportionate-penalties clause by comparing it to the penalty for an offense with different elements (Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 521, 298 Ill. Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492). The court, however, left intact the other two types of proportionate-penalties analysis. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d at 521-22, 298 Ill.Dec. 169, 839 N.E.2d 492.

In light of Sharpe, the State filed a petition for rehearing. Defendant filed an answer to the petition, and the State then filed a reply. We now grant the State's petition for rehearing, withdraw our October 5, 2005, opinion, and issue this opinion in its stead. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's convictions, vacate his sentences for armed robbery and attempted first-degree murder, and remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing on those two convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

During the early morning hours of August 14, 2001, two intruders, both of whom were carrying firearms, broke into the Wright residence in unincorporated St. Charles. The intruders entered the master bedroom of the home, where Thomas Wright and his wife Wendy were awoken. Mr. Wright initially complied with the intruders' demands. However, a struggle later ensued between Mr. Wright and one of the intruders. During the struggle, several rounds of ammunition were fired. The intruders eventually fled the scene carrying a lockbox. Mr. Wright sustained multiple gunshot wounds, requiring several surgeries as well as an extended period of hospitalization and rehabilitation. The Wrights' dog was also struck by a bullet.

Defendant and Ethan Warden were implicated in the crime. On September 14, 2001, a Kane County grand jury returned a six-count indictment against defendant. Count I of the indictment charged defendant with attempted first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)). Count II charged defendant with armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2000)). Counts III and IV charged defendant with home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3), (a)(5) (West 2000)). Count V charged defendant with aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2000)). Count VI charged defendant with criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(d) (West 2000)). Warden was charged with identical offenses. However, he entered into a plea agreement with the State. The terms of the plea agreement provided that the State would amend the armed-robbery charge and one of the home-invasion counts. Warden would then plead guilty to those two charges and serve consecutive sentences of six years' imprisonment for each conviction. The agreement further provided that, "upon full and successful completion by [Warden] of all conditions," including Warden's testimony against defendant, the State would nol-pros the remaining charges.

Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the attempted-first-degree-murder, armed-robbery, and home-invasion charges. Defendant argued that the sentencing provisions for these offenses (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(B) through (c)(1)(D), 18-2(b), 12-11(c) (West 2000)), which provide for a 15-year, 20-year, or 25-year-to-life sentencing enhancement based on the extent to which a firearm was involved in the commission of the offense, violate the due process, equal protection, proportionate-penalties, and separation-of-powers clauses of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11, art. II, § 1). The trial court denied defendant's motions with respect to the attempted-first-degree-murder and home-invasion charges, but granted defendant's motion with respect to the armed-robbery charge. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's ruling with respect to the attempted-first-degree-murder charge in light of the supreme court's decision in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 492, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003) (finding that the sentencing ranges created by the attempted-first-degree-murder statute violate the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution).¹ The trial court denied the motion to reconsider, but agreed that, pursuant to Morgan, defendant should not be subject to an enhanced sentence if convicted of attempted first-degree murder. The State then moved to amend the attempted-first-degree-murder charge in light of Morgan. The trial court granted the motion. In addition, as discussed in more detail below, the trial court granted the State's motions to amend the armed-robbery charge.

At defendant's trial, Warden testified that defendant recruited him to participate in the offenses with which he was charged, that defendant supplied the weapons used, and that defendant was the individual who requested the lockbox and who struggled with Mr. Wright. Defendant gave a statement to police in which he admitted supplying the weapons, but claimed that it was Warden who requested the lockbox from and struggled with Mr. Wright. The jury was given an accountability instruction. Ultimately, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all charges except for one count of home invasion. The trial court merged the aggravated-battery-with-a-firearm conviction into the attempted-first-degree-murder conviction. Defendant filed various posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years' imprisonment for the home-invasion conviction. The court added 20 years to the sentence for the home-invasion conviction because the jury determined that defendant "personally discharged a firearm during...