People v. Guin

• Decision Date: 20 October 1997
• Citation: 663 N.Y.S.2d 621,243 A.D.2d 649
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant, v. Augustus GUIN, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 621

663 N.Y.S.2d 621

243 A.D.2d 649

The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant, v. Augustus GUIN, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Oct. 20, 1997.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (John M. Castellano, Jeanette Lifschitz, and Johnnette Traill, of counsel), for appellant.

John F. Clennan, Ronkonkoma, for respondent.

Before THOMPSON, J.P., and SULLIVAN, JOY and FLORIO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rutledge, J.), dated November 20, 1996, which granted the defendant's oral application to reinspect the Grand Jury minutes underlying Queens County Indictment No. 1372/95 and reduced the count of grand larceny in the fourth degree charged therein to petit larceny.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, the oral application is denied, the count of grand larceny in the fourth degree is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The defendant was indicted for grand larceny in the fourth degree, jostling, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree after he allegedly stole a subway token and some cash from a passenger on a subway train. In response to the defendant's omnibus motion, the Supreme Court, Queens County (Braun, J.), inter alia, inspected the Grand Jury minutes and found that the charges were supported by legally sufficient evidence. The matter subsequently came before Justice Richard B. Rutledge of the same court, at which time the defendant made an oral application to have Justice Rutledge reinspect the Grand Jury minutes to determine whether the count of grand larceny in the fourth degree was supported by legally sufficient evidence. Justice Rutledge granted the application, reviewed the minutes, reduced the count to petit larceny, and immediately accepted the defendant's plea of guilty to that count in full satisfaction of the indictment, all over the objections of the People. We now reverse.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, this appeal is not procedurally barred, since he has not yet been sentenced in this matter (see generally, People v. Moquin, 77 N.Y.2d 449, 568 N.Y.S.2d 710, 570 N.E.2d 1059; Matter of Kisloff v. Covington, 73 N.Y.2d 445, 541 N.Y.S.2d 737, 539 N.E.2d 565; Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, 60 N.Y.2d 165, 468 N.Y.S.2d 865, 456 N.E.2d 806; People v. Bartley, 47 N.Y.2d 965, 419 N.Y.S.2d 956, 393 N.E.2d 1029), and further proceedings have been stayed during the pendency of this appeal (see, CPL 210.20[1-a], [6][c]; CPL 460.40[2] ).

Turning to the merits, the People correctly contend that Justice Rutledge erred in granting the application to have the Grand Jury minutes reinspected. There is no statutory authority for reinspection, and Justice Rutledge violated the doctrine of the law of the case by reviewing a matter which already had been the subject of a binding determination by a Judge of coordinate jurisdiction (see, Martin v. City of Cohoes, 37 N.Y.2d 162, 371 N.Y.S.2d 687, 332 N.E.2d 867; People v. Johnson, 131 A.D.2d 696, 517 N.Y.S.2d 31). While adherence to the law of the case doctrine is not mandated in all cases, only extraordinary circumstances will justify a departure from it (see, People v. Williams, 188 A.D.2d 573, 591 N.Y.S.2d 467; People v. Finley, 104 A.D.2d 450, 479 N.Y.S.2d 63). Since the defendant did not make such a showing and the record otherwise fails to support a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the departure of Justice Rutledge from the law of the case doctrine was unwarranted (see, e.g., People v. Finley, supra).

Furthermore, while Justice...